1972 JTR(Mad) 485
1974 AIR(Mad) 144 ; 1974 KHC 1737
Madras High Court
KAILASAM
Saraswathi Sriraman - Appellant
Versus
Pappi Chetty Raghaviah Chettis Charities - Respondent
Decided On : 09/04/1972
The definition of 'tenant' in Section 2(8) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 1970 includes a surviving spouse, son, or daughter who had been living with the tenant at the time of their death, but not a son or daughter who was separate and not living with the tenant at the time of their death.
Act Referred :TAMIL NADU BUILDINGS LEASE AND RENT CONTROL ACT : S.2(8), S.10(3)(a)(i), S.10(3)(c), S.10(3)(a)(iii)
MADRAS BUILDINGS (LEASE AND RENT CONTROL) ACT 1970 - SECTION 10(2)(C) - ADDITIONAL ACCOMMODATION - INTERPRETATION OF THE DEFINITION OF TENANT - APPLICABILITY OF RESTRICTIONS UNDER SECTION 10(3)(A) TO SECTION 10(3)(C) - BALANCE OF CONVENIENCE.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioners, tenants of a building, challenged the order of the appellate court allowing the respondent, a charity, to obtain additional accommodation under Section 10(2)(c) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 1970. The petitioners argued that the son of the original tenant, who was in essential service, could not be evicted, and that the respondent could not obtain additional accommodation for non-residential purposes while the petitioners were using the upstairs for residential purposes.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the definition of 'tenant' in Section 2(8) of the Act includes a surviving spouse, son, or daughter who had been living with the tenant at the time of their death, but not a son or daughter who was separate and not living with the tenant at the time of their death. The court also held that the restrictions under Section 10(3)(a) of the Act, which apply to applications for possession of a residential or non-residential building, do not apply to applications for additional accommodation under Section 10(3)(c). The court further held that the balance of convenience favored the respondent, as the respondent's need for additional accommodation was real and the inconvenience to the petitioners was not outweighing.
Issues: 1. Whether the son of the original tenant, who was in essential service, could be evicted under the Act. 2. Whether the respondent could obtain additional accommodation for non-residential purposes while the petitioners were using the upstairs for residential purposes. 3. Whether the balance of convenience favored the petitioners or the respondent.
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The definition of 'tenant' in Section 2(8) of the Act includes a surviving spouse, son, or daughter who had been living with the tenant at the time of their death, but not a son or daughter who was separate and not living with the tenant at the time of their death. 2. The restrictions under Section 10(3)(a) of the Act, which apply to applications for possession of a residential or non-residential building, do not apply to applications for additional accommodation under Section 10(3)(c). 3. The balance of convenience favored the respondent, as the respondent's need for additional accommodation was real and the inconvenience to the petitioners was not outweighing.
Final Decision: The petition was dismissed, and the petitioners were granted time till 15-4-1973 to vacate the premises.
MADRAS BUILDINGS (LEASE AND RENT CONTROL) ACT 1970 - SECTION 10(2)(C) - ADDITIONAL ACCOMMODATION - INTERPRETATION OF THE DEFINITION OF TENANT - APPLICABILITY OF RESTRICTIONS UNDER SECTION 10(3)(A) TO SECTION 10(3)(C) - BALANCE OF CONVENIENCE.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioners, tenants of a building, challenged the order of the appellate court allowing the respondent, a charity, to obtain additional accommodation under Section 10(2)(c) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 1970. The petitioners argued that the son of the original tenant, who was in essential service, could not be evicted, and that the respondent could not obtain additional accommodation for non-residential purposes while the petitioners were using the upstairs for residential purposes.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the definition of 'tenant' in Section 2(8) of the Act includes a surviving spouse, son, or daughter who had been living with the tenant at the time of their death, but not a son or daughter who was separate and not living with the tenant at the time of their death. The court also held that the restrictions under Section 10(3)(a) of the Act, which apply to applications for possession of a residential or non-residential building, do not apply to applications for additional accommodation under Section 10(3)(c). The court further held that the balance of convenience favored the respondent, as the respondent's need for additional accommodation was real and the inconvenience to the petitioners was not outweighing.
Issues: 1. Whether the son of the original tenant, who was in essential service, could be evicted under the Act. 2. Whether the respondent could obtain additional accommodation for non-residential purposes while the petitioners were using the upstairs for residential purposes. 3. Whether the balance of convenience favored the petitioners or the respondent.
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The definition of 'tenant' in Section 2(8) of the Act includes a surviving spouse, son, or daughter who had been living with the tenant at the time of their death, but not a son or daughter who was separate and not living with the tenant at the time of their death. 2. The restrictions under Section 10(3)(a) of the Act, which apply to applications for possession of a residential or non-residential building, do not apply to applications for additional accommodation under Section 10(3)(c). 3. The balance of convenience favored the respondent, as the respondent's need for additional accommodation was real and the inconvenience to the petitioners was not outweighing.
Final Decision: The petition was dismissed, and the petitioners were granted time till 15-4-1973 to vacate the premises.
ORDER :-
KAILASAM, J.
The tenants are the petitioners. The respondent is a Charity and it applied for additional accommodation of the premises occupied by the petitioners under Section 10(2)(c) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 1970. Various legal contentions were raised by Mr. R.S. Venkatachari, the learned counsel for the petitioners-tenants. He submitted that one of the sons of the original tenant, Sri Raman, who died in 1960 is in the Air Force and as such he belongs to the essential service, and could nor be evicted. He relied on the definition of the word tenants in Section 2(8) which includes the surviving spouse, or any son, or daughter, or legal representative of a deceased tenant who had been living with the tenant in the building as a member of the tenant's family upto the death of the tenant, and submits that the clause "who had been living with the tenant in the building as a member of the tenant's family upto the death of the tenant" would qualify only as the legal representative and not the surviving spouse, or any son, or daughter. His contention is that usually in a clause like this, the rule of construction would limit the qualification to the last clause, that is, the legal representative alone. Though something could be said in favour of the grammatical construction, the entire context as well as the intention of the definition as a whole will have to be taken into account. In extending the meaning of the word 'tenant' it is easy to perceive the inclusion of the surviving spouse, son or daughter or legal representative who had been living with the tenant in the building as a member of the tenant's family upto the death of the tenant; but, if the son and daughter were separate and were not living with a tenant at the tune of his death, there appears to be no reason for including them within the definition of the word tenants. In the context, therefore, the proper construction would be that the extended meaning of tenants would be applicable to a surviving spouse, son or daughter who had been living with the tenant at the time of his death. In this view, as admittedly the son who is in essential service was not living with the tenant at the time of his death, this contention will have to fail.
2. The second submission of Mr. R.S. Venkatachari, is that the Trust who is the respondent is in occupation of the downstairs for non-residential purposes and the petitioners-tenants are occupying the upstairs for residential purposes, and therefore, additional accommodation under Section 10(3)(c) can only be given to the landlord when it requires the building for the purpose for which it is used by the tenants. I do not see any such restriction in that clause. Section 10(3)(a)(i) and (iii) makes it clear that when a landlord applies to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building, he can either ask for possession of residential building under clause (3)(a)(i) or non-residential building under clause 3(a)(iii) and there also, the purpose for which the building could be obtained is made specific, while under Section 10(3)(c), the restrictions that are made applicable to Section 10(3)(a) are not insisted as Section 10(3)(c) provides that notwithstanding anything contained in clause (a), the landlord can apply to the controller for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of title building to put the landlord in possession thereof, 2 he required additional accommodation for residential purposes or for purposes of a business which he is carrying on, as the case may be. In Section 10(3)(c), the building referred to is the entire building and not the building with the restricted meaning i.e. in occupation of the tenant alone or of the landlord alone. The building
in this clause would take in the entire building that to in occupation of the landlord as well as the tenant and when the landlord wants additional accommodation be may either need it for residential or for non-residential purpose as long as it is in the same building. Strung reliance was placed on the words 'as the case may be' as indicating that he can apply only for residential or non-residential purpose as referred to in Section 10(3)(a). I am not able to accept the contention for the words are plain enough. The purpose behind the section also appears, to be obvious that in the case of additional accommodation the landlord is given a little more indulgence. On a reading of use Sub-Section, I would prefer the view taken by this court in P.L. Kurian v. Govt. of Tamil Nadu, (1972) 85 Mad LW 364 rather than the one expressed in Govindan v. Rajagopal Nadar, 1968-2 Mad LJ 315. This point also fails.
3. It was next contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the hardship that is caused to the tenants outweighs the inconvenience to the landlord and urged that the view taken by the Rent Controller should be accepted rather than that of the appellate court. The appellate court has given reasons for corning to its conclusion, namely, that the necessity of the landlord is real and that though there may be some inconvenience to the tenants. It cannot be said to outweigh the inconvenience caused to the landlord. I agree with the view taken by the lower appellate court. All the points taken by the learned counsel for the petitioners fail and this petition is dismissed.
4. Taking into consideration that the tenants have been living in the premises for over 20 years and there are two school going children, the trust itself is generous in granting time to the tenants upto 31-3-1973. But the learned counsel for the petitioners pleads for 15 more days as he says that the schools would close only in April. Time is granted till 15-4-1973. The petitioners tenants will continue to pay the rent regularly as and when it falls due.
Petition dismissed.