1996 JTR(SC) 460
1996 ACJ 730 ; 1996 AIR(SC) 1560 ; 1996 AIR(SCW) 1661 ; 1996 3 AWC 1408 ; 1996 3 CCC(SC) 48 ; 1996 3 CurCC(SC) 48 ; 1996 DNJ 288 ; 1996 3 ICC 453 ; 1996 JLJ 499 ; 1996 5 JT 543 ; 1996 2 PLJR(SC) 3 ; 1996 3 PLR(SC) 507 ; 1996 2 RRR 671 ; 1996 2 Scale 782 ; 1996 3 SCC 142 ; 1996 SCC(Cri) 467 ; 1996 2 SCR 1036 ; 1996 2 UJ 61 ; 1996 WBLR 307 ; 1996 KHC 758 ; 1996 1 KLT(Online) 1014 ; 1996 5 Supreme 153
1996(5) Supreme 153
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
A.M. Ahmadi C.J.I. and Sujata V. Manohar, J
Ramesh Singh & Anr. -Appellants
versus
Cinta Devi & Ors. -Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 4255 of 1996
(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 17698 of 1994)
Decided on 23-2-1996
IMPORTANT POINT
Appellant is entitled to file appeal without being required to make deposit under Section 173 of Motor Vehicles Act against award passed in a petition instituted under Old Motor Vehicles Act of 1939.
Act
Referred
:GENERAL CLAUSES ACT : S.6
MOTOR VEHICLES ACT : S.173, S.217(4), S.110(d), S.110(a)
A) The interplay between the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Old Act), the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (New Act), and the General Clauses Act, 1897 is determinative of this appeal. The accident occurred under the Old Act regime, but the claim application was instituted before its repeal, with the appeal arising after the New Act came into force. The critical issue is whether the right of appeal under the now-repealed Old Act survives the repeal. The New Acts repealing clause, Section 217(4), explicitly preserves Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Section 6 provides that a repeal does not affect the previous operation of the repealed law or any right, privilege, obligation, or liability accrued thereunder. Consequently, the procedural requirements of the New Act, including the deposit under Section 173, cannot be applied retrospectively to extinguish a vested right of appeal that crystallized when the claim application was filed under the operative law at the time.
B) The core legal principles established are: (i) a repeal does not destroy rights that accrued under the repealed law; (ii) the General Clauses Act, 1897, governs the effect of repealing statutes; (iii) a statutory provision cannot be read retrospectively unless expressly stated; and (iv) the right of appeal in such quasi-judicial proceedings vests upon the institution of the claim application and is not contingent on subsequent procedural amendments.
Facts of the case:
An accident occurred on 27.5.1988, leading to a compensation claim under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Old Act). The claim application was filed on 23.12.1988. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (New Act) came into force on 1.7.1989. The claim application was disposed of on 29.6.1992 post the commencement of the New Act, resulting in a decree. An appeal was preferred under the Old Act on 25.9.1992, which was dismissed by the High Court on the ground that the appellant had not deposited the amount required by the proviso to Section 173 of the New Act.
Findings of Court:
The High Courts dismissal was based on the requirement of a deposit under the New Acts Section 173. However, this Court held that the New Act does not expressly or by necessary implication make its provisions retrospective. The decisions of other High Courts and this Courts own precedents confirm that the right to appeal under the Old Act crystallized upon the institution of the claim application and survives the repeal, irrespective of the new deposit condition.
Issues:
Whether a right of appeal accrued under the repealed Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, on the institution of a claim application, survives the enactment of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, and whether the appellant was required to comply with the deposit provision of the new Act.
Ratio Decidendi:
A right of appeal that accrues under the Old Act at the time of instituting a claim application is a vested right protected under the General Clauses Act, 1897. Such a right cannot be defeated by a subsequent statutes procedural requirements unless the new law is expressly made retrospective. Therefore, the appellant was not required to deposit the amount under the New Acts proviso to Section 173.
Result:
Appeal allowed. The impugned order of the High Court dismissing the appeal is set aside, and the appeal is to be disposed of on merits without insisting on the deposit.
A) The interplay between the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Old Act), the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (New Act), and the General Clauses Act, 1897 is determinative of this appeal. The accident occurred under the Old Act regime, but the claim application was instituted before its repeal, with the appeal arising after the New Act came into force. The critical issue is whether the right of appeal under the now-repealed Old Act survives the repeal. The New Acts repealing clause, Section 217(4), explicitly preserves Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Section 6 provides that a repeal does not affect the previous operation of the repealed law or any right, privilege, obligation, or liability accrued thereunder. Consequently, the procedural requirements of the New Act, including the deposit under Section 173, cannot be applied retrospectively to extinguish a vested right of appeal that crystallized when the claim application was filed under the operative law at the time.
B) The core legal principles established are: (i) a repeal does not destroy rights that accrued under the repealed law; (ii) the General Clauses Act, 1897, governs the effect of repealing statutes; (iii) a statutory provision cannot be read retrospectively unless expressly stated; and (iv) the right of appeal in such quasi-judicial proceedings vests upon the institution of the claim application and is not contingent on subsequent procedural amendments.
Facts of the case:
An accident occurred on 27.5.1988, leading to a compensation claim under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Old Act). The claim application was filed on 23.12.1988. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (New Act) came into force on 1.7.1989. The claim application was disposed of on 29.6.1992 post the commencement of the New Act, resulting in a decree. An appeal was preferred under the Old Act on 25.9.1992, which was dismissed by the High Court on the ground that the appellant had not deposited the amount required by the proviso to Section 173 of the New Act.
Findings of Court:
The High Courts dismissal was based on the requirement of a deposit under the New Acts Section 173. However, this Court held that the New Act does not expressly or by necessary implication make its provisions retrospective. The decisions of other High Courts and this Courts own precedents confirm that the right to appeal under the Old Act crystallized upon the institution of the claim application and survives the repeal, irrespective of the new deposit condition.
Issues:
Whether a right of appeal accrued under the repealed Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, on the institution of a claim application, survives the enactment of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, and whether the appellant was required to comply with the deposit provision of the new Act.
Ratio Decidendi:
A right of appeal that accrues under the Old Act at the time of instituting a claim application is a vested right protected under the General Clauses Act, 1897. Such a right cannot be defeated by a subsequent statutes procedural requirements unless the new law is expressly made retrospective. Therefore, the appellant was not required to deposit the amount under the New Acts proviso to Section 173.
Result:
Appeal allowed. The impugned order of the High Court dismissing the appeal is set aside, and the appeal is to be disposed of on merits without insisting on the deposit.
ORDER
Special leave granted.
The short question is: does a right of appeal accrue to a claimant under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, hereinafter called the Old Act , on the institution of a claim application in the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, notwithstanding its repeal by the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, hereinafter called the New Act ? In other words, does the right of appeal under the Old Act survive even after its repeal by the New Act? The brief facts are that an accident took place on 27.5.1988 which gave rise to a claim for a compensation under the Old Act. The claim application was filed on 23.12.1988. Thereafter the New Act came into force with effect from 1.7.1989. The claim application which was instituted under the Old Act was disposed of on 29.6.1992 after the New Act came into force. That gave rise to a right to file an appeal. The appeal was preferred under the Old Act on 25.9.1992. However, the Division Bench of the High Court by the impugned order dismissed the appeal on the ground that the appellant had not deposited the amount as required by the proviso to Section 173 of the New Act. Section 173 of the New Act, insofar as is relevant for our purpose, reads as under :
"Section 173. Appeals-(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), any person aggrieved by an award of a Claims Tribunal may, within ninety days from the date of the award,prefer an appeal to the High Court: Provided that no appeal by the person who is required to pay any amount in terms of such award shall be entertained by the High Court unless he has deposited with it twenty five thousand rupees or fifty per cent of the amount so awarded, whichever is less, in the manner directed by the High Court."
Admittedly, the appellant had not deposited the amount as required by the said proviso. The High Court, therefore, came to the conclusion that the appeal was not maintainable and dismissed the same. It is against the said order of the High Court that the present appeal is preferred.
2. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant and have perused the relevant provisions of the Old Act as well as the New Act bearing on the question whether or not the appellant was required to make the deposit and we may state that the repealing clause, namely sub-section (4) of Section 217, preserves Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. We may at this stage reproduce Section 217(4) of the New Act and Section 6 of the General Clauses Act.
"Section 217(4). The mention of particular matters in this section shall not be held to prejudice or affect the general application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897), with regard to the effect of repeals."
"Section 6. Effect of repeal.-Where this Act, or any (Central Act) or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not-
(a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or;
(b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or
(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or
(d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or
(e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forteiture or punishment as aforesaid,
and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed."
Suffice it to say that the New Act does not expressly or by necessary implication make the relevant provisions retrospective in character.
3. The High Courts of Allahabad and Madhya Pradesh have, vide AIR 1990 Allahabad 1041 and AIR 1990 MP 3542, held that in such circumstances the appellant s right to appeal without being required to make the deposit under the first proviso to Section 173 of the New Act remains unaffected. However, the judgment impugned herein takes a different view. Hence there is a controversy which needs to be resolved.
4. In our view the point at issue stands squarely covered by three decisions of this Court reported in Hussain Kasim Dada v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Others3, State of Bombay v. Supreme General Films Exchange Limited4, and Vithal Bhai Narang Bhai Patel v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P. & Nagpur5. In all these decisions the view taken is that unless the New Act expressly or by necessary implication makes the provision applicable retrospectively, the right to appeal will crystalise in the appellant on the institution of the application in the Tribunal of first instance and that vested right of appeal would not be dislodged by the enactment of the New Act. In other words, the appellant would be entitled to file the appeal without being required to make the deposit under the proviso to Section 173 of the New Act. The law, therefore, seems to be fairly well settled by the said three decisions of this Court.
5. In the result, the appeal succeeds. The impugned judgment of the High Court dismissing the appellant s appeal against the award made by the Tribunal is set aside. The matter will go back to the High Court for disposal of the appeal in accordance with law without insisting on deposit of the amount. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
Appeal allowed.
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Parallel Citations of other Journals :
Ramesh Singh & Anr. v. Cinta Devi & Ors., 1996(5) Supreme 153 : JT 1996 (5) SC 543
00042
00043