1996 JTR(SC) 1376
1996 4 ICC 590 ; 1996 9 JT 258 ; 1996 7 Scale 82 ; 1996 6 SCC 405 ; 1996 Supp5 SCR 445 ; 1996 2 KLT(Online) 1263 ; 1996 8 Supreme 187

1996(8) Supreme 187
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
K. Ramaswamy and G.B. Pattanaik, JJ.
Shri Chandragauda Ramgonda Patil & Anr. -Petitioners
versus
State of Maharashtra & Ors. -Respondents
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 16573 of 1996
with
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 19030 of 1996
(CC - 4204/96)
Decided on 2-9-1996
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Petitioners : Bimrao N. Naik, Sr. Advocate and A.M. Khanwilkar, Advocate.

IMPORTANT POINT
Land acquired for a public purpose would be utilised for any another public purpose, though use of it was intended for the original public purpose.

Act Referred :LAND ACQUISITION ACT : S.6, S.4
MAHARASHTRA REGIONAL AND TOWN PLANNING ACT : .

(A) The Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act and the Land Acquisition Act are the primary statutory frameworks governing the acquisition and utilisation of land for public purposes. Notification under Section 126(4) of the Maharashtra Regional Town Planning Act and the passing of an award under Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, vest land in the public authority, and subsequent utilisation for a different public purpose does not trigger a right of restitution to erstwhile owners, especially where compensation has been paid. Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act validates the acquisition proceedings, and Section 4 supports the Governments resolution on land utilisation.

(B) Key legal principles include the doctrine of res judicata, the finality of orders on merits, the non-maintainability of petitions lacking merit, and the principle that land acquired for a public purpose remains subject to public utilisation without reversion to former owners.

Facts of the case:

The land was acquired in 1974 under the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act and the Land Acquisition Act for a stated public scheme. After utilisation, surplus land was earmarked for allotment to councilors and employees. The first writ petition was dismissed on merits in 1990, and a subsequent suit challenging the acquisition was withdrawn. The second writ petition was dismissed as being barred by res judicata.

Findings of Court:

The court found that the second writ petition was not maintainable as it was barred by the earlier decision. The court held that the land, having been acquired and vested for public use, could not be restituted to former owners despite any government resolution, and the High Court was justified in refusing relief.

Issues:

Whether a writ petition seeking restitution of land acquired for a public purpose is maintainable when an earlier petition on the same facts has been decided on merits.

Ratio Decidendi:

Where land is acquired for a public purpose under the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act and the Land Acquisition Act, and has been utilised for another public purpose, such land cannot be restituted to erstwhile owners on the basis of a government resolution, as the doctrine of res judicata applies and the earlier order on merits is final.

Result:

The special leave petitions are dismissed, and the orders dismissing the writ petitions are upheld.

ORDER

These Special Leave Petitions have been filed against the orders passed in W.P. No. 5196/89 on March 12, 1990 and W.P. No. 1552/96 on April 26, 1996. There is absolutely no merit for condonation of delay in the first writ petition. As regards the second writ petition, the facts are not in dispute. Way back in 1974, notification under Section 126(4) of the Maharashtra Regional Town Planning Act ["MRTP Act", for short] was issued after the approval of the Scheme by the State Government, for acquiring the land for utilisation thereof for the stated Scheme. Pursuant thereto, an award came to be passed by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, the "Act") on November 11, 1977. Possession was taken earlier on October 21, 1974. After the utilisation of the land, surplus land was sought to be used for allotment to some of the Councilors and the employees of the Kolhapur Municipality. Consequently, the first writ petition came to be filed which was dismissed on merits on March 12, 1990. Thereafter, the petitioners filed a suit challenging the acquisition and suit came to be dismissed as withdrawn being not maintainable. Writ Petition No. 1552/96 came to be filed. That writ petition was also dismissed on the ground that the earlier order in the writ petition operated as res judicata. Therefore, the second writ petition was held to be not maintainable.

2. Shri Naik, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners, contended that in the second writ petition, the petitioner sought restitution of the possession pursuant to the Resolution of the State Government dated October 10, 1973 under which Government directed that the surplus land was to be utilised first for any other public purpose and in the alternative it was to be given back to the erstwhile owners. Since he had sought enforcement of the said Government Resolution, the writ petition could not be dismissed on the ground of constructive res judicata. He also seeks to rely upon certain orders said to have been passed by the High Court in conformity with enforcement of the Government Resolution. We do not think that this Court would be justified in making direction for restitution of the land to the erstwhile owners when the land was taken way back and vested in the Municipality free from all encumbrances. We are not concerned with the validity of the notification in either of the writ petitions. It is axiomatic that the land acquired for a public purpose would be utilised for any another public purpose, though use of it was intended for the original public purpose. It is not intended that any land which remain unutilised, should be restituted to the erstwhile owner to whom adequate compensation was paid according to the market value as on the date of the notification. Under these circumstances, the High Court was well justified in refusing to grant relief in both the writ petitions.

3. The special leave petitions are dismissed.

Petitions dismissed.

*******

Parallel Citations of other Journals ;

Shri Chandragauda Ramgonda Patil & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., 1996(8) Supreme 187

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