1996 JTR(SC) 2007
1997 1 AICLR 191 ; 1997 34 AllCriC 144 ; 1997 1 AWC 550 ; 1997 1 BLJR 481 ; 1997 1 CHN(SC) 37 ; 1997 CriLR 108 ; 1997 CriR(SC) 305 ; 1997 1 EastCrC(SC) 149 ; 1996 10 JT 633 ; 1996 8 Scale 554 ; 1996 11 SCC 19 ; 1997 SCC(Cri) 1 ; 1996 Supp9 SCR 233 ; 1996 KHC 1408 ; 1996 8 Supreme 208
1996(8) Supreme 208
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
J.S. Verma and Sujata V. Manohar, JJ.
Phoolan Devi -Petitioner
versus
State of M.P. & Ors. -Respondents
Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 43 of 1993
Decided on 27-11-1996
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appearing Parties : Ram Jethmalani, Gulab Gupta, Sr. Advocates, Ms. Kamini Jaiswal, (Anil Kumar Jha,) Advocate (NP), (Uma Nath Singh) Advocate for the State of M.P., (A.S. Pundir) Advocate for State of U.P., T.C. Sharma, Advocate, for C.V. Subba Rao, Advocate for Union of India), (A.K. Srivastava, D.S. Mehra) Advocate for (NCT, Delhi), M.A. Krishnamoorthy, Advocates.
IMPORTANT POINTS
1. Merely because of the lapse of several years since the commencement of criminal prosecutions, it cannot be said that for that reason alone the continuance of the prosecutions would violate the petitioner s right to speedy trial.
2. Smt. Phoolan Devi, who is on parole by virtue of order dated 18.2.1994 made in her case, shall continue to remain free, subject to the requirement of taking her in custody by virtue of any order made by a competent court/authority in any of the prosecutions pending in the State of Uttar Pradesh or any other case.
Act Referred :CONSTITUTION OF INDIA : Art.32, Art.21
(A) The relevant statutory provisions are Article 32 and Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Article 32 empowers this Court to issue writs for the enforcement of fundamental rights, while Article 21 guarantees the protection of life and personal liberty, which encompasses the right to a speedy trial. These provisions are directly invoked in this matter where the petitioner challenges prolonged custody and seeks release, asserting that her fundamental right to life and liberty has been impaired by unreasonable delay in the criminal proceedings.
(B) Key legal principles include that mere lapse of time in prosecuting a case does not automatically violate the right to speedy trial; the burden to prove violation shifts based on demonstrated delays and reasons therefor; the right to speedy trial under Article 21 is subject to compliance with lawful procedures; and an order of release on parole does not automatically convert into a final discharge if other prosecutions remain pending. Custody must be justified by lawful authority, and any continuation of detention requires valid legal basis.
Facts of the case:
The petitioner was in custody since February 1983 and filed a writ petition in January 1993 under Article 32 seeking release and quashing of multiple prosecutions. She alleged surrender on terms including eight years' imprisonment, and that further prosecutions in Uttar Pradesh violated her right to speedy trial. The State of Madhya Pradesh confirmed she had served the sentence in its case, while the State of Uttar Pradesh sought leave to withdraw prosecution in various trials.
Findings of Court:
The Court found that neither Madhya Pradesh nor Uttar Pradesh demonstrated any lawful authority to justify further custody. It observed that the right to speedy trial cannot be defeated merely by prolonged prosecution, and that terms of surrender are relevant only in the pending criminal cases. The Court held that the petitioner is entitled to release at this stage, subject to any future custody orders by competent courts in ongoing prosecutions.
Issues:
Whether the petitioners right to speedy trial under Article 21 has been violated by prolonged prosecutions; whether the alleged terms of surrender justify quashing or withdrawing the prosecutions; and whether the petitioner is entitled to release after serving the sentence imposed by the relevant court.
Ratio Decidendi:
The Court determined that the right to speedy trial does not mandate automatic quashing of prosecutions solely due to delay, and that the petitioners release is warranted when no authority exists to justify continued custody, leaving the determination of remaining prosecutions to the respective trial courts.
Result:
The writ petition is disposed of with the petitioner directed to remain free, subject to any future custody orders by competent courts in pending prosecutions, while the prayer to quash all prosecutions in Uttar Pradesh is rejected.
(A) The relevant statutory provisions are Article 32 and Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Article 32 empowers this Court to issue writs for the enforcement of fundamental rights, while Article 21 guarantees the protection of life and personal liberty, which encompasses the right to a speedy trial. These provisions are directly invoked in this matter where the petitioner challenges prolonged custody and seeks release, asserting that her fundamental right to life and liberty has been impaired by unreasonable delay in the criminal proceedings.
(B) Key legal principles include that mere lapse of time in prosecuting a case does not automatically violate the right to speedy trial; the burden to prove violation shifts based on demonstrated delays and reasons therefor; the right to speedy trial under Article 21 is subject to compliance with lawful procedures; and an order of release on parole does not automatically convert into a final discharge if other prosecutions remain pending. Custody must be justified by lawful authority, and any continuation of detention requires valid legal basis.
Facts of the case:
The petitioner was in custody since February 1983 and filed a writ petition in January 1993 under Article 32 seeking release and quashing of multiple prosecutions. She alleged surrender on terms including eight years' imprisonment, and that further prosecutions in Uttar Pradesh violated her right to speedy trial. The State of Madhya Pradesh confirmed she had served the sentence in its case, while the State of Uttar Pradesh sought leave to withdraw prosecution in various trials.
Findings of Court:
The Court found that neither Madhya Pradesh nor Uttar Pradesh demonstrated any lawful authority to justify further custody. It observed that the right to speedy trial cannot be defeated merely by prolonged prosecution, and that terms of surrender are relevant only in the pending criminal cases. The Court held that the petitioner is entitled to release at this stage, subject to any future custody orders by competent courts in ongoing prosecutions.
Issues:
Whether the petitioners right to speedy trial under Article 21 has been violated by prolonged prosecutions; whether the alleged terms of surrender justify quashing or withdrawing the prosecutions; and whether the petitioner is entitled to release after serving the sentence imposed by the relevant court.
Ratio Decidendi:
The Court determined that the right to speedy trial does not mandate automatic quashing of prosecutions solely due to delay, and that the petitioners release is warranted when no authority exists to justify continued custody, leaving the determination of remaining prosecutions to the respective trial courts.
Result:
The writ petition is disposed of with the petitioner directed to remain free, subject to any future custody orders by competent courts in pending prosecutions, while the prayer to quash all prosecutions in Uttar Pradesh is rejected.
JUDGMENT
J.S. Verma, J.-The petitioner - Smt. Phoolan Devi was in custody since February 12, 1983 when she claims to have voluntarily surrendered in the State of Madhya Pradesh with a criminal past. She was in the Central Jail at Gwalior in Madhya Pradesh. In this writ petition filed in January, 1993 under Article 32 of the Constitution she has prayed for a direction for her release from custody; and an appropriate writ, order or direction quashing the large number of prosecutions initiated against her by the State of Uttar Pradesh for commission of heinous offences, e.g. dacoity and murder. In substance, she claims that her right to speedy trial guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution has been violated and her continued custody was without any lawful authority. By an order dated February 18, 1994 this Court directed release of the petitioner on parole in view of the fact that the petitioner had been in custody for a period of eleven years till then. The petitioner is on parole pursuant to that order.
2. The petitioner alleges that atrocities were committed on her and members of her family by persons belonging to the upper castes and she was also the victim of gang rape which drove her to adopt a life of crime; this criminal past is the cause for a large number of criminal cases for offences of dacoity and murder etc. against her in the State of Uttar Pradesh. She alleges that she had surrendered on certain terms and conditions offered to her by the Government of Madhya Pradesh; those terms included, inter alia, the assurance that she would be released from custody after eight years; she would be tried in the courts in Madhya Pradesh only even for the crimes alleged to have been committed in the State of Uttar Pradesh; and death penalty would not be imposed in any case. On this basis it is claimed that the custody for eleven years undergone by the petitioner is sufficient to satisfy this requirement and all the prosecutions pending against her in the courts in Uttar Pradesh should be quashed. According to the petitioner there are about 55 criminal prosecutions against her in the courts in Uttar Pradesh alleging the commission of heinous offences like dacoity and murder by her.
3. Shri Ram Jethmalani, learned counsel for the petitioner, strenuously urged that there is no justification for continuing the prosecution of the petitioner in any of the criminal cases pending against her in the courts of Uttar Pradesh, since the petitioner has already been in custody for a total period of eleven years when according to the terms of surrender she was required to undergo imprisonment for a total period of eight years only. He submitted that to honour this commitment the petitioner did not challenge the order dated August 13, 1986 passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh in the purported exercise of power under Section 268 of the Criminal Procedure Code even though it was invalid for continuing the petitioner s detention in the Central Jail at Gwalior. He submitted that the petitioner was required to serve the sentence of three years imprisonment in the only case in the State of Madhya Pradesh which term of imprisonment ended on July 25, 1985 and, therefore, the further custody for a period of eight years satsified the terms of the surrender. Shri Jethmalani submitted that the petitioner did not challenge the validity of Madhya Pradesh Government s order dated August 13, 1986 because of the moral justification for continuing her custody for a further period of eight years under the terms of surrender. Learned counsel submitted that now there is no justification for continuing any prosecution in Uttar Pradesh, there being no other criminal case pending in Madhya Pradesh against her. On this basis learned counsel contended, that all the prosecutions pending in the courts in Uttar Pradesh against the petitioner should be quashed; and her release on parole should be converted into a direction for her final release.
4. It may be mentioned that the petitioner has also filed Transfer Petition (Crl.) No. 36 of 1992 praying for transfer of all the criminal cases against her, pending in the courts of Uttar Pradesh to the Special Court at Gwarlior in Madhya Pradesh. That transfer petition is pending and is to be heard separately. The order disposing of this writ petition has no bearing on that transfer petition. For the same reason the arguments of Shri Jethmalani which may have relavance in the transfer petition, though urged in this writ petition are not being considered in this writ petition and would remain available for considering the prayer made in the petitioner s transfer petition.
5. In our opinion, the limited scope of this writ petition is the question of the release of the petitioner from custody on the present facts. The other aspects sought to be raised by Shri Jethmalani do not require consideration in this writ petition. The question of the contest and effect of the terms of surrender alleged by the petitioner has to be raised and decided in the criminal cases pending against the petitioner. The same cannot be raised on the basis of an omnibus statement in this petition under Article 32 of the Constituion.
6. We are informed that the State of Uttar Pradesh has moved an application in each trial pending in the courts of Uttar Pradesh seeking leave to withdraw the prosecution. This aspect based on the alleged terms of the surrender may have relevance in those proceedings requiring consideration of the same in the facts of each prosecution. The question whether the blame for the entire delay in the prosecution/trial in each of those criminal cases lies on the State alone and not the petitioner is a question of fact to be considered in each of those cases. Merely because of the lapse of several years since the commencement of those prosecutions, it cannot be said that for that reason alone the continuance of the prosecutions would violate the petitioner s right to speedy trial. Similarly, the cumulative effect of the terms of the alleged surrender have to be examined, on the same being duly proved in those prosecutions to decide the merit of the contention that the petitioner is not liable for any further punishment as claimed by her. The mere fact that the alleged terms offer immunity from death penalty and trial of all cases in Madhya Pradesh even for crimes committed in Uttar Pradesh, indicates that the question of the punishment to be imposed on the petitioner in each case depends on the final outcome at the trial, and the imprisonment of eight years mentioned in one of these terms does not conclude the prosecutions. The petitioner s contention that the violation of her right to speedy trial is proved by these facts alone to justify quashing of all the prosecutions is, therefore, untenable.
7. The only question now is of the relief pertaining to petitioner s release from custody at this juncture. In response to the notice of this petition, it has been stated clearly on behalf of the State of Madhya Pradesh that the petitioner has served out the sentence of three years imprisonment awarded in the only case against her in Madhya Pradesh; and that there is no other criminal case in which she has been sentenced or is wanted. This being so, no authority has been shown to justify continuance of her custody on account of the commission of any crime in Madhya Pradesh or any judgment of any court in Madhya Pradesh. On behalf of the State of Uttar Pradesh also, nothing has been shown to indicate that there is any subsisting order or judgment of any court requiring the continuance of petitioner in custody. In short, no authority has been shown either by the State of Madhya Pradesh or by the State of Uttar Pradesh to justify further custody of the petitioner at this juncture. This is, however, subject to the requirement of any order made hereafter by any competent cout in any of the pending prosecutions against the petitioner. The petitioner is, therefore, entitled to release at present, unless by any order made hereafter by any competent court she is required to be taken in custody. The petitioner is entitled to the grant of relief only to this extent in this writ petition.
8. For the aforesaid reasons we direct that the petitioner, who is on parole by virtue of order dated February 18, 1994 made in this case, shall continue to remain free, subject to the requirement of taking her in custody by virtue of any order made by a competent court/authority in any of the prosecutions pending in the State of Uttar Pradesh or any other case. The prayer in the writ petition for quashing the prosecutions pending in the State of Uttar Pradesh is rejected.
9. The writ petition is disposed of in this manner.
Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 509 of 1995
ORDER
In view of the order made today disposing of Writ Petition No. 43 of 1993, Phoolan Devi v. State of M.P. & Ors. this writ petition has become infructuous.
It is, accordingly, dismissed.
Writ petition disposed of accordingly.
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Parallel Citations of other Journals :
Phoolan Devi v. State of MP & Ors., 1996(8) Supreme 208 : JT 1996(10) SC 632
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