1997 JTR(SC) 609
1997 AIR(SC) 2399 ; 1997 AIR(SCW) 2310 ; 1997 2 AllCJ 930 ; 1997 AllLJ 1369 ; 1997 30 AllLR 307 ; 1997 2 APLJ 58 ; 1997 DNJ 196 ; 1997 4 JT 425 ; 1997 2 KLT(SN) 11 ; 1999 17 LCD 515 ; 1997 2 PLJR(SC) 86 ; 1997 1 RCR(Rent) 591 ; 1997 3 Scale 400 ; 1997 4 SCC 413 ; 1997 3 SCR 508 ; 1997 WBLR 312 ; 1997 KHC 502 ; 1997 3 Supreme 597
1997(3) Supreme 597
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
K. Ramaswamy and G.B. Pattanaik, JJ.
Kamleshwar Prasad -Appellant
versus
Pradumanju Agarwal (dead) by LRs. -Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 2576 of 1997
(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 4923 of 1997)
Decided on 2.4.1997
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : Manoj Swarup and Ms. Lalitha Kohli, Advocates.
For the Respondents : Ms. Halida Khatoon, Advocate.
IMPORTANT POINT
Eviction order against a tenant on bona fide need of landlord having become final under the Act cannot be interferred with by High Court in exercise of its power under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution by taking into account any subsequent event.
Act
Referred
:CONSTITUTION OF INDIA : Art.227, Art.226
UTTAR PRADESH ACT : S.21(1)(a)
(A) The appeal arises under the Uttar Pradesh Act XIII of 1972 read with the supervisory jurisdiction of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, concerning the finality of an eviction decree passed under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act. The landlord sought eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement to carry on his own business, and the appellate authority held that such requirement existed, directing eviction. The High Court, in a writ petition under Article 226, examined whether the death of the landlord during the pendency of the writ petition vitiated the decree, ultimately holding that the finality of the decree prevented the High Court from taking into account the subsequent event. This headnote explains the interplay between the statutory eviction procedure and the constitutional supervisory jurisdiction, and the effect of a change in the personal status of the party after the decree has become final.
(B) The order of the appellate authority under the U.P. Act is a decree of a civil court and, once final, is not open to interference by the High Court in the exercise of its powers under Articles 226 and 227 except in rare, exceptional circumstances. The doctrine of finality protects judicial decrees, and a subsequent event affecting the personal status of a party, such as death, does not automatically nullify a decree pronounced earlier. The burden on the tenant arises once the landlord establishes bona fide requirement, and the appellate authority acts as the fact-finder on that question. The writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is supervisory and not an appellate forum to re-appreciate the evidence afresh.
Facts of the case:
The tenant-appellant faced an eviction petition filed by the landlord-respondent under Section 21(1)(a) of the Uttar Pradesh Act XIII of 1972 on the ground that the landlord bona fide required the premises for carrying on his own business and had no other means of livelihood. The prescribed authority rejected the petition, finding that the landlord did not require the premises bona fide and that the tenant would suffer comparative harassment if evicted. On appeal, the appellate authority reversed this conclusion, held that the landlords need was bona fide, and directed eviction. While the writ petition was pending in the High Court, the landlord died, and the matter was proceeded with by his legal heirs. The High Court held that the decree for eviction had become final and refused to take into account the subsequent death of the landlord.
Findings of Court:
The Supreme Court, on special leave, noted that the appellate authority had correctly appraised the evidence and that the requirement of the landlord for the premises was a bona fide one entitling him to eviction under the Act. It held that the order of the appellate authority was final and enforceable as a decree of a civil court, and that the High Court could not interfere by importing a subsequent event such as the death of the landlord. The Court observed that the tenant had incurred liability on the crucial date of the application, and that the bona fide need could continue through the widow or an elder son, negating any lapse of the requirement.
Issues:
Whether the death of the landlord during the pendency of a writ petition under Article 226 affects the finality of an eviction decree passed under the Uttar Pradesh Act, and whether the High Court is competent to take into account such a subsequent event in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction.
Ratio Decidendi:
An order passed by an appellate authority under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Act, once treated as a decree of a civil court, becomes final and conclusive. The High Court cannot set aside or interfere with such a decree on the basis of events occurring after the decree was pronounced, as the jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 is supervisory and does not permit re-appreciation of facts or the nullification of a final decree on account of intervening personal changes.
Result:
The appeal is dismissed, and the impugned judgment of the High Court is upheld.
(A) The appeal arises under the Uttar Pradesh Act XIII of 1972 read with the supervisory jurisdiction of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, concerning the finality of an eviction decree passed under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act. The landlord sought eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement to carry on his own business, and the appellate authority held that such requirement existed, directing eviction. The High Court, in a writ petition under Article 226, examined whether the death of the landlord during the pendency of the writ petition vitiated the decree, ultimately holding that the finality of the decree prevented the High Court from taking into account the subsequent event. This headnote explains the interplay between the statutory eviction procedure and the constitutional supervisory jurisdiction, and the effect of a change in the personal status of the party after the decree has become final.
(B) The order of the appellate authority under the U.P. Act is a decree of a civil court and, once final, is not open to interference by the High Court in the exercise of its powers under Articles 226 and 227 except in rare, exceptional circumstances. The doctrine of finality protects judicial decrees, and a subsequent event affecting the personal status of a party, such as death, does not automatically nullify a decree pronounced earlier. The burden on the tenant arises once the landlord establishes bona fide requirement, and the appellate authority acts as the fact-finder on that question. The writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is supervisory and not an appellate forum to re-appreciate the evidence afresh.
Facts of the case:
The tenant-appellant faced an eviction petition filed by the landlord-respondent under Section 21(1)(a) of the Uttar Pradesh Act XIII of 1972 on the ground that the landlord bona fide required the premises for carrying on his own business and had no other means of livelihood. The prescribed authority rejected the petition, finding that the landlord did not require the premises bona fide and that the tenant would suffer comparative harassment if evicted. On appeal, the appellate authority reversed this conclusion, held that the landlords need was bona fide, and directed eviction. While the writ petition was pending in the High Court, the landlord died, and the matter was proceeded with by his legal heirs. The High Court held that the decree for eviction had become final and refused to take into account the subsequent death of the landlord.
Findings of Court:
The Supreme Court, on special leave, noted that the appellate authority had correctly appraised the evidence and that the requirement of the landlord for the premises was a bona fide one entitling him to eviction under the Act. It held that the order of the appellate authority was final and enforceable as a decree of a civil court, and that the High Court could not interfere by importing a subsequent event such as the death of the landlord. The Court observed that the tenant had incurred liability on the crucial date of the application, and that the bona fide need could continue through the widow or an elder son, negating any lapse of the requirement.
Issues:
Whether the death of the landlord during the pendency of a writ petition under Article 226 affects the finality of an eviction decree passed under the Uttar Pradesh Act, and whether the High Court is competent to take into account such a subsequent event in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction.
Ratio Decidendi:
An order passed by an appellate authority under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Act, once treated as a decree of a civil court, becomes final and conclusive. The High Court cannot set aside or interfere with such a decree on the basis of events occurring after the decree was pronounced, as the jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 is supervisory and does not permit re-appreciation of facts or the nullification of a final decree on account of intervening personal changes.
Result:
The appeal is dismissed, and the impugned judgment of the High Court is upheld.
JUDGMENT
Pattanaik, J.-Leave granted.
2. This appeal by special leave to appeal is directed against the judgment dated 17.2.1997 of the Allahabad High Court dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant. The Respondent- landlord filed a petition for eviction of the appellant under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Act XIII of 1972 inter alia on the ground that he bona fide requires the premises for carrying on his own business and he has no other means of livelihood. The tenant-appellant filed objections before the prescribed authority stating therein that the application for eviction has been filed on false and baseless allegations and in fact the respondent does not need the premises bona fide for starting his own business. The prescribed authority on consideration of the materials on record came to the conclusion that the landlord does not require the premises for his own use bone fide. The said prescribed authority also came to the conclusion that the tenant would be comparatively harrassed if an order of eviction is passed. With these conclusions, the application for eviction having been rejected, the landlord preferred an appeal. The appellate authority re-appreciated the entire evidence on record and reversed the conclusion of the prescribed authority. The said appellate authority came to the conclusion that in the facts and circumstances of the case the requirement of the landlord to start a cloth business must be a bona fide requirement entitling him to get an order of eviction under Section 21(1) (a) of the Act. The appellate authority, therefore, set aside the order of the prescribed authority and directed eviction of the appellate. Being aggrieved by the order of the appellate authority, the tenant carried the matter to the High Court by filing a writ petition. During the pendency of the writ petition in the High Court the landlord died and was substituted by his legal heirs namely his widow, two sons and the married daughter. On behalf of the tenant, it was urged before the High Court that the landlord having died, the bona fide requirement which was found to have existed by the appellate authority no more survives, and therefore, taking into consideration the subsequent event the High Court must quash the order of eviction passed by the appellate authority. On behalf of the landlord it was contended that the order of the appellate authority in the eviction proceedings, is a decree and that decree having become final, in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court will not be entitled to take into consideration any subsequent event that had occured and on that score it would not be appropriate for the High Court to interfere with the decree passed by the appellate authority. It was also contended that the requirement in question must exist on the day the application for eviction was filed and the same requirement having been found to be established by the competent forum who was required to go into the said question, it is no longer open to the High Court to interfere with the said finding in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The High Court by the impugned judgment came to the conclusion that the decree for eviction has become final and the said finality cannot be disturbed on the application under Article 226 of the Constitution by taking into account the facts that the original landlord died during the pendency of the writ petition.
3. Mr. Manoj Swarup, learned counsel appearing for the appellant in this Court urged that the person for whose bona fide requirement the order of eviction has been passed by the appellate authority having died during the pendency of the writ petition, the said bona fide requirement no longer subsists and consequently the High Court should have taken that fact into consideration and should have interfered with the order passed by the appellate authority for the eviction of the tenant. The learned Counsel further urged that no doubt the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution is not a continuation of the eviction proceedings under the Act, but all the same the High Court while exercising its power of supervision under Article 226 of the Constitution is not denuded of its power to take into consideration the subsequent event that had happened which is necessary to be taken into consideration in the interest of justice. Accordingly, the High Court committed serious error in not taking into account the facts of the death of the landlord for whose bona fide requirement the order of eviction had been passed by the appellate authority, and therefore, this Court should interfere with the said order of the High Court. Having given an anxious consideration to the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant and under the facts and circumstances of this case we are of the considered opinion that this case does not warrant interference by this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. Under the Act the order of the appellate authority is final and the said order is a decree of the civil court and decree of a competent Court having become final cannot be interferred with by the High Court in exercise of its power of superintendence under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution by taking into account any subsequent even which might have happened. That apart, the fact that the landlord needed the premises in question for starting a business which fact has been found by the appellate authority, in eye of law, must be that on the day of application for eviction which is the crucial date, the tenant incurred the liability of being evicted from the premises. Even if the landlord died during the pendency of the writ petition in the High Court the bona fide need cannot be said to have lapsed as the business in question can be carried on by his widow or any elder son. In this view of the matter, we find on force in the contention of Mr. Manoj Swarup, learned counsel appearing for the appellate and we do not find any error in the impugned judgment of the High Court warranting interference by this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. The appeal, accordingly, fails and is dismissed but in the circumstances without any order as to costs.
Appeal dismissed.
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Parallel Citations of other Journals :
Kamleshwar Prasad v. Pradumanju Agarwal, 1997(3) Supreme 597 : JT 1997(4) SC 425 : JT 1997(4) SC 366
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