1997 JTR(SC) 835
1997 AIR(SC) 2695 ; 1997 AIR(SCW) 2663 ; 1997 2 AllCJ 1292 ; 1997 4 AllMR(SC) 447 ; 1998 1 BomCR(SC) 786 ; 1997 2 CLT(SC) 489 ; 1997 3 CurCC(SC) 16 ; 1997 DNJ 250 ; 1997 5 JT 632 ; 1997 3 MhLJ(SC) 695 ; 1997 4 Scale 337 ; 1997 6 SCC 73 ; 1997 SCR 257 ; 1997 2 UJ 303 ; 1997 KHC 1689 ; 1997 5 Supreme 578
1997(5) Supreme 578
Supreme Court of India
K. Ramaswamy, S. Saghir Ahmad & G.B. Pattanaik, JJ.
Uttam Namdeo Mahale -Appellant
versus
Vithal Deo & Ors. -Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 3691 of 1997
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 9225 of 1997)
Decided on 7-5-1997
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : A.S. Bhasme and Manoj K. Misra, Advocates.
For the Respondents : S.V. Tambwekar and Nitin Tambwekar, Advocates.
IMPORTANT POINT
Where there is statutory rule operating in the field, the implied power of exercise of the right within reasonable limitation does not arise.
Act
Referred
:LIMITATION ACT : Art.136
MAMLATDARS COURTS ACT : S.21
(A) The relevant statutory framework comprises the Limitation Act, which operates as an excluded limitation in this context, and Section 21 of the Mamalatdar s Court Act, 1906, which vests an executory power in the court. The interplay of these provisions dictates that where a final order of eviction is made under Section 21, no statutory period of limitation attaches to its execution, and the general limitation laws are supplanted, thereby permitting the enforcement of the decree irrespective of the elapsed time since its pronouncement.
(B) The core legal principles elucidated are that a final order of ejectment under Section 21 of the Mamalatdar s Court Act is executable without any prescribed limitation period, and the absence of a specific rule does not imply a lack of power; rather, it implies the exclusion of the Limitation Act, allowing for enforcement at any time. (
Facts of the case:
) The respondent is recognized as the owner of the property who had issued a notice to the appellant to vacate, which became a final order upon confirmation by the Court. Subsequently, execution proceedings were initiated, and the respondent raised an objection that the decree was time-barred. (
Findings of Court:
) The High Court correctly held that Section 21 does not prescribe a limitation for execution, and thus the general Limitation Act is excluded, validating the execution of the order despite the passage of more than twelve years. (
Issues:
) Whether an order of eviction under Section 21 of the Mamalatdar s Court Act is subject to the Limitation Act or can be executed after more than twelve years. (
Ratio Decidendi:
) The court determined that in the absence of any specific limitation provided under Section 21, the Limitation Act is expressly excluded, thereby empowering the court to enforce the final order at any time without the bar of prescription. (
Result:
) The appeal is dismissed with no costs awarded.
(A) The relevant statutory framework comprises the Limitation Act, which operates as an excluded limitation in this context, and Section 21 of the Mamalatdar s Court Act, 1906, which vests an executory power in the court. The interplay of these provisions dictates that where a final order of eviction is made under Section 21, no statutory period of limitation attaches to its execution, and the general limitation laws are supplanted, thereby permitting the enforcement of the decree irrespective of the elapsed time since its pronouncement.
(B) The core legal principles elucidated are that a final order of ejectment under Section 21 of the Mamalatdar s Court Act is executable without any prescribed limitation period, and the absence of a specific rule does not imply a lack of power; rather, it implies the exclusion of the Limitation Act, allowing for enforcement at any time. (
Facts of the case:
) The respondent is recognized as the owner of the property who had issued a notice to the appellant to vacate, which became a final order upon confirmation by the Court. Subsequently, execution proceedings were initiated, and the respondent raised an objection that the decree was time-barred. (
Findings of Court:
) The High Court correctly held that Section 21 does not prescribe a limitation for execution, and thus the general Limitation Act is excluded, validating the execution of the order despite the passage of more than twelve years. (
Issues:
) Whether an order of eviction under Section 21 of the Mamalatdar s Court Act is subject to the Limitation Act or can be executed after more than twelve years. (
Ratio Decidendi:
) The court determined that in the absence of any specific limitation provided under Section 21, the Limitation Act is expressly excluded, thereby empowering the court to enforce the final order at any time without the bar of prescription. (
Result:
) The appeal is dismissed with no costs awarded.
ORDER
Leave granted.
2. This appeal has been filed against the order of the High Court of Bombay, made on January 20, 1997 in Writ Petition 6182 of 1996.
3. The admitted position is that the respondent No. 1 is the owner of the property and earlier a notice was issued to the appellant to vacate the land in question. That order of eviction became final with the confirmation of the order by this Court in a special leave petition. Thereafter, proceedings were initiated for execution. An objection has been raised on the ground that since more than 12 years have elapsed, the order cannot be implemented. The High Court has pointed out that under Section 21 of the Mamalatdar s Court Act, 1906, it has not prescribed any limitation for execution of the orders vide the Division Bench judgment of the High Court of Bombay in Babaji Khanduji v. Kushaba Ramji1.
4. Mr. Bhasme, learned counsel for the appellant, contends that in the absence of fixation of rule of limitation, the power can be exercised within a reasonable time and in the absence of such prescription of limitation, the power to enforce the order is vitiated by error of law. He places reliance on the decisions in State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha & Ors.2; Ram Chand & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.3, Mohamad Kavi Mohamad Amin v. Fatmabai Ibrahim4. We find no force in the contention. It is seen that the order of ejectment against the applicant has become final. Section 21 of the Mamalatdar s Court Act does not prescribe any limitation within which the order needs to be executed. In the absence of any specific limitation provided thereunder, necessary implication is that the general law of limitation provided in Limitation Act (Act 2 of 1963) stands excluded. The Division Bench, therefore, has rightly held that no limitation has been prescribed and it can be executed at any time, especially when the law of limitation for the purpose of this appeal is not there. Where there is statutory rule operating in the field, the implied power of exercise of the right within reasonable limitation does not arise. The cited decisions deal with that area and bear no relevance to the facts.
5. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
Appeal dismissed.
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Parallel Citations of other Journals :
Uttam Namdeo Mahale v. Vithal Deo & Ors., 1997(5) Supreme 578 : JT 1997(5) SC 632 : 1997(3) CCC 16 (SC)
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