1997 JTR(SC) 1242
1997 4 AICLR 610 ; 1998 AIR(SC) 16 ; 1997 AIR(SCW) 3959 ; 1997 35 AllCriC 598 ; 1998 92 CompCas 313 ; 1997 96 ELT 511 ; 1997 8 JT 135 ; 1997 4 RCR(Cri) 393 ; 1997 6 Scale 140 ; 1997 8 SCC 358 ; 1998 SCC(Cri) 74 ; 1997 SCR 142 ; 1998 WBLR 77 ; 1997 KHC 1100 ; 1997 8 Supreme 268
1997(8) Supreme 268
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
A.S. Anand & K. Venkataswami, JJ.
C. Sampath Kumar -Appellant
versus
The Enforcement Officer, Enforcement Directorate, Madras -Respondent
Civil Appeal No. 6446 of 1997
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 11424 of 1996)
Decided on 16-9-1997
Counsel for the Parties :
Appearing for the Parties, S.S. Ray, T.S. Arunachalam, K.T.S. Tulsi, S.B. Wad, Sr. Advocates, Jinasenan, N. Jothi, K.K. Mani, K.V. Vishwanathan, Vikas Pahwa, K.V. Vijaya Kumar, S.N. Bhat, Manoj Wad, V.K. Verma, Advocates.
IMPORTANT POINT
Issuance of summons u/s 40 of FERA calling upon a person to give his statement in writing and sign it is not prohibited by Statute or Constitution and there is no presumption that such a statement was always involuntary.
Act
Referred
:CONSTITUTION OF INDIA : Art.136
EVIDENCE ACT : S.24
FOREIGN EXCHANGE REGULATION ACT : S.40(3), S.40(4), S.40
(A) The impugned proceeding was initiated under Section 40 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, which empowers authorities to summon individuals and require them to provide statements in connection with alleged offences. The appellant challenged the validity of being compelled to provide a written statement, invoking the protections available under Article 136 of the Constitution for special leave to appeal, read with the evidentiary framework under Section 24 of the Evidence Act. The High Courts dismissal of the writ appeal was examined, with specific reliance on Section 40(3) and Section 40(4) of FERA, which contemplate the administration of caution regarding truthful disclosure and the safeguards of recording statements in writing, thereby not rendering the process inherently coercive or violative of constitutional rights. The court further considered that non-disclosure of the written statements deprived it of the ability to infer compulsion, while noting the statutory mandate that such a course is neither prohibited nor unconstitutional.
(B) A person summoned under Section 40 of FERA may be required to give a statement in writing and sign it; such a statement is not presumed to be involuntary. Administering a caution that nontruthful statements constitute an offence is a legitimate regulatory measure and does not amount to the use of pressure or extraction. The recording of statements in writing, with the signature of the maker, is a permissible and desirable practice to ensure accuracy and deter subsequent complaints. The remedy of special leave under Article 136 is available against the orders of the High Court, but the merits of the appeal were barred at the stage of admission.
Facts of the case:
The appellant was issued summons by the respondent authority under Section 40 of FERA. He appeared on 15th May, 1996 after conditions were imposed, and his statement was recorded. Further statements were recorded on 9th July, 1996 and 12th July, 1996. The appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging the issuance of summons and the requirement to give a written statement, alleging compulsion. The Single Judge dismissed the petition, and the writ appeal was dismissed at the stage of admission. The appellant then filed a special leave petition in this Court.
Findings of Court:
The statements of the appellant were recorded on three dates in May and July 1996. The requirement to provide a written statement under Section 40 of FERA does not attract a presumption of compulsion, and the statute does not prohibit such a course. The caution administered for nontruthful statements is in the interest of the person making the statement under Section 40(4) and cannot be characterised as extraction of statements under pressure. The appellants failure to file copies of the statements with the special leave petition limits the Courts ability to assess any element of compulsion, and no material has been placed on record to demonstrate that the statements were extracted.
Issues:
Whether a person summoned under Section 40 of FERA can be compelled to give a written statement; whether the administration of caution as required by the statute constitutes compulsion or extraction; whether the nonfiling of statement copies in the special leave petition warrants an inference of coercion; whether the High Court was correct in dismissing the writ appeal.
Ratio Decidendi:
Section 40 of FERA expressly contemplates the recording of statements in writing, and the statute does not prohibit this practice. The requirement to provide a written statement, accompanied by a caution regarding falsity, is a legitimate regulatory measure and does not attract constitutional infirmity merely because the term 'compelled' is used. In the absence of material evidence showing actual coercion, and given the appellants choice not to disclose the statements, the appeal lacks merit.
Result:
The appeal is dismissed as it fails to demonstrate any illegality or compulsion; the interim direction is vacated, and the appellant is ordered to pay costs of Rs. 5,000.
(A) The impugned proceeding was initiated under Section 40 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, which empowers authorities to summon individuals and require them to provide statements in connection with alleged offences. The appellant challenged the validity of being compelled to provide a written statement, invoking the protections available under Article 136 of the Constitution for special leave to appeal, read with the evidentiary framework under Section 24 of the Evidence Act. The High Courts dismissal of the writ appeal was examined, with specific reliance on Section 40(3) and Section 40(4) of FERA, which contemplate the administration of caution regarding truthful disclosure and the safeguards of recording statements in writing, thereby not rendering the process inherently coercive or violative of constitutional rights. The court further considered that non-disclosure of the written statements deprived it of the ability to infer compulsion, while noting the statutory mandate that such a course is neither prohibited nor unconstitutional.
(B) A person summoned under Section 40 of FERA may be required to give a statement in writing and sign it; such a statement is not presumed to be involuntary. Administering a caution that nontruthful statements constitute an offence is a legitimate regulatory measure and does not amount to the use of pressure or extraction. The recording of statements in writing, with the signature of the maker, is a permissible and desirable practice to ensure accuracy and deter subsequent complaints. The remedy of special leave under Article 136 is available against the orders of the High Court, but the merits of the appeal were barred at the stage of admission.
Facts of the case:
The appellant was issued summons by the respondent authority under Section 40 of FERA. He appeared on 15th May, 1996 after conditions were imposed, and his statement was recorded. Further statements were recorded on 9th July, 1996 and 12th July, 1996. The appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging the issuance of summons and the requirement to give a written statement, alleging compulsion. The Single Judge dismissed the petition, and the writ appeal was dismissed at the stage of admission. The appellant then filed a special leave petition in this Court.
Findings of Court:
The statements of the appellant were recorded on three dates in May and July 1996. The requirement to provide a written statement under Section 40 of FERA does not attract a presumption of compulsion, and the statute does not prohibit such a course. The caution administered for nontruthful statements is in the interest of the person making the statement under Section 40(4) and cannot be characterised as extraction of statements under pressure. The appellants failure to file copies of the statements with the special leave petition limits the Courts ability to assess any element of compulsion, and no material has been placed on record to demonstrate that the statements were extracted.
Issues:
Whether a person summoned under Section 40 of FERA can be compelled to give a written statement; whether the administration of caution as required by the statute constitutes compulsion or extraction; whether the nonfiling of statement copies in the special leave petition warrants an inference of coercion; whether the High Court was correct in dismissing the writ appeal.
Ratio Decidendi:
Section 40 of FERA expressly contemplates the recording of statements in writing, and the statute does not prohibit this practice. The requirement to provide a written statement, accompanied by a caution regarding falsity, is a legitimate regulatory measure and does not attract constitutional infirmity merely because the term 'compelled' is used. In the absence of material evidence showing actual coercion, and given the appellants choice not to disclose the statements, the appeal lacks merit.
Result:
The appeal is dismissed as it fails to demonstrate any illegality or compulsion; the interim direction is vacated, and the appellant is ordered to pay costs of Rs. 5,000.
ORDER
Leave granted.
2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order of the High Court dated 28th March, 1996 in Writ Appeal No. 329 of 1996.
3. Summons were issued by the respondent to appellant under Section 40 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (hereinafter called as FERA) to appear before him on the fixed date. After putting in certain conditions for his appearance, the appellant appeared before the respondent on 15th May, 1996 when his statement was recorded. His statements were also recorded on 9th July, 1996 and 12th July, 1996. The appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging the issuance of summons to him and in the writ petition precise grievance made was that the appellant cannot be "compelled" to give his statement in writing in connection with an offence under FERA. A learned Single Judge of the High Court after detailed discussion dismissed the writ petition. The appellant took the matter in a writ appeal. The writ appeal by a detailed order, was dismissed at the stage of admission itself. By special leave, this appeal has been filed in this Court.
4. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.
It is not denied that the statements of the appellant have been recorded by the respondent on 15th May, 1996, 9th July, 1996 and 12th July, 1996. Learned counsel for the appellant did not dispute and rightly so that a person to whom summons are issued under Section 40 of FERA may be called upon to give his statement in writing and sign it and such a course is not prohibited either by the statute or the Constitution. In our opinion there is no presumption that such a statement is always "involuntary". In Amba Lal v. Union of India and others1 a Constitution Bench of this Court opined that such a course was desirable and observed that the giving of the statement in writing under the signatures of the maker safeguards the interest of the maker as well as the department and eliminates the possibility of making a complaint subsequently that the statement was not correctly recorded by the authorities. What has, however, been urged before us is that he cannot be "compelled" to give such a statement. Apart from the assertion of the appellant in the Court that the statements are "extracted" under `compulsion , which fact has been denied by the respondents, there is no other material placed on the record from which we may assume any element of "compulsion" being exercised as alleged by the appellant.
5. Despite our giving opportunities to the appellant to file copies of those statements in this Court to satisfy ourselves whether there was any element of "compulsion" visible from those statements, copies of those statements have been withheld for reasons best known to the appellant. As a matter of fact copies of those statements ought to have been filed with the special leave petition itself. It is, therefore, not possible for us to assume that any "compulsion" was exercised by the respondent to force the appellant to give his statements in writing. Administration of caution to the person summoned under Section 40 of FERA that not making a truthful statement would be an offence cannot by any stretch of imagination be construed as use of "pressure" to "extract" the statement. Administration of such a caution, which has the statutory backing of Section 40(3) of FERA itself, is in effect in the interest of the person who is making the statement in view of the provisions of Section 40(4) of FERA.
6. Thus, for what we have said above and for the reasons given by the High Court, we find no merit in this appeal. This appeal, therefore, fails and is hereby dismissed. The interim direction shall stand vacated. The appellant shall pay Rs. 5,000/- as costs.
Appeal dismissed.
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Parallel Citations of other Journals :
C. Sampath Kumar v. The Enforcement Officer, Enforcement Directorate, Madras, 1997(8) Supreme 268
00029
00030