1999 JTR(SC) 1500
2000 AIR(SC) 614 ; 2000 AIR(SCW) 43 ; 2000 1 AllCJ 623 ; 2000 38 AllLR 338 ; 2000 3 CivCC 165 ; 2000 1 CLT(SC) 92 ; 2000 1 CTC 163 ; 2000 1 CurLJ 251 ; 2000 4 ICC 708 ; 1999 10 JT 61 ; 2000 1 KLJ 261 ; 2000 1 KLT 274 ; 2000 18 LCD 599 ; 2000 2 MLJ 20 ; 2000 1 PLJR(SC) 111 ; 2000 2 PLR(SC) 547 ; 2000 1 RCR(Civ) 511 ; 2000 1 RCR(Rent) 10 ; 2000 2 RLW(Raj) 279 ; 1999 7 Scale 463 ; 2000 1 SCC 712 ; 1999 Supp5 SCR 271 ; 2000 1 UJ 209 ; 2000 WLC 1 ; 2000 KHC 54 ; 1999 10 Supreme 229
1999(10) Supreme 229
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Kerala High Court)
S.P. Kurdukar and R.P. Sethi, JJ.
B.K.N. Pillai -Petitioner
versus
P.Pillai & Anr. -Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 7222-23 of 1999
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 14540-14541 of 1999)
Decided on 13-12-1999
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appearing Parties : T.L. Vishwanatha Iyer, S. Balakrishnan, Sr. Advocates, K.L. Rathee, Subramonium Prasad, M.R. Rajendran Nair, K.M.K. Nair, Vipin Nair, Advocates.
IMPORTANT POINT
Where the defendant in a suit for eviction on ground of licencee but a lessee but later on sought to amend written statement incorporate an alternative plea that in case the Court found him to be a licensee he would be entitled to benefit of section 60(b) of Indian Easement Act, it could not be siad that amendment sought for if allowed would amount to permitting him to withdraw his admission in written statement so as to refuse amendment.
Act
Referred
:CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE : O.6 R.17
EASEMENTS ACT : S.60(b)
(A) The relevant statutory framework comprises Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which confers a wide discretion to courts to permit amendments to pleadings at any stage to ensure the determination of real controversies, and Section 60(b) of the Indian Easements Act, 1882, which addresses the rights of a licencee and the conditions under which a licence may be revoked. In this matter, the trial court and the High Court rejected the defendants application to amend his written statement to raise an alternative plea that he was not a lessee but a licencee, and that in the alternative, he was entitled to the protection of Section 60(b) on the basis of an alleged irrevocable licence. This Court applies the principles governing amendment to balance the need for procedural flexibility against the risk of prejudice, while Section 60(b) informs the substantive question of whether a licence, once executed and relied upon with permanent works, can be revoked to oust the defendant from the property.
(B) Key legal principles include that amendments to pleadings are to be liberally permitted in the interests of justice, provided they do not constitute a new cause of action, do not prejudice the other party, and do not seek to take advantage of a statute of limitation. Alternative pleas in defence are permissible if they do not withdraw admissions or cause irretrievable prejudice. Courts may allow amendments even after the expiry of limitation periods if substantial justice is served. Further, a party relying on a licence cannot be permitted to evade liabilities, such as non-payment of licence fees, especially where permanent works have been executed on the strength of the licence.
Facts of the case:
The respondent-plaintiff filed a suit against the appellant-defendant seeking mandatory and prohibitory injunction for eviction on the ground that the appellant was merely a licencee. The appellant denied being a licencee and claimed to be a lessee. During trial, the appellant sought leave to amend his written statement to alternatively plead that, in the event he was found to be a licensee, he was not liable for eviction on the basis that the licence was irrevocable, and to raise a plea that the plaint and a subsequent claim were barred by limitation. He also asserted that he had executed permanent works and incurred expenses, and therefore his licence could not be revoked under Section 60(b) of the Indian Easements Act, 1882. The amendment was denied by both the trial court and the High Court on the ground that it was mutually destructive, as it would amount to withdrawing admissions already made.
Findings of Court:
The High Courts order was set aside. It was held that the proposed amendment did not introduce a new cause of action or replace the original basis of the lis, but was a legitimate alternative plea that did not prejudice the respondent. The Court emphasized that liberal amendment rules should apply, particularly where costs could compensate the other side, and that an amendment seeking to avail of Section 60(b) could be allowed subject to the appellant fulfilling his obligations, including payment of arrears of licence fees and costs.
Issues:
Whether the appellant was entitled to amend his written statement to raise an alternative plea based on Section 60(b) of the Indian Easements Act, 1882, after the expiry of the limitation period and after the trial had proceeded substantially, and whether such amendment would prejudice the respondent to an extent that could not be compensated by costs.
Ratio Decidendi:
The Court held that amendments should be liberally construed to avoid multiplicity of litigation and to serve the ends of justice, and that an alternative plea seeking the benefit of Section 60(b) was not inconsistent with the original defence. The amendment was allowed on the condition that the appellant discharged his obligations regarding licence fees and costs, ensuring that the respondent was compensated for any inconvenience.
Result:
The appeals were allowed. The order of the High Court was set aside, and the appellant was permitted to amend his written statement to include the plea under Section 60(b) of the Indian Easements Act, 1882, subject to payment of all arrears of licence fee and costs of Rs. 3,000 within one month.
(A) The relevant statutory framework comprises Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which confers a wide discretion to courts to permit amendments to pleadings at any stage to ensure the determination of real controversies, and Section 60(b) of the Indian Easements Act, 1882, which addresses the rights of a licencee and the conditions under which a licence may be revoked. In this matter, the trial court and the High Court rejected the defendants application to amend his written statement to raise an alternative plea that he was not a lessee but a licencee, and that in the alternative, he was entitled to the protection of Section 60(b) on the basis of an alleged irrevocable licence. This Court applies the principles governing amendment to balance the need for procedural flexibility against the risk of prejudice, while Section 60(b) informs the substantive question of whether a licence, once executed and relied upon with permanent works, can be revoked to oust the defendant from the property.
(B) Key legal principles include that amendments to pleadings are to be liberally permitted in the interests of justice, provided they do not constitute a new cause of action, do not prejudice the other party, and do not seek to take advantage of a statute of limitation. Alternative pleas in defence are permissible if they do not withdraw admissions or cause irretrievable prejudice. Courts may allow amendments even after the expiry of limitation periods if substantial justice is served. Further, a party relying on a licence cannot be permitted to evade liabilities, such as non-payment of licence fees, especially where permanent works have been executed on the strength of the licence.
Facts of the case:
The respondent-plaintiff filed a suit against the appellant-defendant seeking mandatory and prohibitory injunction for eviction on the ground that the appellant was merely a licencee. The appellant denied being a licencee and claimed to be a lessee. During trial, the appellant sought leave to amend his written statement to alternatively plead that, in the event he was found to be a licensee, he was not liable for eviction on the basis that the licence was irrevocable, and to raise a plea that the plaint and a subsequent claim were barred by limitation. He also asserted that he had executed permanent works and incurred expenses, and therefore his licence could not be revoked under Section 60(b) of the Indian Easements Act, 1882. The amendment was denied by both the trial court and the High Court on the ground that it was mutually destructive, as it would amount to withdrawing admissions already made.
Findings of Court:
The High Courts order was set aside. It was held that the proposed amendment did not introduce a new cause of action or replace the original basis of the lis, but was a legitimate alternative plea that did not prejudice the respondent. The Court emphasized that liberal amendment rules should apply, particularly where costs could compensate the other side, and that an amendment seeking to avail of Section 60(b) could be allowed subject to the appellant fulfilling his obligations, including payment of arrears of licence fees and costs.
Issues:
Whether the appellant was entitled to amend his written statement to raise an alternative plea based on Section 60(b) of the Indian Easements Act, 1882, after the expiry of the limitation period and after the trial had proceeded substantially, and whether such amendment would prejudice the respondent to an extent that could not be compensated by costs.
Ratio Decidendi:
The Court held that amendments should be liberally construed to avoid multiplicity of litigation and to serve the ends of justice, and that an alternative plea seeking the benefit of Section 60(b) was not inconsistent with the original defence. The amendment was allowed on the condition that the appellant discharged his obligations regarding licence fees and costs, ensuring that the respondent was compensated for any inconvenience.
Result:
The appeals were allowed. The order of the High Court was set aside, and the appellant was permitted to amend his written statement to include the plea under Section 60(b) of the Indian Easements Act, 1882, subject to payment of all arrears of licence fee and costs of Rs. 3,000 within one month.
JUDGEMENT
Sethi, J. -Leave granted. Heard.
2. The respondent-plaintiff filed a suit against the appellant-defendant praying for the grant of mandatory and prohibitory injunction seeking eviction allegedly on the ground of his being a licencee. In the written statement filed the appellant herein pleaded that he was not a licencee but a lessee. During the trial of the suit the appellant filed an application for amendment of the written statement to incorporate an alternative plea that in case the court found that the defendant was a licencee, he was not liable to be evicted as according to him the licence was irrevocable. He further wanted to add a plea that first and second prayers in the plaint were barred by limitation and that as acting upon the licence he has executed works of permanent nature and incurred expenses in execution of the same, his licence cannot be revoked by the grantor under Section 60(b) of the Indian Eastements Act, 1882. The prayer was rejected by the Trial Court as also by the High Court on the ground that the proposed amendment was mutually destructinve which, if allowed, would amount to permitting the defendant to withdraw the admission allegedly made by him in the main written statement.
3. The purpose and object of Order 6 Rule 17 CPC is to allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just. The power to allow the amendment is wide and can be exercised at any stage of the proceedings in the interests of justice on the basis of guidelines laid down by various High Courts and this Court. It is true that the amendment cannot be claimed as a matter of right and under all circumstances. But it is equally true that the courts while deciding such prayers should not adopt hypertechnical approach. Liberal approach should be the general rule particularly in cases where the other side can be compensated with the costs. Technicalities of law should not be permitted to hamper the courts in the administration of justice between the parties. Amendments are allowed in the pleadings to avoid uncalled for multiplicity of litigation.
4. This Court in A.K. Gupta & Sons v. Damodar Valley Corporation1 held :
"The general rule, no doubt, is that a party is not allowed by amendment to set up a new case or a new cause of action particularly when a suit or new case or cause of action is barred : Weldon v. Neale (1887) 19 QBD 394. But it is also well recognised that where the amendment does not constitute the recognised that where the amendment does not constitute the addition of a new cause of action or raise a different case, but amounts to no more than different or additional approach to the same facts, the amendments will be allowed even after the expirty of the statutory period of limitation : See Charan Das v. Amir Khan, AIR 1921 PC 50 and LJ Leach and Company Limited and Anr. v. Jardine Skinner and Company, 1957 SCR 438.
The principal reasons that have led to the rule last mentioned are, first, that the object of courts and rules of procedure is to decide the rights of the parties and not to punish them for their mistakes (Cropper v. Smith (1884) 26 Ch.D. 700) and secondly, that a party is strictly not entitled to rely on the statute of limitation when what is sought to be brought in by the amendment can be said in substance to be already in the pleading sought to be amended in Kishandas Rupchand v. Rachappa Vithoba (1909) ILR 33 Bom. 644 approved in Pirgonda Hongonda Patil v. Kalgonda Sidgonda Patil, 1957 SCR 595.
The expression cause of action in the present context does not mean every fact which it is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed as was said in Cooke v. Gill (1873) 8 CP 107, in a different context, for if it were so, no material fact could ever be amended or added and, of course, no one would want to change or add an immaterial allegation by amndement. That expression for the present purpose only means, a new claim made on a new basis constituted by new facts. Such a view was taken in Robinson v. Unicos Property Corporation Limited 1962-2 All ER 24, and it seems to us to be the only possible view to take. Any other view would make the rule futil. The words new case have been understood to mean new set of ideas Dornan v. J.W. Ellis and Company Limited, 1962-1 All ER 303. This also seems to us to be a reasonable view to take. No amendment will be allowed to introduce a new set of ideas to the prejudice of any right acquired by any paty by lapse of time."
5. Again in Smt. Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar & Ors.2 this Court held :
"The power to allow an amendment is undoubtedly wide and may at any stage be appropriately exercised in the interest of justice, the law of limitation notwithstanding. But the exercise of such far reaching discretionary powers is governed by judicial considerations and wider the discretion, greater ought to be the care and circumspection on the part of the Court."
In M/s. Ganesh Trading Company v. Moji Ram3 it was held :
"It is clear from the foregoing summary of the main rules of pleadings and provisions for the amendment of pleadings, subject to such terms as to costs and giving of all parties concerned necessary opportunities to meet exact situations resulting from amendments, are intended for promoting the ends of justice and not for defeating them. Even if a party or its Counsel is inefficient in setting out its case initially the short coming can certainly be removed generally by appropriate steps taken by a party which must no doubt pay costs for the inconvenience or expense caused to the other side from its omissions. The error is not incapable of being rectified so long as remedial steps do not unjustifiably injure rights accrued.
The principles applicable to the amendments of the plaint are equally applicable to the amendments of the written statements. The courts are more generous in allowing the amendment of the written statement as question of prejudice is less likely to operate in that event. The defendant has a right to take alternative plea in defence which, however, is subject to an exception that by the proposed amendment other side should not be subjected to injustice and that any admission made in favour of the plaintiff is not withdrawn. All amendments of the pleadings should be allowed which are necessary for determination of the real controversies in the suit provided the proposed amendment does not alter or substitute a new cause of action on the basis of which the original lis was raised or defence taken. Inconsistent and contradictory allegations in negation to the admitted position of facts or mutually destructive allegations of facts should not be allowed to be incorporated by means of amendment to the pleadings. Proposed amendment should not cause such prejudice to the other side which cannot be compensated by costs. No amendment should be allowed which amounts to or relates in defeating a legal right accruing to the opposite part on account of lapse of time. The delay in filing the petition for amendment of the pleadings should be properly compensated by costs and error or mistake which, if not fraudulent, should not be made a ground for rejecting the application for amendment of plaint or written statement.
6. In the appeal the appellant-defendant wanted to amend the written staement by taking a plea that in case he is not held a lessee, he was entitled to the benefit of Section 60(b) of the Indian Eastements Act, 1882. Learned counsel for the appellant is not interested in incorporation of the other pleas raised in the application seeking amendment. The plea sought to be raised is neither inconsistent nor repugnant to the pleas already raised in defence. The alternative plea sought to be incorporated in the written statement is in fact the extension of the plea of the respondent-plaintiff and rebuttal to the issue framed regarding liability of the appellant of being dispossed on proof of the fact that he was a licencee liable to be evicted in accordance with the provisions of law. The mere fact that the appellant had filed the application after a prolonged delay could not be made a ground for rejecting his prayer particularly when the respondent-plaintiff could be compensated by costs. We do not agree with the finding of the High Court that the proposed amendment virtually amounted to withdrawalof any admission made by the appellant and that such withdrawal was likely to cause irretrievable prejudice to the respondent.
7. It has been stated on behalf of the respondent at the bar that the appellant having not come to the court with clean hands is not entitled to any discretionary relief. It is contended that the appellant has not paid any licence fee as per the terms of the additional licence granted in his favour. It has been stated that in case the appeals are allowed the appellant-defendant be directed to pay all the arrears of the licence fee. We find substance in the submission made on behalf of the respondents.
8. Under the circumstances, the appeal are allowed by setting aside the orders impugned. The appellant-defendant is permitted to amend the written statement to the extent of incorporating the plea of his entitlement to the benefit of Section 60(b) of the Indian Easements Act, 1882 only subject to his paying all the arrears on account of licence fee and costs assessed at Rs. 3,000/- within a period of one month from the date the parties appear in the Trial Court. Costs of the appeals are made easy.
(C.R.) Appeals allowed.
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Parallel Citations of other Journals :
B.K.N. Pillai v. P. Pillai & Anr., 1999(10) Supreme 229
00043