2000 JTR(SC) 108
2000 AIR(SC) 775 ; 2000 AIR(SCW) 321 ; 2000 2 AllCJ 943 ; 2000 41 AllLR 774 ; 2000 1 AndhWR(SC) 100 ; 2000 1 BBCJ(SC) 150 ; 2000 2 BomCR(SC) 685 ; 2000 1 CLT(SC) 268 ; 2000 1 CurLJ 139 ; 2000 DNJ 112 ; 2000 1 EastCrC(SC) 343 ; 2000 1 JT 266 ; 2000 1 KLT(SN) 50 ; 2000 2 MLJ 24 ; 2000 2 PLJR(SC) 2 ; 2000 2 RCR(Civ) 207 ; 2001 92 RD 71 ; 2000 1 Scale 146 ; 2000 2 SCC 13 ; 2000 1 SCR 254 ; 2000 WLC 135 ; 2000 KHC 221 ; 2000 1 Supreme 209
2000(1) Supreme 209
Supreme Court of India
(From Madras High Court)
V.N. Khare & S. Santosh Hegde, JJ.
Bhagwandas Fatechand Daswani & Ors. —Appellants
versus
H.P.A. International & Ors. Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 7386 of 1994
Decided on 13-1-2000
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellants : Soli J. Sorabjee, Attorney General, H.N. Salve, S. Ganesh, Sr. Advocates, P.H. Parekh, Amit Dhingra, Jayesh Dolia, Harish Y. Shankar, Sameer Parekh, V. Balachandran, Raju Ramachandran, Joseph Pookkat, R.A. Perumal, N.C. Ramesh, N.S. Varadachari, Advocates.
For the Respondents : K. Parasaran, Sr. Advocate, V. Balachandran, S. Aravindh, Santhel Jagadeesan, V. Rama Subramaniam, T.K. Sharedri, Advocates.
Important point
Where judgment was delivered after five years after conclusion of hearing of the appeal, Supreme Court set aside judgment for deciding the appeal on merit holding that the party whose appeal had been dismissed may have the apprehension that the arguments raised at the bar have not been reflected or appreciated while dictating the judgment.
Act Referred :CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE : S.96
(A) The Civil Procedure Code, Section 96, provides the statutory framework governing appeals in civil matters, ensuring that decrees and judgments passed by lower courts are subject to appropriate review by higher courts. The present appeal invokes this provision as it challenges the Madras High Courts decree for specific performance, which was passed after a long delay in judgment delivery. The interplay of this section with the principles of finality and procedural fairness is evident, as the delay itself becomes a ground for setting aside the impugned judgment without necessarily delving into the merits, thereby underscoring the right to a speedy and fair adjudication under the Code.
(B) Key legal principles include that an appeal against a decree for specific performance lies to the appropriate higher court, undue delay in delivering judgment can vitiate the process and justify setting aside the decree, parties in possession must maintain status quo pendente lite, and agreed stipulations regarding rent deposit and non-creation of third-party rights are binding during appellate proceedings.
Facts of the case:
On 26th June, 1977, respondent No. 2 entered into an agreement transferring his life interest in a property to the first respondent, and on 29th December, 1979, defendant-appellants, as subsequent purchasers, acquired the rights for Rs. 4.40 lakhs. Plaintiff-respondent No. 1 filed a suit for specific performance, which was decreed by the trial court and later affirmed by the Madras High Court. The appellants appeal in this Court was noted after a long delay, and interim relief was denied, leading to the execution of a sale deed and possession by respondent No. 1. An agreed statement was filed to protect appellants interests during the pendency of the appeal.
Findings of Court:
The High Court was criticized for the long delay in delivering its judgment, which caused unnecessary speculation and raised concerns that arguments may not have been fully appreciated. Consequently, the judgment was set aside without commenting on the merits, and the case was remitted for a fresh hearing. The court also observed that respondent No. 1, being in lawful possession, would not create third-party rights, and the parties agreed to deposit rental income subject to the appeals outcome.
Issues:
Whether the delay in delivering the High Courts judgment justifies setting aside the decree? Whether the status quo should be maintained during the appellate process, and how the interests of both parties are to be protected?
Ratio Decidendi:
The primary ratio is that an inordinate and unexplained delay in delivering a judgment, which spans several years after the conclusion of hearings, undermines the fairness of the appellate process and warrants the setting aside of the impugned decree. The court prioritizes procedural fairness and the right to a speedy resolution, leading to the remission of the case for a fresh merits-based hearing while preserving the status quo through agreed stipulations.
Result:
The appeal is allowed. The contested judgment is set aside without expressing any opinion on the merits, and the case is remitted to the High Court to be decided afresh, with an expectation of expeditious disposal within six months. No order as to costs is made.
(A) The Civil Procedure Code, Section 96, provides the statutory framework governing appeals in civil matters, ensuring that decrees and judgments passed by lower courts are subject to appropriate review by higher courts. The present appeal invokes this provision as it challenges the Madras High Courts decree for specific performance, which was passed after a long delay in judgment delivery. The interplay of this section with the principles of finality and procedural fairness is evident, as the delay itself becomes a ground for setting aside the impugned judgment without necessarily delving into the merits, thereby underscoring the right to a speedy and fair adjudication under the Code.
(B) Key legal principles include that an appeal against a decree for specific performance lies to the appropriate higher court, undue delay in delivering judgment can vitiate the process and justify setting aside the decree, parties in possession must maintain status quo pendente lite, and agreed stipulations regarding rent deposit and non-creation of third-party rights are binding during appellate proceedings.
Facts of the case:
On 26th June, 1977, respondent No. 2 entered into an agreement transferring his life interest in a property to the first respondent, and on 29th December, 1979, defendant-appellants, as subsequent purchasers, acquired the rights for Rs. 4.40 lakhs. Plaintiff-respondent No. 1 filed a suit for specific performance, which was decreed by the trial court and later affirmed by the Madras High Court. The appellants appeal in this Court was noted after a long delay, and interim relief was denied, leading to the execution of a sale deed and possession by respondent No. 1. An agreed statement was filed to protect appellants interests during the pendency of the appeal.
Findings of Court:
The High Court was criticized for the long delay in delivering its judgment, which caused unnecessary speculation and raised concerns that arguments may not have been fully appreciated. Consequently, the judgment was set aside without commenting on the merits, and the case was remitted for a fresh hearing. The court also observed that respondent No. 1, being in lawful possession, would not create third-party rights, and the parties agreed to deposit rental income subject to the appeals outcome.
Issues:
Whether the delay in delivering the High Courts judgment justifies setting aside the decree? Whether the status quo should be maintained during the appellate process, and how the interests of both parties are to be protected?
Ratio Decidendi:
The primary ratio is that an inordinate and unexplained delay in delivering a judgment, which spans several years after the conclusion of hearings, undermines the fairness of the appellate process and warrants the setting aside of the impugned decree. The court prioritizes procedural fairness and the right to a speedy resolution, leading to the remission of the case for a fresh merits-based hearing while preserving the status quo through agreed stipulations.
Result:
The appeal is allowed. The contested judgment is set aside without expressing any opinion on the merits, and the case is remitted to the High Court to be decided afresh, with an expectation of expeditious disposal within six months. No order as to costs is made.
Order
The defendant-appellants, who are the subsequent purchasers, are in appeal. This appeal is directed against the judgment of Madras High Court dated 24th January, 1994 whereby the decree for specific performance of the agreement passed by the trial Court was affirmed.
2. On 26th June, 1977 respondent No. 2 entered into an agreement with first respondent herein, for transfer of his life interest in the property in dispute. On 29.12.79. respondent No. 2 transferred the rights in favour of the defendant-appellants who are the subsequent pruchasers for consideration of Rs. 4.40 lakhs. Under such circumstances, plaintiff-respondent No.1 brought a suit for specific performance, which was decreed by the trial Court and the appeal preferred to the High Court was dismissed. It is in this way the defendant-appellants are before us.
3. Learned Attorney General appearing for the appellants urged that, before the High Court, the hearing of the appeal was concluded on 22nd March, 1999 but the judgment was delivered on 24th January, 1994—nearly five years after the hearing was concluded, and this long delay in delivery of judgment by itself is sufficient to set aside the judgment under appeal. Learned Attorney General has also relied upon decision of this Court in the case of Kunwar Singh and others v. Sri Thakurji Maharaj1. At present, we are not deposed to go into this broad question as urged by the learned Attorney General. However, it is correct to this extent that long delay in delivery of judgment gives rise to unnecessary speculations in the mind of parties to a case. Moreover, the appellants whose appeals have been dismissed by the High Court may have the apprehension that the arguments raised at the bar have not have been reflected or appreciated while dictating the judgment-nearly after five years. This is fairly not disputed by learned senior counsel, Shri K. Parasaran, appearing for respondent No. 1. We, therefore, on this short question, set aside the judgment under appeal without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case and remit the case to the High Court for deciding the appeal afresh, on merits. In view of the fact, that the matter has been pending for a considerable period of time, we request the High Court to decide the matter expeditiously, if possible, within six months.
4. Before we part with the case, we would like to observe that when this appeal was filed in this Court, the interim relief prayed for by the appellants was refused. As a consequence, respondent No. 2 executed a sale deed in favour of respondent No. 1, and respondent No. 1 came in possession of the property and since then, he continues to be in possession. Under such circumstances, respondent No.1 being the lawful owner, so long the decree remains intact, is entitled to continue in possession over the property in dispute. Learned Attorney General urged that, in case respondent No.1 is to continue in possession over the property, the interest of the appellants may also to be protected. It is then, learned counsel for the parties made an agreed statement that during the pendency of the appeal before the High Court respondent No.1 shall not create any third party right in respect of the property in dispute and further shall deposit the rent income received from that property in the High Court after deducting the maintenance charges and tax liabilities which shall be subject to the decision of the appeal in the High Court. We order accordingly.
5. The appeal is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs. All the I.As. are disposed of accordingly.
(C.R.) Appeal allowed.
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Parallel Citations of other Journals :
Bhagwandas Fatechand Daswani & Ors. v. H.P.A. International & Ors., 2000(1) Supreme 209 : 2000(1) JT 266 : (2000) 2 SCC 813 : 2000 SCFBRC 47 : AIR 2000 SC 775 : 2000(2) Civ. L.J. 590
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