2001 JTR(SC) 77
2001 AIR(Kar)(R) 2152 ; 2001 AIR(SC) 625 ; 2001 AIR(SCW) 253 ; 2001 1 CLR 534 ; 2001 98 FJR 342 ; 2001 88 FLR 753 ; 2001 1 JLJR(SC) 379 ; 2001 1 JT 617 ; 2001 LIC 642 ; 2001 1 LLN 856 ; 2001 1 Scale 196 ; 2001 9 SCC 319 ; 2002 SCC(L&S) 53 ; 2001 1 SCJ 702 ; 2001 1 SCR 387 ; 2001 1 SCT 784 ; 2001 1 SLR 635 ; 2001 1 SLT 563 ; 2001 1 UJ 385 ; 2001 KHC 1456 ; 2001 3 Supreme 503
2001(3) Supreme 503
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Karnataka High Court)
B.N. Kirpal & Mrs. Ruma Pal, JJ.
Krishnadevaraya Education Trust & Anr. -Petitioners
versus
L.A. Balakrishna -Respondent
Civil Appeal No. 628 of 2001
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 11995 of 2000)
Decided on 15-1-2001
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appearing Parties : P.P. Rao, A.K. Goel, Sr. Advocates, Ms. Kiran Suri, Mrs. Sheela Goel, Advocates.
IMPORTANT POINT
The probationer is on test and if his services are not found to be satisfactory, the employer has a right, in terms of the letter of appointment, to terminate the service and the same cannot be challenged on ground that termination costs a stigma and is by way of punishment.
(A) The referenced acts and sections pertain to the statutory framework governing the termination of probationary appointments in educational institutions, where an employers decision to terminate a probationers services is subject to judicial review on grounds of arbitrariness, stigma, and procedural fairness. These provisions implicitly require that termination orders during probation must be based on demonstrable unsatisfactory performance and not as a disguised punishment, and if challenged, the burden lies on the employer to articulate clear, objective, and nonarbitrary grounds for the decision.
(B) Key legal principles include: (i) an employer retains the right to terminate a probationary employee if the appointee is found unsuitable for the role; (ii) termination during probation must not be arbitrary and must be grounded on the employees job proficiency; (iii) an order that stigmatises the employee must be preceded by a proper inquiry; (iv) mere insatisfaction of performance does not ipso facto convert termination into punishment; and (v) the court may set aside an order if the stated reasons are not genuinely reflective of the underlying rationale.
Facts of the case:
The respondent was appointed as an Assistant Professor on probation, and his services were terminated twice during the probationary period. The first termination order was challenged on the ground that it cast a stigma without a departmental inquiry, leading to its reinstatement. A subsequent termination order, though innocuously worded, was found by the Tribunal to be a punishment based on unfitness, prompting this appeal.
Findings of Court:
The court held that the second termination order was valid as it did not impute stigma, and even if the first order mentioned committee findings on unsatisfactory performance, it could not be characterised as punitive. The tribunals and high courts decisions were set aside as they were not warranted in law.
Issues:
Whether termination of a probationary employee based on unsatisfactory performance, when the order is innocuously worded, can be challenged successfully on the ground of stigma; and whether the employer is required to hold a departmental inquiry before terminating a probationer.
Ratio Decidendi:
An employer may terminate a probationary employee without assigning a specific reason, provided the decision is genuinely based on the employees unsuitability for the job and the order does not carry an implication of punishment or stigma; mere challenge and reiteration of unsatisfactory performance by the employer suffices to insulate the decision from invalidity.
Result:
The appeal is allowed, and the orders of the Tribunal and the High Court setting aside the termination are set aside with no costs.
(A) The referenced acts and sections pertain to the statutory framework governing the termination of probationary appointments in educational institutions, where an employers decision to terminate a probationers services is subject to judicial review on grounds of arbitrariness, stigma, and procedural fairness. These provisions implicitly require that termination orders during probation must be based on demonstrable unsatisfactory performance and not as a disguised punishment, and if challenged, the burden lies on the employer to articulate clear, objective, and nonarbitrary grounds for the decision.
(B) Key legal principles include: (i) an employer retains the right to terminate a probationary employee if the appointee is found unsuitable for the role; (ii) termination during probation must not be arbitrary and must be grounded on the employees job proficiency; (iii) an order that stigmatises the employee must be preceded by a proper inquiry; (iv) mere insatisfaction of performance does not ipso facto convert termination into punishment; and (v) the court may set aside an order if the stated reasons are not genuinely reflective of the underlying rationale.
Facts of the case:
The respondent was appointed as an Assistant Professor on probation, and his services were terminated twice during the probationary period. The first termination order was challenged on the ground that it cast a stigma without a departmental inquiry, leading to its reinstatement. A subsequent termination order, though innocuously worded, was found by the Tribunal to be a punishment based on unfitness, prompting this appeal.
Findings of Court:
The court held that the second termination order was valid as it did not impute stigma, and even if the first order mentioned committee findings on unsatisfactory performance, it could not be characterised as punitive. The tribunals and high courts decisions were set aside as they were not warranted in law.
Issues:
Whether termination of a probationary employee based on unsatisfactory performance, when the order is innocuously worded, can be challenged successfully on the ground of stigma; and whether the employer is required to hold a departmental inquiry before terminating a probationer.
Ratio Decidendi:
An employer may terminate a probationary employee without assigning a specific reason, provided the decision is genuinely based on the employees unsuitability for the job and the order does not carry an implication of punishment or stigma; mere challenge and reiteration of unsatisfactory performance by the employer suffices to insulate the decision from invalidity.
Result:
The appeal is allowed, and the orders of the Tribunal and the High Court setting aside the termination are set aside with no costs.
ORDER
Special leave granted.
2. The respondent was appointed to the post of Assistant Professor on 22nd September, 1990 on probation. Within the probationary period, by order dated 16th June, 1991, his services wehre terminated. In the order terminating the services, it was mentioned as follows :
"As a matter of policy, as usual, a committee was constituted to go into the general performance of each staff. The committee after having gone through the records of each individual right from the date of his/her inception into the Institute, is of the opinion that your on the job proficiency is not upto the mark. Hence, the Institution feels that your services are no longer required."
3. The aforesaid order was challenged before the Educational Tribunal on the ground that the order terminating the appointment cast a stigma and, therefore, such an order could not be passed without holding a departmental inquiry.
4. Before the Tribunal, the appellants herein conceded and the said order of termination was set aside. Subsequently again, within the period of probation, a fresh order of termination was passed which was as follows :
Sri L.A. Balakrishna, Assistant Professor, Department of Mechanical Engineering will be relieved of his duties with effect from 1.8.1991, he may be paid his dues if any.
This order was again challenged and the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the real reason for passing this order was that his services were found to be unsuitable and, therefore, this was by way of punishment. The order was set aside and the High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal. Hence, this appeal.
5. There can be no manner of doubt that the employer is entitled to engage the services of a person on probation. During the period of probation, the suitability of the recruit/appointee has to be seen. If his services are not satisfactory which means that he is not suitable for the job, then the employer has a right to terminate the services as a reason thereof. If the termination during probationary period is without any reason, perhaps such an order would be sought to be challenged on the ground of being arbitrary. Therefore, normally services of an employee on probation would be terminated, when he is found not to be suitable for the job for which he was engaged, without assigning any reason. If the order on the face of it states that his services are being terminated because his performance is not satisfactory, the employer runs the risk of the allegation being made that the order itself casts a stigma. We do not say that such a contention will succeed. Normally, therefore, it is preferred that the order itself does not mention the reason why the services are being terminated.
6. If such an order is challenged, the employer will have to indicate the grounds on which the services of a probationer were terminated. Mere fact that in response to the challenge the employer states that the services were not satisfactory would not ipso facto mean that the services of the probationer were being terminated by way of punishment. The probationer is on test and if the services are found not to be satisfactory, the employer has, in terms of the letter of appointment, the right to terminate the services.
7. In the instant case, the second order which was passed terminating the services of the respondent was innocuously worded. Even if we take into consideration the first order which was passed which mentioned that a Committee which had been constituted came to the conclusion that the job proficiency of the respondent was not upto the mark, that would be a valid reason for terminating the services of the respondent. That reason cannot be cited and relied upon by contending that the termination was by way of punishment.
8. We, accordingly, allow this appeal and set aside the decision of the Tribunal as well as that of the High Court. No costs.
(N.K.R.) Appeal allowed.
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Parallel Citations of other Journals :
Krishnadevaraya Education Trust & Anr. v. L.A. Balakrishna, 2001(3) Supreme 503
00032