2001 JTR(SC) 1429
2001 4 AICLR 412 ; 2001 AIR(Jhar)(R) 534 ; 2001 AIR(SC) 2989 ; 2001 AIR(SCW) 4186 ; 2001 2 ALD(Cri)(SC) 836 ; 2001 43 AllCriC 1089 ; 2001 AllMR(Cri)(SC) 2403 ; 2001 3 BBCJ(SC) 177 ; 2002 1 BLJR 707 ; 2002 CriLR 59 ; 2001 CrLJ 4718 ; 2002 1 EastCrC(SC) 339 ; 2001 2 JCC 344 ; 2001 2 JLJR(SC) 895 ; 2001 8 JT 473 ; 2001 4 PLJR(SC) 183 ; 2001 4 RCR(Cri) 589 ; 2001 7 Scale 232 ; 2002 1 SCC 149 ; 2002 SCC(Cri) 110 ; 2001 Supp4 SCR 157 ; 2002 1 WLC 155 ; 2002 KHC 1086 ; 2001 7 Supreme 748
2001(7) Supreme 748
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Patna High Court)
M.B. Shah and R.P. Sethi, JJ.
Mahendra Lal Das -Appellant
versus
State of Bihar & Ors. -Respondents
Criminal Appeal No. 1038 of 2001
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 3645 of 2000)
Decided on 12-10-2001
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : S.B. Sanyal, Sr. Advocate, Alok Kumar, Rajesh Pathak, Advocate for Ms. Narosh Bakshi, Advocates.
For the Respondents : Saket Singh, Advocate for B.B. Singh, Advocate.
IMPORTANT POINT
Keeping in view the inordinate delay of 13 years in granting sanction, differences of opinion as to initiate prosecution and case law no useful purpose would be served to put the appellant at trial of impugned corruption case. The same is quashed in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case.
Act
Referred
:CONSTITUTION OF INDIA : Art.21, Art.136
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE : S.482, S.157
PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT : S.19, S.5(1)(e), S.6
(A) The provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, specifically Sections 5(1)(e), 5(2), and 6, read in conjunction with Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which guarantees the right to life and personal liberty encompassing a speedy trial, are central to this case. The charge under Section 5(1)(e) relates to criminal misconduct by a public servant regarding disproportionate assets, while Section 5(2) provides for the presumption of corruption in such cases. Section 6 outlines the procedural framework for investigation and prosecution. The prolonged inordinate delay of over twelve years in obtaining sanction for prosecution, without satisfactory justification, is viewed as a direct infringement of the fundamental right to a speedy trial, as interpreted in Article 136 and reinforced by the principles of criminal procedure under Sections 482 and 157 of the CrPC. The court examines how the failure of the investigative and executive authorities to act decisively prejudices the accused and undermines the integrity of the judicial process.
(B) The case establishes that in corruption matters, the mere vesting of suspicion is not as significant as the necessity for swift justice. An inordinate and unexplained delay in granting sanction for prosecution, particularly when it exceeds reasonable limits, constitutes a breach of the accused's right to a speedy trial and can prejudice their liberty. Such delay, especially when sanctioned by higher authorities, may amount to harassment and warrants the quashing of proceedings to uphold the rule of law and prevent the abuse of process. The investigation agency cannot indefinitely prolong its inquiries without concluding the process.
Facts of the case:
The appellant, an Executive Engineer, was accused by an informant of acquiring disproportionate assets amounting to approximately Rs. 50,600/- during his tenure between 1961-62 and 1982-83. An investigation was initiated, and the officer-in-charge concluded that the appellant possessed unaccountable funds. A proposal for sanction to prosecute was submitted multiple times to the competent authorities starting in 1992, but no final orders were passed for over thirteen years, leaving the case in a state of limbo. The appellant moved the High Court to quash the proceedings, arguing that the delay prejudiced his career and personal life, and he was ultimately granted anticipatory bail. The state authorities themselves acknowledged the futility of proceeding and the lack of a meritorious case.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the prosecution had failed to provide any reasonable explanation for the delay exceeding twelve years in sanctioning the prosecution. The authorities were not convinced of the merits of the case and believed that granting sanction would be a futile exercise. The court held that such inordinate delay, which resulted in the appellant losing a promotion and being unable to live with his family abroad, prejudiced his fundamental right to a speedy trial. The court drew parallels with prior judgments where similar delays led to the quashing of cases, concluding that pursuing the matter further would be a travesty of justice and an unnecessary burden on the court.
Issues:
The primary legal issue was whether the unexplained delay of over thirteen years in obtaining sanction for prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act, during which the accused remained in anticipatory bail, violated the accused's right to a speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution, thereby warranting the quashing of the proceedings.
Ratio Decidendi:
The core judicial reasoning is that in corruption cases, the mandate of a speedy trial under Article 21 is paramount. An inordinate and unexplained delay in the investigative and sanction-granting process, particularly when it extends beyond reasonable limits and prejudices the accused, is sufficient grounds to quash the proceedings. The court must scrutinize such delays, and if found to be without just cause, must grant relief to prevent the abuse of the legal process.
Result:
The appeal was allowed. The order quashing the FIR and the proceedings initiated under Section 0017/88 of the Prevention of Corruption Act was set aside, and the case was dismissed.
(A) The provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, specifically Sections 5(1)(e), 5(2), and 6, read in conjunction with Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which guarantees the right to life and personal liberty encompassing a speedy trial, are central to this case. The charge under Section 5(1)(e) relates to criminal misconduct by a public servant regarding disproportionate assets, while Section 5(2) provides for the presumption of corruption in such cases. Section 6 outlines the procedural framework for investigation and prosecution. The prolonged inordinate delay of over twelve years in obtaining sanction for prosecution, without satisfactory justification, is viewed as a direct infringement of the fundamental right to a speedy trial, as interpreted in Article 136 and reinforced by the principles of criminal procedure under Sections 482 and 157 of the CrPC. The court examines how the failure of the investigative and executive authorities to act decisively prejudices the accused and undermines the integrity of the judicial process.
(B) The case establishes that in corruption matters, the mere vesting of suspicion is not as significant as the necessity for swift justice. An inordinate and unexplained delay in granting sanction for prosecution, particularly when it exceeds reasonable limits, constitutes a breach of the accused's right to a speedy trial and can prejudice their liberty. Such delay, especially when sanctioned by higher authorities, may amount to harassment and warrants the quashing of proceedings to uphold the rule of law and prevent the abuse of process. The investigation agency cannot indefinitely prolong its inquiries without concluding the process.
Facts of the case:
The appellant, an Executive Engineer, was accused by an informant of acquiring disproportionate assets amounting to approximately Rs. 50,600/- during his tenure between 1961-62 and 1982-83. An investigation was initiated, and the officer-in-charge concluded that the appellant possessed unaccountable funds. A proposal for sanction to prosecute was submitted multiple times to the competent authorities starting in 1992, but no final orders were passed for over thirteen years, leaving the case in a state of limbo. The appellant moved the High Court to quash the proceedings, arguing that the delay prejudiced his career and personal life, and he was ultimately granted anticipatory bail. The state authorities themselves acknowledged the futility of proceeding and the lack of a meritorious case.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the prosecution had failed to provide any reasonable explanation for the delay exceeding twelve years in sanctioning the prosecution. The authorities were not convinced of the merits of the case and believed that granting sanction would be a futile exercise. The court held that such inordinate delay, which resulted in the appellant losing a promotion and being unable to live with his family abroad, prejudiced his fundamental right to a speedy trial. The court drew parallels with prior judgments where similar delays led to the quashing of cases, concluding that pursuing the matter further would be a travesty of justice and an unnecessary burden on the court.
Issues:
The primary legal issue was whether the unexplained delay of over thirteen years in obtaining sanction for prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act, during which the accused remained in anticipatory bail, violated the accused's right to a speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution, thereby warranting the quashing of the proceedings.
Ratio Decidendi:
The core judicial reasoning is that in corruption cases, the mandate of a speedy trial under Article 21 is paramount. An inordinate and unexplained delay in the investigative and sanction-granting process, particularly when it extends beyond reasonable limits and prejudices the accused, is sufficient grounds to quash the proceedings. The court must scrutinize such delays, and if found to be without just cause, must grant relief to prevent the abuse of the legal process.
Result:
The appeal was allowed. The order quashing the FIR and the proceedings initiated under Section 0017/88 of the Prevention of Corruption Act was set aside, and the case was dismissed.
JUDGMENT
Sethi, J.-Leave granted.
2. The appellant who, at the relevant time, was an Executive Engineer, Public Engineering Department, Mechanical Division, Ranchi, has prayed for quashing of the FIR registered on 20.5.1988 against him under Sections 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 wherein it was alleged that the appellant was in possession of disproportionate assets to the extent of Rs. 50,600/-. The FIR was sought to be quashed mainly on the ground that despite expiry of over 12 years, the respondent-State had not granted the sanction which amounted to the violation of his right of life and liberty as enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The petition, filed by the appellant, was dismissed vide the order impugned on the ground that mere delay in granting the sanction has not prejudiced the appellant in any manner particularly when he is already on anticipatory bail.
3. It appears that one Smt. Usha Punindre Narayan Sinha, filed a FIR in the Vigilance Thana, Division and District, Patna, alleging that the appellant while holding different posts during the years 1961-62 to 1982-83 acquired disproportionate assets by misusing his official position and adopting corrupt means. During investigation, the appellant gave details of his income and expenses, on the basis of which the IO concluded that the appellant was in possession of Rs. 50,600/- as unaccountable money. As no prosecution was launched against the appellant till the year 2000, he moved the High Court for quashing the proceedings and his prayer was rejected vide the order impugned.
4. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent-State it is submitted that a case of disproportionate assets of Rs. 50,600 was registered against the appellant as P.S. No. 0017/88 under the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act and detailed enquiry held by the then Deputy Superintendent of Police. After four years of investigation, the IO submitted a proposal for granting sanction for prosecution of the appellant for which a letter was sent to the Secretary, PH Engineering Department, Patna through the Vigilance Department on 6.1.1992. The Department of PHED as well as the Law Department, after the scrutiny of the allegations made against the appellant, arrived at the conclusion that the case could not be proved in the court. They further concluded that the grant of sanction would prove to be a futile attempt on the part of the Department, The Advocate General of the State also opined that no case for sanction was made out on the basis of the material collected during the investigation of the case registered against the appellant. The file was also sent to the Chief Minister through Chief Secretary. The Chief Secretary suggested that the attention of the investigating agency be drawn to the defects and after obtaining its opinion appropriate orders be passed. Again in the year 1992, the then Investigating Officer submitted a proposal for granting sanction for prosecution of the appellant but till the time the petition was disposed of by the High Court, no orders were passed on the proposal seeking the grant of sanction. Even in the affidavit filed in this Court on 27.11.2000, it is submitted that "A fresh letter for sanction of prosecution against accused Mahendra Lal Das was sent by Vigilance Department to Dy. Secretary, PHED vide letter No. SRO 17/88 Vig. 794 C.R. dated 17.11.2000. Now the matter is under consideration and opinion by the parent department". However, during the arguments we were informed that ultimately sanction has been granted after filing of the SLP in this Court.
5. It is true that interference by the court at the investigation stage is not called for. However, it is equally true that the investigating agency cannot be given the latitude of protracting the conclusion of the investigation without any limit of time. This Court in Abdul Rehman Antulay & Ors. v. R.S. Nayak & Anr. [1992(1) SCC 225] while interpreting the scope of Article 21 of the Constitution held that every citizen has a right of speedy trial of the case pending against him. The speedy trial was considered also in public interest as it serves the social interest also. It is in the interest of all concerned that guilt or innocence of the accused is determined as quickly as possible in the circumstances. The right to speedy trial encompasses all the stages, namely, stage of investigation, enquiry, trial, appeal, revision and re-trial. While determining the alleged delay, the court has to decide each case on its facts having regard to all attending circumstances including nature of offence, number of accused and witnesses, the work-load of the court concerned, prevailing local conditions, etc. Every delay may not be taken as causing prejudice to the accused but the alleged delay has to be considered in the totality of the circumstances and the general conspectus of the case. Inordinate long delay can be taken as a presentive proof of prejudice.
6. In this case the prosecution has miserably failed to explain the delay of more than 13 years by now, in granting the sanction for prosecution of the appellant-accused of possessing disproportionate wealth of about Rs. 50,600/-. The authorities of the respondent-State also appear to be not satisfied about the merits of the case and were convinced that despite granting of sanction the trial would be a mere formality and exercise in futility.
7. In cases of corruption the amount involved is not material but speedy justice is the mandate of the Constitution being in the interests of the accused as well as that of the society. Cases relating to corruption are to be dealt with swiftly, promptly and without delay. As and when delay is found to have been caused during the investigation, inquiry or trial, the concerned appropriate authorities are under an obligation to find out and deal with the persons responsible for such delay. The delay can be attributed either to the connivance of the authorities with the accused or used as a lever to pressurise and harass the accused as is alleged to have been done to the appellant in this case. The appellant has submitted that due to registration of the case and pendency of the investigation he lost his chance of promotion to the post of Chief Engineer. It is common knowledge that promotions are withheld when proceedings with respect to allegations of corruption are pending against the incumbent. The appellant has further alleged that he has been deprived the love, affection and the society of his children who were residing in foreign country as on account of the pendency of the investigation he could not afford to leave the country.
8. This Court in Ramanand Chaudhary v. State of Bihar & Ors. [AIR 1994 SC 948] quashed the investigation against the accused on account of not granting the sanction for more than 13 years. The facts of the present case are almost identical. No useful purpose would be served to put the appellant at trial at this belated stage.
9. Keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, we are inclined to quash the proceedings against the appellant as permitting further prosecution would be the travesty of justice and a mere ritual or formality so far as the prosecution agency is concerned, and unnecessary burden as regards the courts.
10. This appeal is accordingly allowed by setting aside the order impugned and quashing the proceedings initiated against the appellant on the basis of PS No. 0017/88 under the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act.
(N.K.R.) Appeal allowed.
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Parallel Citations of other Journals :
Mahendra Lal Das v. State of Bihar, 2001(7) Supreme 748 : 2001 (8) JT 473 : 2001 (4) All.Cri.L.R. 412 : AIR 2001 SC 2989 : 2001 (2) JCC 344 : 2001(5) Supreme 671 : 2001 (3) Crimes 159 & 482 : 2001 (4) Supreme 431
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