2001 JTR(SC) 1441
2001 AIR(SC) 2951 ; 2001 AIR(SCW) 4419 ; 2001 6 ALD(SC) 138 ; 2001 45 AllLR 688 ; 2001 6 ALT(SC) 39 ; 2002 1 AndhWR(SC) 114 ; 2001 3 APLJ 67 ; 2002 1 AWC 106 ; 2002 1 CivLJ 597 ; 2002 1 ICC 42 ; 2001 9 JT 176 ; 2002 1 KLJ(NOC) 1 ; 2002 1 KLT(SN) 71 ; 2002 1 MLJ 82 ; 2002 1 OLR 184 ; 2001 2 PLJ 521 ; 2002 1 RCR(Civ) 805 ; 2001 7 Scale 380 ; 2002 1 SCC 142 ; 2001 SCR 236 ; 2002 1 UPLBEC 109 ; 2002 KHC 285 ; 2001 8 Supreme 89
2001(8) Supreme 89
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Karnataka High Court)
S.P. Bharucha, Y.K. Sabharwal and Brijesh Kumar, JJ.
Siddappa Vassappa Kuri & Anr. -Appellants
versus
Special Land Acquisition Officer & Anr. -Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 1687 of 1998
Decided on 16-10-2001
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellants : S.K. Kulkarni, Advocate for Ms. Sangeeta Kumar, Advocate.
For the Respondent : Sanjay R. Hegde, Advocate.
VERY IMPORTANT POINT
For the purpose of calculating additional amount to be awarded u/s. 23(1A) of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 @ 12% p.a. on the market value, the starting point is the date of publication of the Section 4 notification and the terminal point is the date of the award or the date of taking possession, whichever is earlier but it must be subsequent to starting point i.e. If possession is taken before notification, the only available terminal is the date of award.
(A) The Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Section 23(1A) governs the award of additional compensation for delayed possession relative to the notification date. In this matter, the statutory scheme applies where land was taken in 1977, yet the Section 4 notification emerged only in 1991. The provision calculates interest at twelve per cent per annum from the notification date to the earlier of the award date or possession date, excluding stays. Because possession preceded the notification, the period attracting interest runs from notification until the award, as possession cannot precede the reference date for additional compensation.
(B) The core legal principle is that Section 23(1A) provides interest from the Section 4 notification to the award or possession, whichever is earlier, but where possession occurs before notification, only the period from notification to award is admissible. The clause whichever is earlier must be strictly read, and the provision admits no construction that would override its clear terms to avoid harshness.
Facts of the case:
Possession of a specified land parcel was acquired on 1 June 1977 for an irrigation project. A Section 4(1) notification was issued on 8 March 1991, followed by a Section 6 notification and application of Section 17. An award of compensation at Rs. 10,000 per acre was made on 6 February 1993, later enhanced by the District Judge. The High Court held that additional compensation under Section 23(1A) was payable from the notification date to the award date. The executing court had previously granted compensation from possession, a position contested by the State on appeal.
Findings of Court:
The Court held that Section 23(1A) is clear and must receive its plain meaning. The starting point is the notification date, and the terminal point is the earlier of the award or possession. Since possession preceded the notification, the terminal point was the award date. The High Courts order was therefore correct, and no additional compensation was payable for the pre-notification period.
Issues:
Whether additional compensation under Section 23(1A) can extend to the period between possession and the notification when possession occurred before the notification.
Ratio Decidendi:
Section 23(1A) mandates interest from the notification date to the earlier of the award or possession date; where possession predates notification, the earlier terminal point is the award, and no interest is payable for the pre-notification period.
Result:
The appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.
(A) The Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Section 23(1A) governs the award of additional compensation for delayed possession relative to the notification date. In this matter, the statutory scheme applies where land was taken in 1977, yet the Section 4 notification emerged only in 1991. The provision calculates interest at twelve per cent per annum from the notification date to the earlier of the award date or possession date, excluding stays. Because possession preceded the notification, the period attracting interest runs from notification until the award, as possession cannot precede the reference date for additional compensation.
(B) The core legal principle is that Section 23(1A) provides interest from the Section 4 notification to the award or possession, whichever is earlier, but where possession occurs before notification, only the period from notification to award is admissible. The clause whichever is earlier must be strictly read, and the provision admits no construction that would override its clear terms to avoid harshness.
Facts of the case:
Possession of a specified land parcel was acquired on 1 June 1977 for an irrigation project. A Section 4(1) notification was issued on 8 March 1991, followed by a Section 6 notification and application of Section 17. An award of compensation at Rs. 10,000 per acre was made on 6 February 1993, later enhanced by the District Judge. The High Court held that additional compensation under Section 23(1A) was payable from the notification date to the award date. The executing court had previously granted compensation from possession, a position contested by the State on appeal.
Findings of Court:
The Court held that Section 23(1A) is clear and must receive its plain meaning. The starting point is the notification date, and the terminal point is the earlier of the award or possession. Since possession preceded the notification, the terminal point was the award date. The High Courts order was therefore correct, and no additional compensation was payable for the pre-notification period.
Issues:
Whether additional compensation under Section 23(1A) can extend to the period between possession and the notification when possession occurred before the notification.
Ratio Decidendi:
Section 23(1A) mandates interest from the notification date to the earlier of the award or possession date; where possession predates notification, the earlier terminal point is the award, and no interest is payable for the pre-notification period.
Result:
The appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.
JUDGMENT
Bharucha, J.-This appeal has been referred to a bench of three Judges by reason of the contrary views taken by two benches of two learned Judges in Special Tahsildar (LA), P.W.D. Schemes, Vijayawada vs. M.A. Jabbar (1995(2) SCC 142) on the one hand and in Asstt.Commr., Gadag Sub-Division, Gadag vs. Mathapathi Basavannewwa (1995 (6) SCC 355) on the other. (The referral order also makes a reference to State of H.P. vs. Dharam Das (1995(5) SCC 683), but no reasoning can be discerned therein.)
2. We are required to consider the provisions of Section 23 (1A) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in the context of the following facts: Possession of land bearing Survey No. 311/3, admeasuring 2 acres and 16 guntas, situated at Village Hirenandi, Gokak Taluk, Belgaum District, Karnataka was taken by the respondents from the appellants, who were the owners thereof, on 1st June, 1977 for the purposes of the construction of an Irrigation channel. On 8th March, 1991, a notification was issued under Section 4(1) of the Act in relation to the said land. It was followed by a notification under Section 6. The provisions of Section 17 were thereafter applied. On 6th February, 1993, an award was made and compensation was awarded to the appellants at the rate of Rs.10,000 per acre. On a reference made by the appellants, the District Judge enhanced the compensation to Rs. 50,000 per acre. The Land Acquisition Officer and the State preferred appeals before the High Court. Therein, compensation was reduced to Rs.41,400 per acre. The decree so passed was put in execution. Before the executing court the question of additional compensation under Section 23(1A) arose. The executing court granted to the appellants additional compensation under Section 23(1A) from the date on which possession of the land was taken, namely, 1st June, 1977 to the date on which the Section 4 notification was issued, namely, 8th March, 1991. The High Court; before whom a revision petition was presented by the LAO, took the view that the appellants were entitled to the additional compensation from the date of the Section 4 notification, namely, 8th March, 1991, to the date of the award, namely, 6th February, 1992. Against this order of the High Court, this appeal has been filed.
3. Section 23(1A) reads thus:
"23(1-A) In addition to the market-value of the land, as above provided, the Court shall in every case award an amount calculated at the rate of twelve per cent per annum on such market-value for the period commencing on and from the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4. Sub-section (1), in respect of such land to the date of the award of the Collector of the date of taking possession of the land, whichever is earlier.
Explanation.-In computing the period referred to in this sub-section, any period of periods during which the proceedings for the acquisition of the land were held up on account of any stay or injunction by the order of any court shall be excluded.
4. It is the contention of learned counsel for the appellants that the appellants are entitled to compensation for the period 1st June, 1977 to 8th March, 1991 i.e, from the date on which possession of the said land was taken till the date of publication of the Section 4(1) notification. He finds sustenance for this contention in the decision of this Court in Mathapathi Basavannewwa s case (1995 (6) SCC 355) where a similar contention was upheld. The provisions of Section 23(1A) were analysed but, said the Court, "strict construction leads to unjust result, hardship to the owner and defeats legislative object." In its view, therefore, the expression "whichever is earlier" in Section 23(1A) had to be construed in that backdrop and the claimant was entitled to the additional amount from the date of taking possession. Since advance possession was taken before the publication of the notification under Section 4(1), "the claimants, by necessary implication, are entitled to the payment of additional amount by way of compensation from the date of taking over the possession for loss of enjoyment of the land."
5. This Court in Special Tahsildar (LA), P.W.D. Schemes, Vijayawada vs. M. A. Jabbar, (1995) 2 SCC 142, quoted Section 23(1A) and said "In other words, the owner of the land who has been deprived of the enjoyment of the land by having been parted with possession, the Act intended that the owner be compensated by awarding an additional amount calculated at the rate of 12 per centum per annum on the enhanced market value for the period between the date of notification and the date of award or date of taking possession of the land, whichever is earlier. Admittedly, possession having already been taken on 15-2-1965, before publication of the notification under Section 4(1) on 6-3-1980, the award of additional amount for the period from 6-3-1980 to 30-9-1983, i.e., the date of making the award under Section 11 is perfectly correct."
6. It is, as we see it, clear from Section 23(1A) that the starting point for the purposes of calculating the amount to be awarded thereunder, at the rate of 12 per centum per annum on the market value, is the date of publication of the Section 4 notification. The terminal point for the purpose is either the date of the award or the date of taking possession, whichever is earlier. In the present case, possession of the land having been taken prior to the publication of the Section 4 notification, that terminal is not available. The only available terminal is the date of the award. The High Court, therefore, was in no error in holding that the appellants were entitled to the additional compensation under Section 23(1A) for the period 8th March, 1991 to 6th Febrauary, 1993.
7. Section 23(1A) admits of no meaning other than the meaning that we have placed upon it. There is no room here for any construction other than that given above. It is only where a provision is ambiguous that a construction that leads to a result that is more just can be adopted. Having regard to its clear terms, Section 23(1A) must receive the only construction it can bear. We are of the view, therefore, that the law has been correctly laid down in the decision in Special Tahsildar (LA), P.W.D. Schemes vs. M.A. Jabbar (1995 (2) SCC 142) and that it has not been correctly laid down in Asstt. Commr., Gadag Sub-Division vs. Mathapathi Basavannewwa (1995 (6) SCC 355) and, for that matter in State of H.P. vs. Dharam Das (1995 (5) SCC 683).
8. The appeal is dismissed.
9. No order as to costs.
(N.K.R.) Appeal dismissed.
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Parallel Citations of other Journals :
Siddappa Vassappa Kuri & Anr. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, 2001(8) Supreme 89 : 2001 (9) JT 176 : AIR 2001 SC 2951 : 2001 (4) CCC 296
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