2002 JTR(SC) 147
2002 AIR(SC) 827 ; 2002 AIR(SCW) 490 ; 2003 1 AllCJ 417 ; 2002 3 ALT(SC) 14 ; 2002 1 CTC 439 ; 2002 2 JCR(SC) 63 ; 2002 1 JT 433 ; 2002 20 LCD 1155 ; 2002 1 MLJ 166 ; 2002 1 RCR(Rent) 166 ; 2002 1 RentLR 409 ; 2002 1 Scale 512 ; 2002 2 SCC 440 ; 2002 1 WLC 207 ; 2002 KHC 1145 ; 2002 1 Supreme 369
2002(1) Supreme 369
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Madras High Court)
R.C. Lahoti and Brijesh Kumar, JJ.
Neelakantan & Ors. -Appellants
versus
Mallika Begum -Respondent
Civil Appeal Nos. 5963-5974 of 1999
Decided on 29-1-2002
Counsel for the Parties :
For the appellants : Ms. V. Mohana, Advocate.
For the Respondent : Mr. M.A. Krishna Moorthy, Advocate.
IMPORTANT POINT
High Court committed no error in holding in revision that the courts below had wrongly placed the burden on the dependant / landlady to establish the fact that the property in question did not fall in the area declared as Slum Area U/s. 3 of Tamil Nadu Slum Areas (Improvement & Clearance) Act, 1951.
Act
Referred
:CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE : S.100, S.115
EVIDENCE ACT : S.101, S.103, S.102
TAMIL NADU SLUM AREAS IMPROVEMENT AND CLEARANCE ACT : S.3, S.29
(A) The Tamil Nadu Slum Areas Improvement and Clearance Act, 1971, sections 3 and 29, governs the present dispute by defining the procedural framework for slum area declarations and eviction protections. Section 3 empowers the State Government to declare any area as a slum area, while section 29 operates as a substantive shield, prohibiting eviction proceedings against occupiers without prior permission from the prescribed authority, thereby conditioning the initiation of eviction on a valid slum declaration. These provisions directly frame the litigation where the tenants sought to invoke the declaration and injunction reliefs, asserting that the super-structure stood on property declared as a slum area under section 3, which would trigger section 29 protection. The evidence act sections, specifically sections 101, 102, and 103, alongside civil procedure code sections 100 and 115, govern the burden of proof and appellate procedures, requiring the party claiming the benefit of a statutory declaration to substantiate the premise through legal and cogent evidence. The interplay of these statutes dictates that the onus lies on the plaintiff-tenants to establish the identity of the property as a slum area notified under the Act, failing which they are not entitled to the protection against eviction.
(B) Key legal principles include that the burden of proof in suits for declaration and injunction under the Slum Areas Act lies on the plaintiff to prove the property falls within a declared slum area; courts will not reverse findings of fact absent legal infirmity, misreading of evidence, or perversity; and section 29 of the Act operates as a procedural bar preventing eviction proceedings unless the area is formally declared.
Facts of the case:
The tenants have resided in the accommodation for a long period, predating the landlady's purchase in 1979. The landlady initiated eviction proceedings in 1980, which ended with an opportunity to agitate the matter fresh. Subsequently, the tenants filed suits claiming the super-structure belonged to them and praying for an injunction, contending the property lay in a slum area under section 3 of the Act. The trial court found the property in a slum area (Survey No. 1303/1) and granted an injunction against eviction except through legal process with prior permission. First appeals by the landlady were dismissed, but the High Court allowed the landlady's second appeal ex parte, holding that the tenants failed to prove the property was notified as a slum area. The tenants cross-appealed, asserting the burden was on the landlady to prove the property was not in the slum area.
Findings of Court:
The High Court correctly held that the burden was on the plaintiff-tenants to prove that the disputed property was situated in Survey No. 1303/1, which was alleged to be a slum area, and to provide legal evidence of a declaration under section 3 of the Act. The tenants failed to discharge this burden, as the documentary and oral evidence was inconclusive, and the landlady rebutted with communication identifying the property as Survey No. 1303/13, which had not been declared a slum area. The tenants' claim of ownership of the super-structure was also rejected in all courts. The court observed that without proof of a section 3 declaration, the tenants were not entitled to protection under section 29 of the Act.
Issues:
Whether the High Court erred in placing the burden of proving the property's inclusion in a slum area on the tenants rather than the landlady.
Whether the tenants were entitled to relief of declaration and injunction in the absence of proof of a valid section 3 notification.
Ratio Decidendi:
The court determined that the tenants, as plaintiffs seeking a declaration and injunction under the Slum Areas Act, were required to prove that the property fell within a formally declared slum area as per section 3; the failure to prove this essential fact extinguished their right to invoke section 29 protection, and the burden of proof accordingly rested on them, not the landlady.
Result:
The appeals are dismissed, with the parties bearing their own costs.
(A) The Tamil Nadu Slum Areas Improvement and Clearance Act, 1971, sections 3 and 29, governs the present dispute by defining the procedural framework for slum area declarations and eviction protections. Section 3 empowers the State Government to declare any area as a slum area, while section 29 operates as a substantive shield, prohibiting eviction proceedings against occupiers without prior permission from the prescribed authority, thereby conditioning the initiation of eviction on a valid slum declaration. These provisions directly frame the litigation where the tenants sought to invoke the declaration and injunction reliefs, asserting that the super-structure stood on property declared as a slum area under section 3, which would trigger section 29 protection. The evidence act sections, specifically sections 101, 102, and 103, alongside civil procedure code sections 100 and 115, govern the burden of proof and appellate procedures, requiring the party claiming the benefit of a statutory declaration to substantiate the premise through legal and cogent evidence. The interplay of these statutes dictates that the onus lies on the plaintiff-tenants to establish the identity of the property as a slum area notified under the Act, failing which they are not entitled to the protection against eviction.
(B) Key legal principles include that the burden of proof in suits for declaration and injunction under the Slum Areas Act lies on the plaintiff to prove the property falls within a declared slum area; courts will not reverse findings of fact absent legal infirmity, misreading of evidence, or perversity; and section 29 of the Act operates as a procedural bar preventing eviction proceedings unless the area is formally declared.
Facts of the case:
The tenants have resided in the accommodation for a long period, predating the landlady's purchase in 1979. The landlady initiated eviction proceedings in 1980, which ended with an opportunity to agitate the matter fresh. Subsequently, the tenants filed suits claiming the super-structure belonged to them and praying for an injunction, contending the property lay in a slum area under section 3 of the Act. The trial court found the property in a slum area (Survey No. 1303/1) and granted an injunction against eviction except through legal process with prior permission. First appeals by the landlady were dismissed, but the High Court allowed the landlady's second appeal ex parte, holding that the tenants failed to prove the property was notified as a slum area. The tenants cross-appealed, asserting the burden was on the landlady to prove the property was not in the slum area.
Findings of Court:
The High Court correctly held that the burden was on the plaintiff-tenants to prove that the disputed property was situated in Survey No. 1303/1, which was alleged to be a slum area, and to provide legal evidence of a declaration under section 3 of the Act. The tenants failed to discharge this burden, as the documentary and oral evidence was inconclusive, and the landlady rebutted with communication identifying the property as Survey No. 1303/13, which had not been declared a slum area. The tenants' claim of ownership of the super-structure was also rejected in all courts. The court observed that without proof of a section 3 declaration, the tenants were not entitled to protection under section 29 of the Act.
Issues:
Whether the High Court erred in placing the burden of proving the property's inclusion in a slum area on the tenants rather than the landlady.
Whether the tenants were entitled to relief of declaration and injunction in the absence of proof of a valid section 3 notification.
Ratio Decidendi:
The court determined that the tenants, as plaintiffs seeking a declaration and injunction under the Slum Areas Act, were required to prove that the property fell within a formally declared slum area as per section 3; the failure to prove this essential fact extinguished their right to invoke section 29 protection, and the burden of proof accordingly rested on them, not the landlady.
Result:
The appeals are dismissed, with the parties bearing their own costs.
JUDGEMENT
Brijesh Kumar, J.-These appeals arise out of the common judgment and order dated 18.11.1997 passed by the Madras High Court in Second Appeals, Civil Revisions and Cross Objections filed by the parties against each other involving same questions. The tenants have come up in appeal before this Court The respondent Smt. Mallika Begum is the landlady of the accommodation in dispute. It will be convenient to refer to the parties as tenants and landlady.
2. The landlady had purchased the suit property in the year 1979. According to the tenant appellants, they have been residing in the accommodation in question since long before 1979. An earlier round of litigation between the parties, as initiated by the landlady for eviction of the tenants In 1980 ended In the High Court finally giving liberty to her to agitate the matter afresh in accordance with the law.
3. Later on however, in the year 1984, tenants filed four suits separately in the City Civil Court, Madras against the landlady with a prayer for dcclaiation that the Super-structure standing on the suit property, belongs to the tenants and further prayed for grant of permanent injunction restraining her from disturbing their possession. The case of the tenant plaintiffs has been that the Suit Property situated in Survey No. 1303/1, has been declared as slum area under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act 1971, ( for short Act ). Section 3 of the Act provides that the State Government, on being so satisfied, may declare any area as slum area. Section 29 of the Act inter-alia, provides that no proceeding can be initiated for eviction of an occupant from any building or land in the slum area except with the prior permission of the prescribed authority. The land-lady, namely, the defendant in all the suits, pleaded that the case of the tenant plaintiff to the effect that the super structure belongs to them is false. It was also pleaded that the property lay in Survey No.1301/13 which has not been declared under the provisions of Section 3 of the Act, as slum area. The plaintiffs arc not entitled for the relief of injunction since no prior permission was necessary before initiating any proceedings for their eviction.
4. The trial court by judgment dated 14.9.88 partly decreed the suits but did not accept the case of the plaintiffs to the effect that the super structure standing over the land in question belongs to them. It was however found that the property Survey No.1303/1 lies in the slum area. Therefore, relief of injunction was granted to the extent that plaintiffs shall not be ejected except through process of law with the prior permission from prescribed authority.
5. The first appeals preferred by the land-lady were dismissed but the finding to the effect that the super-structure did not belong to tine plaintiffs was maintained. The cross objections of tenants were dismissed. The defendant-landlady preferred second appeal against the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate court. The plaintiff -tenants also preferred their cross appeals.
6. The eviction proceedings also seem toave been initiated by the landlady in 1987, who instituted a petition (RCOP) for eviction of the tenants on the ground of willful default in payment of rent. The tenants, in defence took the same plea on the basis of which they had instituted Civil Suits for relief of declaration and injunction that the superstructure belonged to them and the property in suit, is situate in slum area, hence, no order for their eviction could be passed unless prior permission was taken under Section 29 of the Act before initiating the proceedings. The Landlady had denied the claim of the plaintiff tenants that suit property lies in slum area as it was not in survey No. 1303/1. According to the landlady, it was survey No. 1303/13 which was not declared as slum area under the Act. In these RCOP proceedings landlady had adduced evidence to support her case that it was Survey No.1303/13 and not 1303/1. The Rent Control Petition of the landlady was however dismissed on the ground that the permission was not taken under Section 29 of the Act. She preferred appeal before the Judge, Small Cause Courts. The appeal was allowed ex-parte against the tenants passing an order of their eviction. The tenants thereafter filed Civil Revisions, in the High Court. The Civil Revisions, Second Appeals as well as tenants Cross Objections preferred in the Second Appeal filed by the landlady, were heard together by the High Court and all came to be decided by a common judgment dated 18.11.1997.
7. On analysis of results in different cases, the position that emerges is indicated hereinafter. namely, the plea that the super-structure belonged to the tenants had been rejected throughout by all Courts, namely, all three Courts in the Civil Proceedings initiated by the tenants as well as in the proceedings on the Rent Control side. The High Court while dealing with the matter also took note of the fact that there has been adniission on the part of the tenants that the original lease was taken by them alongwith superstructure. The Cross-objections, in that regard as preferred by the tenants have been dismissed. The other question regarding necessity of permission under section 29 of the Act, depended on the fact whether the property in dispute lay in slum area or not. The Trial Court and tne First Appellate Court, in Civil proceedings, found that it lay in slum area bearing Survey No. 1303/1 is alleged and pleaded by the tenant plaintiffs in the suits. On the Rent Control side, the Trial Court also held the same. The Appellate Court, however, had allowed the appeal ex-parte. The High Court in its judgement held that the plaintiff s in the suit failed to prove that the disputed area was declared a slum area under Section 3 of the Act.
8. The main contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the High Court could not take a different view on question of facts. As proposition of law, the submission made on behalf of the appellant tenants cannot be faulted with. It is well settled that the High Courts while considering the matter in exercise of its jurisdiction in Second appeal or Civil Revision would not reverse the finding of fact as recorded hy the Courts below. But it is not an absolute proposition. In a case where the finding is recorded without any legal evidence on the record, or on misreading of evidence or suffers from any legal infirmity, which materially prejudices the case of one of the parties or the finding is perverse, it would be open for the High Court to set aside such a finding and to take a different view. The fact which is to be kept in mind is that the civil proceedings were initiated by the tenant appellants as plaintiffs praying for relief of declaration that they were owners of the superstructure over Survey Plot Number 1303/1 Which area had been declared as a slum area under Section 3 of the Act. On the same basis relief of inJunction was also claimed in view of protection provided under section 29 of the Act. The landlady as defendant had denied that the suit property was ever notified as slum area under Section 3 of the Act. The landlady had further pleaded that the property in dispute lay in Survey Number 1303/13 in respect of whe Act. In view of the above position, the High Court rightly held that the burden lay upon the plaintiff tenants in their suits to establish that property in dispute lay in Survey No. 1303/1. On the other hand, it is observed by the High Court that the Courts below held that it was for the defendant landlady to prove that the property was situated in Survey No. 1303/13. The High Court in our view was right in holding that so as to be entitled for relief for injunction as prayed, the plaintiff tenants were legally required to prove by legal and cogent evidence that the property was situated in Survey No.l303/1 in respect of which a notification was issued under section 3 of die Act. The case of the plaintiff tenants that they were the owners of the superstructure has been found to be incorreet and the same has been disbelieved and declaration to that effect has been retused. The High Court has observed that the document exhibits A-13 and A-14 do not speak about the suit property. There was oral evidence of PW-2 only saying that the property viz. Survey No.1303/1 was notified by the Government as slum area, as claimed by the plaintiffs. The High Court rightly found that the plaintiffs failed to discharge the burden to prove that any declaration was issued under Sectioii 3 of the Act in respect of the property in suit, by reason of which protection could be claimed by the plaintiff tenants under Ssction 29 of the Act.
9. The High Court observed that the case of the defendant land-lady was that the property is identified by door number which has been indicated as door No.40 and old door no.15. Survey numhers may not always be the same (and they change). According to her initially it was Survey No.1303/1 but on sale to different persons in smaller areas the property in question was renumbered as 1303/13 The Door No. 40 and old Door No. 15 correctly bear Survey No.1303/13 and not 1303/1. The High Court has taken into consideration a communication received from the Chairman,Tamil nadu Slum clearance Board No. MM No.21756/87/No.l dated 2nd September. 1987 indicating that the area situated in door No.40 (old Door No.l5) bears survey No.1303/13 which has not been declared as slum area. Evidence was adduced by the landlady in her RCPO. The property purchased by the landlady corresponded to new Door no.40 and old Door no.15. In the face of such a rebuttal of the plaintiffs case on the part of the defendant the onus was upon the plaintiffs to prove their case identifying the property enuring benefit under Section 29 of the Act.
10. In view of the discussion held above, we find that the High Court committed no error in holding that the Courts below had wrongly placed the burden upon the defendant landlady to establish the fact that the property in question did not fall in the area declared as slum area. On the other hand, the burden lay on the plaintiffs to establish their case and fix the identity of the property in suit in reference to Door number which may have been declare as slum area under Section 3 of the Act. Plaintiffs will not be entitled for the relief of injunction as the basis of the provision under Section 29 of the Act.
11. We therefore, feel disinclined to interfere in the order passed by the High Court. In the result, the appeals fail and they are accordingly dismissed. The parties to bear their own costs.
(N.K.R.) Appeals dismissed.
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Parallel Citations of other Journals :
Neelakantan & Ors. v. Mallika Begum, 2002(1) Supreme 369 : 2002(1) JT 433 : 2002(1) RCR 166 : (2002) 2 SCC 440 : AIR 2002 SC 827 : 2002(1) RLR 409
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