2002 JTR(SC) 642
2002 AIR(SC) 2102 ; 2002 AIR(SCW) 2172 ; 2002 3 ALD(SC) 142 ; 2002 2 AllCJ 1356 ; 2002 4 ALT(SC) 30 ; 2002 100 FJR 844 ; 2002 94 FLR 152 ; 2002 2 JCR(SC) 153 ; 2002 Supp1 JT 109 ; 2002 LIC 1709 ; 2002 3 LLN 22 ; 2002 4 RLW(Raj) 564 ; 2002 4 Scale 525 ; 2002 5 SCC 11 ; 2002 SCC(L&S) 623 ; 2002 3 SCR 924 ; 2002 2 SCT 1104 ; 2002 2 UJ 846 ; 2002 4 Supreme 207
2002(4) Supreme 207
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Rajasthan High Court)
Syed Shah Mohammed Quadri & S.N. Variava, JJ.
Union of India & Ors. -Appellants
versus
Narain Singh -Respondent
Civil Appeal No. 3414 of 2002
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 11784 of 2001)
Decided on 9-5-2002
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellants : Ranjit Kumar, Sr. Advocate, Ms. Binu Tamta, Ms. Sushma Suri, Advocates.
For the Respondent : Dhruv Mehta, Ms. Shobha, Anu Mehta, Advocates for M/s. K.L. Mehta & Co. Advocates.
IMPORTANT POINT
It is not for the Court to determine the quantum of punishment once charges are proved in domestic enquiry, unless punishment is disproportionate to proved misconduct. In this case it cannot be said that the punishment of dismissal is not commensurate with not obeying lawful order of Superior Officer and assaulting him particularly when it was so in para-military force service and for the third time the respondent was punished. Division Bench of High Court was wrong in interfering with punishment of dismissal on misplaced ground of mercy on account of poverty, etc.
Act Referred :CONSTITUTION OF INDIA : Art.226, Art.136
(A) The exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution read with the supervisory jurisdiction recognised in Article 136 is engaged when a High Court considers intervening in the findings of a military authority in service matters. The interplay of these provisions governs the extent to which a High Court may review a determination of a competent disciplinary authority on the facts and quantum of punishment in service proceedings. The statutory framework contemplates deference to the findings of such authorities where relevant materials support the conclusion of misconduct, and limits the High Courts role to ensuring that the inquiry was proper rather than re-appreciating evidence.
(B) Key legal principles include: (i) the High Court cannot lightly interfere with the quantum of punishment where charges are proved and the inquiry was proper; (ii) reduction of sentence or setting aside of a dismissal in service matters has a demoralising effect and is a retrograde step; (iii) repentance or unqualified apology at the last appellate stage does not warrant sympathy or mitigation; (iv) the court must not consider extraneous factors such as poverty, family background, or service record so as to undermine the proportionality of the punishment; and (v) where the charges are of a serious nature and the officer has a prior record of punishment, the penalty of dismissal is commensurate and outside the courts supervisory scope unless disproportionate.
Facts of the case:
A Respondent, serving as a Driver and later Constable in a border security force, was punished on three occasions for negligence and misconduct. After being directed to sentry duty, he failed to report and assaulted his supervising Head Constable. He admitted the charges before a Court Martial, was dismissed from service, and suffered dismissal upon appeal. A single Judge and subsequently a Division Bench of the High Court intervened, setting aside the dismissal and directing reinstatement with certain monetary adjustments, taking into account his poverty, family background, and service record.
Findings of Court:
The Supreme Court held that the charges were proved and of a serious nature, and that the High Court ought not to have interfered with the quantum of punishment. The Division Bench erred in considering extraneous factors and in concluding that dismissal was uncalled for merely because the Respondent was poor and pleaded guilty. The court emphasized that the disciplinary process had been satisfied and that the penalty was proportionate and within the bounds of a proper inquiry.
Issues:
Whether a High Court, exercising jurisdiction under Article 226, may set aside a dismissal for misconduct in a paramilitary service on grounds of poverty, family background, and service record after the facts have been admitted and the penalty imposed by a competent disciplinary authority; and whether reduction of such a penalty is permissible where the charges are serious and the officer has a prior disciplinary record.
Ratio Decidendi:
Where the misconduct is admitted and the charges are serious, the High Court must not interfere with the dismissal merely on compassionate or extraneous considerations. The court must respect the findings of the competent authority and the proportionality of the punishment, as interference would undermine discipline and have a demoralising effect on service cadres.
Result:
The Appeal is allowed and the impugned Order setting aside the dismissal and directing reinstatement is set aside. No costs are awarded.
(A) The exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution read with the supervisory jurisdiction recognised in Article 136 is engaged when a High Court considers intervening in the findings of a military authority in service matters. The interplay of these provisions governs the extent to which a High Court may review a determination of a competent disciplinary authority on the facts and quantum of punishment in service proceedings. The statutory framework contemplates deference to the findings of such authorities where relevant materials support the conclusion of misconduct, and limits the High Courts role to ensuring that the inquiry was proper rather than re-appreciating evidence.
(B) Key legal principles include: (i) the High Court cannot lightly interfere with the quantum of punishment where charges are proved and the inquiry was proper; (ii) reduction of sentence or setting aside of a dismissal in service matters has a demoralising effect and is a retrograde step; (iii) repentance or unqualified apology at the last appellate stage does not warrant sympathy or mitigation; (iv) the court must not consider extraneous factors such as poverty, family background, or service record so as to undermine the proportionality of the punishment; and (v) where the charges are of a serious nature and the officer has a prior record of punishment, the penalty of dismissal is commensurate and outside the courts supervisory scope unless disproportionate.
Facts of the case:
A Respondent, serving as a Driver and later Constable in a border security force, was punished on three occasions for negligence and misconduct. After being directed to sentry duty, he failed to report and assaulted his supervising Head Constable. He admitted the charges before a Court Martial, was dismissed from service, and suffered dismissal upon appeal. A single Judge and subsequently a Division Bench of the High Court intervened, setting aside the dismissal and directing reinstatement with certain monetary adjustments, taking into account his poverty, family background, and service record.
Findings of Court:
The Supreme Court held that the charges were proved and of a serious nature, and that the High Court ought not to have interfered with the quantum of punishment. The Division Bench erred in considering extraneous factors and in concluding that dismissal was uncalled for merely because the Respondent was poor and pleaded guilty. The court emphasized that the disciplinary process had been satisfied and that the penalty was proportionate and within the bounds of a proper inquiry.
Issues:
Whether a High Court, exercising jurisdiction under Article 226, may set aside a dismissal for misconduct in a paramilitary service on grounds of poverty, family background, and service record after the facts have been admitted and the penalty imposed by a competent disciplinary authority; and whether reduction of such a penalty is permissible where the charges are serious and the officer has a prior disciplinary record.
Ratio Decidendi:
Where the misconduct is admitted and the charges are serious, the High Court must not interfere with the dismissal merely on compassionate or extraneous considerations. The court must respect the findings of the competent authority and the proportionality of the punishment, as interference would undermine discipline and have a demoralising effect on service cadres.
Result:
The Appeal is allowed and the impugned Order setting aside the dismissal and directing reinstatement is set aside. No costs are awarded.
JudicialReview - The Supreme Court relied on this case to reiterate that the High Court cannot independently reassess evidence or interfere with findings if the inquiry was properly held.
Proportionality - The Supreme Court relied on this case to assert that the High Court should not interfere with punishment unless it is disproportionate, and that an unqualified apology at a late stage does not merit sympathy.
JUDGMENT
S.N. Variava, J.-Leave granted.
2. Heard parties.
3. This Appeal is against an Order dated 26th February, 2001. Briefly stated the facts are as follows:
The Respondent was appointed as a Driver in the Border Security Force in 1990. In 1992 he met with an accident which was found to be due to his negligence. He was punished with 28 days quarter guard and a sum of Rs. 2,405/- was recovered from him. He was then changed from the cadre of Driver to that of a Constable. Thereafter he was punished a second time for misconduct.
4. On 3rd February, 1997 the Head Constable, who was in-charge of assigning duties to the Constables working under him, directed the Respondent to go for Sentry Duty at Sector Headquarters, BSF, Silliguri. The Respondent did not report for Sentry duty. When the Head Constable learnt about this he went to the barrack and found the Respondent sleeping. The Head Constable woke up the Respondent. Some altercation took place and the Respondent gave a fist blow on the mouth of the Head Constable as a result of which the front tooth of the Head Constable was broken.
5. On 4th February, 1997 the Respondent was charge-sheeted for two charges, viz. (i) disobeying the lawful command given by the superior officer and (ii) assaulting the superior officer. On 2nd March,1997, during Court Martial, the Respondent admitted that he had disobeyed the lawful command and that he had assaulted his superior officer. He stated that, "I am a poor man, I have committed a mistake. I may be pardoned." The Disciplinary Authority, on admitted facts, found the Respondent guilty of the charges and dismissed him from service. The Appellate Authority dismissed the Appeal filed by the Respondent.
6. The Respondent filed Writ Petition No. 669 of 1998. This was dismissed by a learned single Judge of the High Court of Rajasthan on 3rd September, 1998. The Respondent then filed an Appeal. The Division Bench in the impugned Order, inter alia, held as follows :
"It is true that the charges levelled against the appellant and found to be proved on his pleading guilty are really of serious nature and such a person cannot be allowed to go scot free without any punishment. More particularly, when he was punished in all thrice in his entire service of about seven years. However, we are of the considered opinion that while passing the extreme penalty of dismissal from service the authorities were also required to keep in mind other factors, namely; (i) the person is coming from which place, (ii) his family back ground, and (iii) his service record of seven years, etc.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
When a poor person pleads guilty to the misconduct committed by him then in our considered opinion the extreme penalty from service was un-called for."
On this reasoning, the Division Bench set aside the Order of dismissal and directed reinstatement of the Respondent. The Division Bench imposed an order of stoppage of three grade increments without cumulative effect. The Division Bench directed the Appellants to reinstate the Respondent latest by 1st May, 2001 without back wages.
7. This Court has, in the case of Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur reported in (1972) 4 SCC 618, held that there are limits to the powers which can be exercised by a Single Judge under Article 226 of the Constitution and, similarly, there are limits to the powers of a Division Bench while sitting in appeal over the judgment of a Single Judge. This Court has held that where there are relevant materials which support the conclusion that the officer is guilty, it is not the function of the High Court to arrive at an independent finding. It has been held that if an enquiry has been properly held the question of adequacy or reliability of evidence cannot be canvassed before the High Court.
8. In the case of Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra reported in (1999) 1 SCC 759, it has been held by this Court that it is within the jurisdiction of the competent authority to decide what punishment is to be imposed and the question of punishment is outside the purview of High Court s interference unless it is so disproportionate to the proved misconduct as to shock the conscious of the Court. It has been held that reduction of sentence by the High Court would have a demoralising effect and would be a retrograde step. It has been held that repentance/unqualified apology at the last appellate stage does not call for any sympathy or mercy.
9. As seen above, the Division Bench notes that the charges against the Respondent are proved and that the charges are of serious nature. Once the Court came to the conclusion that the charges were proved and that the charges were of the serious nature, it was not the function of the Court to interfere with the quantum of punishment. The Division Bench was wrong in holding that factors viz. a) the person is coming from which place, b) his family background and (c) his service record etc. were to be kept in mind. In our view the Division Bench was also wrong in holding that if a poor person pleads guilty to the misconduct, then extreme penalty of dismissal is uncalled for. In our view a Court must not lightly interfere with sentences passed after a properly conducted enquiry where the guilt is proved. Reduction of sentence, particularly in military, para-military or police services can have a demoralising effect and would be a retrograde step so far as discipline of these services is concerned. In this case the charges being of a serious nature the penalty was commensurate with the charges. Further the Division Bench has itself noted that this was the third time the Respondent was punished.
10. Mr. Mehta tried to support the impugned Order on the ground that the Division Bench had taken a just and kind view considering the fact that the Respondent had served for a long time and came from a poor family. He submitted that the impugned Order was a just order and should not be interfered with. We are unable to accept this submission. As stated above, the law is clear. It is not for the Court to determine the quantum of punishment once charges are proved. In this case it cannot be said that the punishment of dismissal is not commensurate with the charges. It is not for the Court to interfere on misplaced grounds of sympathy and/or mercy.
11. In the result, the Appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 26th February, 2001 is set aside. There will be no order as to costs.
(N.K.R.) Appeal allowed.
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Parallel Citations of other Journals :
Union of India & Ors. v. Narain Singh, 2002(4) Supreme 207 : 2002 (Supp. 1) JT 109 : 2002 (94) FLR 152 : 2002 (100) FJR 844 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 623 : 2002(5) SCC 11 : 2002(2) UJ (SC) 846 : 2002 LIC 1709 : 2002(3) LLN 22 : 2002(2) SCSLJ 133 : AIR 2002 SC 2102 : 2002(3) SLJ 151 : 2002(3) ATJ 674
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