2002 JTR(SC) 806
2002 3 AICLR 995 ; 2002 AIR(Jhar)(R) 973 ; 2002 AIR(SC) 2907 ; 2002 AIR(SCW) 3315 ; 2002 2 ALD(Cri)(SC) 404 ; 2002 2 AllCJ 1558 ; 2002 3 BBCJ(SC) 37 ; 2002 3 BLJR 1893 ; 2002 3 CCR(SC) 156 ; 2002 4 CHN(SC) 189 ; 2002 CriLR 874 ; 2002 3 Crimes(SC) 130 ; 2002 CrLJ 3788 ; 2002 3 EastCrC(SC) 119 ; 2002 3 JCC 1691 ; 2002 3 JLJR(SC) 143 ; 2002 6 JT 22 ; 2002 2 MWN(Cri) 312 ; 2002 4 PLJR(SC) 64 ; 2002 4 RCR(Cri) 61 ; 2002 5 Scale 564 ; 2002 6 SCC 650 ; 2002 SCC(Cri) 1448 ; 2002 Supp1 SCR 495 ; 2002 2 WLC 301 ; 2002 KHC 1329 ; 2002 2 KLT(Online) 1048 ; 2002 5 Supreme 332
2002(5) Supreme 332
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Jharkhand High Court)
M.B. Shah & Bisheshwar Prasad Singh, JJ.
Bindeshwari Prasad Singh @ B.P. Singh & Ors. -Appellants
versus
State of Bihar (Now Jharkhand) & Anr. -Respondents
Criminal Appeal No. 808 of 2002
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 3821 of 2001)
Decided on 13-8-2002
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellants : P.S. Mishra, Sr. Advocate, S.K. Sinha, S. Chandrashekhar, Vishnu Sharma, Upendra Mishra, Tathagat H. Vardhan, Advocates.
For the Respondents : R.D. Upadhyay, Vishwajit Singh and Tripurari Roy, Advocates.
VERY IMPORTANT POINT
In exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 Cr.P.C., 1973 against an order of acquittal at the instance of informant, the court exercises only a limited jurisdiction and it should not constitute itself into an appellate Court which has a much wider jurisdiction to go into questions of facts and law, and to convert an order of acquittal into one of conviction.
Act
Referred
:CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE : S.401, S.374
INDIAN PENAL CODE : S.302
(A) The appeal challenges a conviction attempt under Sections 302 and 302/114 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 302 defines murder, and Section 302/114 addresses acts done by multiple persons. Section 401 governs criminal revision by a High Court against an order of a lower court, with sub-section (3) expressly limiting the revisional court from converting an acquittal into a conviction. These statutory provisions frame the scope of the High Courts revisional jurisdiction and the parameters within which the revision petition was entertained.
(B) Key legal principles include that a High Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 401 cannot re-appreciate evidence to reach a conclusion different from the trial court absent manifest illegality or gross miscarriage of justice. The dismissal of an appeal against acquittal on the ground of limitation precludes the exercise of revisional jurisdiction. The court must respect the trial court's assessment of evidence and cannot convert an acquittal into a conviction indirectly through re-trial.
Facts of the case:
An altercation occurred between the informant and the appellants regarding removal of creepers. During the altercation, the deceased was hit with an iron rod and died. The prosecution relied on eyewitness testimony and medical evidence. The trial court acquitted the appellants, but the High Court set aside the acquittal and ordered re-trial based on its re-appreciation of evidence.
Findings of Court:
The High Court was not justified in re-appreciating the evidence and ordering re-trial. The revisional court exceeded its limited jurisdiction by substituting its view of the evidence for that of the trial court where no manifest illegality was shown. The dismissal of the States appeal on limitation further bars revisional interference.
Issues:
Whether a High Court can re-appreciate evidence in a revision petition under Section 401 to set aside an acquittal and order re-trial when the appeal against acquittal is dismissed for limitation. Whether the revisional court can indirectly convert an acquittal into a conviction by ordering re-trial.
Ratio Decidendi:
A High Court cannot convert an acquittal into a conviction, directly or indirectly, under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the absence of manifest illegality or gross miscarriage of justice, and where an appeal against acquittal is dismissed, revisional jurisdiction must not be exercised to re-try the case based on re-appreciation of evidence.
Result:
The appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside, and the order of acquittal of the trial court is restored.
(A) The appeal challenges a conviction attempt under Sections 302 and 302/114 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 302 defines murder, and Section 302/114 addresses acts done by multiple persons. Section 401 governs criminal revision by a High Court against an order of a lower court, with sub-section (3) expressly limiting the revisional court from converting an acquittal into a conviction. These statutory provisions frame the scope of the High Courts revisional jurisdiction and the parameters within which the revision petition was entertained.
(B) Key legal principles include that a High Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 401 cannot re-appreciate evidence to reach a conclusion different from the trial court absent manifest illegality or gross miscarriage of justice. The dismissal of an appeal against acquittal on the ground of limitation precludes the exercise of revisional jurisdiction. The court must respect the trial court's assessment of evidence and cannot convert an acquittal into a conviction indirectly through re-trial.
Facts of the case:
An altercation occurred between the informant and the appellants regarding removal of creepers. During the altercation, the deceased was hit with an iron rod and died. The prosecution relied on eyewitness testimony and medical evidence. The trial court acquitted the appellants, but the High Court set aside the acquittal and ordered re-trial based on its re-appreciation of evidence.
Findings of Court:
The High Court was not justified in re-appreciating the evidence and ordering re-trial. The revisional court exceeded its limited jurisdiction by substituting its view of the evidence for that of the trial court where no manifest illegality was shown. The dismissal of the States appeal on limitation further bars revisional interference.
Issues:
Whether a High Court can re-appreciate evidence in a revision petition under Section 401 to set aside an acquittal and order re-trial when the appeal against acquittal is dismissed for limitation. Whether the revisional court can indirectly convert an acquittal into a conviction by ordering re-trial.
Ratio Decidendi:
A High Court cannot convert an acquittal into a conviction, directly or indirectly, under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the absence of manifest illegality or gross miscarriage of justice, and where an appeal against acquittal is dismissed, revisional jurisdiction must not be exercised to re-try the case based on re-appreciation of evidence.
Result:
The appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside, and the order of acquittal of the trial court is restored.
JUDGMENT
Bisheshwar Prasad Singh, J.-Special Leave granted.
2. The appellants herein were tried by the learned Sessions Judge, Dhanbad in Sessions Trial No.193 of 1992 charged of the offence under Sections 302 and 302/114 of the Indian Panel Code. The learned Sessions Judge by judgment and order dated 21st January, 1994 acquitted the appellants of the charges levelled against them, finding that the prosecution had not proved its case beyond reasonable doubt.
3. The appeal preferred by the State against the acquittal of the appellants was dismissed by the High Court by its order dated 22nd November, 1994. No doubt the appeal was dismissed on the ground of limitation.
4. A revision was preferred by the informant to the High Court under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which has been allowed by the impugned judgment and order dated 6th June, 2001 in Criminal Revision No. 48 of 1994. The judgment of acquittal was set aside and the case was remitted to the Sessions Judge for re-trial in accordance with law.
5. From the evidence on record it appears that an occurrence took place on 20th July, 1989 at about 4.00 p.m. The informant and appellant No. 1 entered into an altercation in connection with removal of creepers which had climbed up to the balcony of the informant. The informant as well as appellant 2 to 5 herein reside in the same building. The altercation took an ugly turn and abuses were exchanged between appellant No.1 and the informant. In the meantime son of the informant, namely Kumud came down and asked the appellants as to why they had not removed the creepers. The case of the prosecution is that appellant No. 1 and other appellants shouted and ordered assault on Kumud. In the assault that followed, deceased Kumud was hit on the head with an iron rod, as a result of which he sustained a serious injury. He was taken to the Bokaro General Hospital, where he was declared dead.
6. The matter was reported to the police. Thereafter the case was investigated and the appellants were put up for trial before the Sessions Judge, Dhanbad.
7. The prosecution relied upon the testimony of three eye witnesses, namely PWs. 1, 3 and 4, who were the mother, sister and father respectively of the deceased. The First Information Report was lodged by PW. 4, the father of the deceased. The prosecution also relied upon the medical evidence on record, which according to the prosecution, corroborated the evidence of the witnesses. The learned Sessions Judge after a consideration of the evidence on record, acquitted the appellants of the charges levelled against them.
8. The State s appeal having been dismissed, a criminal revision was filed by the informant, PW. 4 under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before the High Court.
9. In the revision before the High Court it was sought to be urged on behalf of the informant that there was no reason to discard the testimony of PWs. 1, 3 & 4. The medical evidence on record corroborated their testimony. Therefore, on the basis of the evidence on record, it should have been held that the prosecution had proved its case beyond reasonable doubt.
10. On the other hand it was high-lighted by the appellants that the trial court had recorded its reasons for their acquittal. In the First Information Report a clear allegation was made against appellant No.1 of having assaulted Kumud (deceased) on his head with an iron rod. However, other witnesses in the course of their deposition attributed the assault on Kumud to appellant No. 2, Anuj. The informant also, in his deposition before the Court, changed his version and in line with other witnesses deposed that it was Anuj, appellant No. 2 who gave the blow with an iron rod on the head of the deceased resulting in his death. The medical evidence on record discloses that there were two external injuries only, the first being a lacerated wound over the middle part of the left parietal area and the other being an abrasion on the back of the right elbow.
11. A mere perusal of the judgment of the High Court would disclose that the High Court re-appreciated the evidence on record and came to the conclusion that the learned Sessions Judge was not justified in recording the order of acquittal. The evidence of eye witnesses was consistent and so far as the informant is concerned, no doubt in the First Information Report he had attributed the fatal injury to appellant No. 1, but he later changed his version and deposed that the injury was caused by appellant No. 2. The High Court was impressed by the argument that the First Information Report not being a substantive piece of evidence, at best the evidence of the informant was not corroborated by the First Information Report. The High Court further found that the presence of eye witnesses was natural and the mere fact that they were related was no ground to discard their testimony. Rejecting the argument urged on behalf of the appellants that there was no mention in the First Information Report about the presence of the wife and the daughter of the informant as eye witnesses who witnessed the occurrence from the balcony, the learned Judge observed that it was not expected that every detail would be mentioned in the First Information Report. On such reasoning, the High Court set aside the order of acquittal and ordered re-trial of the appellants.
12. We have carefully considered the material on record and we are satisfied that the High Court was not justified in re-appreciating the evidence on record and coming to a different conclusion in a revision preferred by the informant under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Sub-section (3) of Section 401 in terms provides that nothing in Section 401 shall be deemed to authorize a High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. The aforesaid sub-section, which places a limitation on the powers of the revisional court, prohibiting it from converting a finding of acquittal into one of conviction, is itself indicative of the nature and extent of the revisional power conferred by Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If the High Court could not convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction directly, it could not do so indirectly by the method of ordering a re-trial. It is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that the High Court will ordinarily not interfere in revision with an order of acquittal except in exceptional cases where the interest of public justice requires interference for the correction of a manifest illegality or the prevention of gross miscarriage of justice. The High Court will not be justified in interfering with an order of acquittal merely because the trial court has taken a wrong view of the law or has erred in appreciation of evidence. It is neither possible nor advisable to make an exhaustive list of circumstances in which exercise of revisional jurisdiction may be justified, but decisions of this Court have laid down the parameters of exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the High Court under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in an appeal against acquittal by a private party. (See AIR 1951 SC 196: D. Stephens vs. Nosibolla; AIR 1962 SC 1788: K.C. Reddy vs. State of Andhra Pradesh; (1973) 2 SCC 583: Akalu Ahir and others vs. Ramdeo Ram; AIR 1975 SC 1854: Pakalapati Narayana Gajapathi Raju and others vs. Bonapalli Peda Appadu and another and AIR 1968 SC 707: Mahendra Pratap Singh vs. Sarju Singh).
13. The instant case is not one where any such illegality was committed by the trial court. In the absence of any legal infirmity either in the procedure or in the conduct of the trial, there was no justification for the High Court to interfere in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. It has repeatedly been held that the High Court should not re-appreciate the evidence to reach a finding different from the trial court. In the absence of manifest illegality resulting in grave miscarriage of justice, exercise of revisional jurisdiction in such cases is not warranted.
14. We are, therefore, satisfied that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the order of acquittal in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction at the instance of the informant. It may be that the High Court on appreciation of the evidence on record may reach a conclusion different from that of the trial court. But that by itself is no justification for exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against a judgment of acquittal. We cannot say that the judgment of the trial Court in the instant case was perverse. No defect of procedure has been pointed out. There was also no improper acceptance or rejection of evidence nor was there any defect of procedure or illegality in the conduct of the trial vitiating the trial itself. At best the High Court thought that the prosecution witnesses were reliable while the trial court took the opposite view. This Court has repeatedly observed that in exercise of revisional jurisdictional against an order of acquittal at the instance of a private party, the Court exercises only limited jurisdiction and should not constitute itself into an appellate court which has a much wider jurisdiction to go into questions of facts and law, and to convert an order of acquittal into one of conviction. It cannot be lost sight of that when a re-trial is ordered, the dice is heavily loaded against the accused, and that itself must caution the Court exercising revisional jurisdiction. We, therefore, find no justification for the impugned order of the High Court ordering re-trial of the appellants.
15. The High Court has noticed the fact that the State had preferred an appeal against the acquittal of the appellants. That appeal was dismissed by the High Court on the ground of limitation. In principle that makes no difference, because the dismissal of the appeal even on the ground of limitation is a dismissal for all purposes. As observed earlier, the jurisdiction of the High Court in dealing with an appeal against acquittal preferred under Section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is much wider than the jurisdiction of revisional court exercising jurisdiction under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against an order of acquittal at the instance of a private party. All grounds that may be urged in support of the revision petition may be urged in the appeal, but not vice versa. The dismissal of an appeal preferred by the State against the order of acquittal puts a seal of finality on the judgment of the trial court. In such a case it may not be proper exercise of discretion to exercise revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the order of acquittal at the instance of a private party. Exercise of revisional jurisdiction in such a case may give rise to an incongruous situation where an accused tried and acquitted of an offence, and the order of acquittal upheld in appeal by its dismissal, may have to face a second trial for the same offence of which he was acquitted.
16. For these reasons we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order of the High Court.
(N.K.R.) Appeal allowed.
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Parallel Citations of other Journals :
Bindeshwari Prasad Singh @ B.P. Singh & Ors. v. State of Bihar (Now Jharkhand) & Anr., 2002(5) Supreme 332 : 2002(6) JT 22 : (2002) 6 SCC 650 : 2002(3) All.Crl.L.R. 995 : AIR 2002 SC 2907 : 2002(2) UJ (SC) 1234 : 2002 SCC (Crl.) 1448 : 2002 Crl.L.J. 3788 : 2002(3) SCJ 733
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