2002 JTR(SC) 850
2002 4 AICLR 243 ; 2002 AIR(SC) 2977 ; 2002 AIR(SCW) 3484 ; 2002 2 ALD(Cri)(SC) 468 ; 2002 AllMR(Cri)(SC) 2247 ; 2002 3 CCR(SC) 242 ; 2003 1 CriCC 7 ; 2002 4 Crimes(SC) 1 ; 2002 CrLJ 4099 ; 2002 99 DLT 464 ; 2003 1 EastCrC(SC) 303 ; 2002 3 JCC 1642 ; 2002 6 JT 242 ; 2002 4 RCR(Cri) 275 ; 2002 6 Scale 95 ; 2002 7 SCC 6 ; 2002 SCC(Cri) 1542 ; 2002 SCR 676 ; 2002 2 WLC 411 ; 2002 KHC 1334 ; 2002 2 KLT(Online) 1015 ; 2002 5 Supreme 517
2002(5) Supreme 517
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Delhi High Court)
Doraiswamy Raju & Arijit Pasayat, JJ.
State through CBI -Appellant
versus
Dr. Narayan Waman Nerukar & Anr. -Respondents
Criminal Appeal No. 858 of 2002
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 6873 of 2001)
Decided on 26-8-2002
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : Harish N. Salve, Soliciter General, Rajeev Sharma and P. Parmeswaran, Advocates.
For the Respondents : K. Ramamoorthy, Sr. Advocate, Amit Chadha, Ms. Sobha and N.L. Ganpathi, Advocates.
VERY IMPORTANT POINT
No specific time limit can be laid for right of speedy trial of criminal offences. The order of the High Court quashing criminal prosecution is not sustained under law.
Act
Referred
:CONSTITUTION OF INDIA : Art.21
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE : S.309, S.482, S.311, S.258
INDIAN PENAL CODE : S.120(b)
OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT : S.5, S.3, S.5(3)
(A) The Official Secrets Act 1923 provisions (Sections 3, 5, and 5(3)) along with Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code read with those provisions form the substantive criminal law basis of the charges. The Criminal Procedure Code Sections 482, 311, 309, and 258 govern the procedural aspects including the power to quash proceedings, ensure a speedy trial, and regulate trial conduct. Article 21 of the Constitution of India provides the foundational right to life and personal liberty, which the court interprets to include a right to a speedy trial. The Official Secrets Act provisions are applied in the context of alleged unauthorized disclosure of sensitive defence information, while the Cr.P.C. sections and Article 21 are invoked to assess the legality of the proceedings and the impact of delay on the accused. The interplay between substantive offences under the Official Secrets Act and procedural safeguards under Cr.P.C. and the Constitution is central to this appeal.
(B) The right to a speedy trial is an integral part of Article 21, encompassing all stages from investigation to final verdict. Courts must consider relevant factors such as the nature and complexity of the offence, volume of evidence, and delays caused by the accused, but cannot mechanically bar trials after prescribed periods. Quashing orders must be exceptional and based on clear judicial consideration of delay and its impact. The trial court retains discretion on the applicability of substantive provisions after assessing facts, and appellate courts remit cases for fresh adjudication when High Court decisions are found to be without full appreciation of the material.
Facts of the case:
The prosecution alleged that the respondent, while serving as Adviser in the Department of Electronics, Government of India, divulged a sensitive secret document concerning the User Evaluation Trial Report on RATAC-S Battle Field Surveillance Radar to an expert in France, constituting offences under the Official Secrets Act and Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code. The Chief Metropolitan Magistrate took cognizance of the complaint, and the respondent moved the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings. The High Court quashed the proceedings primarily on the ground of unnecessary delay, noting that the respondent had suffered custody for about two years and the trial had extended over approximately 12 years, with about 100 witnesses expected to be examined.
Findings of Court:
The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in mechanically relying on earlier decisions and in quashing the proceedings solely on the ground of delay without considering relevant factors such as the complexity of the case, the volume of documents, and the nature of the offence. The court observed that the assessment of delay and the applicability of substantive provisions like the Official Secrets Act must be left to the trial court after a full review of the materials, and that appellate courts should not substitute their judgment in place of the trial courts findings. The High Courts order was therefore quashed on the ground that it was vitiated by an inadequate appreciation of the facts and the legal framework governing speedy trial claims.
Issues:
Whether the High Court was justified in quashing the proceedings solely on the basis of delay without evaluating the relevant contextual factors. Whether the High Court correctly determined the maximum possible sentence and the applicability of the specific provision of the Official Secrets Act. Whether appellate intervention is permissible in terms of setting time-limits or mandating acquittal in criminal proceedings.
Ratio Decidendi:
The Supreme Court held that the right to a speedy trial under Article 21 does not mandate automatic quashing of criminal proceedings on the ground of delay. Courts must examine the reasons for delay, the nature of the offence, and other relevant circumstances before concluding that a trial is oppressive. Trial courts retain discretion to apply substantive criminal laws after assessing facts, and appellate courts should not impose rigid time-limits or interfere with the trial process unless the delay is shown to be wholly unjustified and oppressive.
Result:
The appeal is allowed to the extent of setting aside the High Courts quashing order. The matter is remitted to the High Court for a fresh adjudication after permitting the parties to place relevant materials, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the substantive charges.
(A) The Official Secrets Act 1923 provisions (Sections 3, 5, and 5(3)) along with Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code read with those provisions form the substantive criminal law basis of the charges. The Criminal Procedure Code Sections 482, 311, 309, and 258 govern the procedural aspects including the power to quash proceedings, ensure a speedy trial, and regulate trial conduct. Article 21 of the Constitution of India provides the foundational right to life and personal liberty, which the court interprets to include a right to a speedy trial. The Official Secrets Act provisions are applied in the context of alleged unauthorized disclosure of sensitive defence information, while the Cr.P.C. sections and Article 21 are invoked to assess the legality of the proceedings and the impact of delay on the accused. The interplay between substantive offences under the Official Secrets Act and procedural safeguards under Cr.P.C. and the Constitution is central to this appeal.
(B) The right to a speedy trial is an integral part of Article 21, encompassing all stages from investigation to final verdict. Courts must consider relevant factors such as the nature and complexity of the offence, volume of evidence, and delays caused by the accused, but cannot mechanically bar trials after prescribed periods. Quashing orders must be exceptional and based on clear judicial consideration of delay and its impact. The trial court retains discretion on the applicability of substantive provisions after assessing facts, and appellate courts remit cases for fresh adjudication when High Court decisions are found to be without full appreciation of the material.
Facts of the case:
The prosecution alleged that the respondent, while serving as Adviser in the Department of Electronics, Government of India, divulged a sensitive secret document concerning the User Evaluation Trial Report on RATAC-S Battle Field Surveillance Radar to an expert in France, constituting offences under the Official Secrets Act and Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code. The Chief Metropolitan Magistrate took cognizance of the complaint, and the respondent moved the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings. The High Court quashed the proceedings primarily on the ground of unnecessary delay, noting that the respondent had suffered custody for about two years and the trial had extended over approximately 12 years, with about 100 witnesses expected to be examined.
Findings of Court:
The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in mechanically relying on earlier decisions and in quashing the proceedings solely on the ground of delay without considering relevant factors such as the complexity of the case, the volume of documents, and the nature of the offence. The court observed that the assessment of delay and the applicability of substantive provisions like the Official Secrets Act must be left to the trial court after a full review of the materials, and that appellate courts should not substitute their judgment in place of the trial courts findings. The High Courts order was therefore quashed on the ground that it was vitiated by an inadequate appreciation of the facts and the legal framework governing speedy trial claims.
Issues:
Whether the High Court was justified in quashing the proceedings solely on the basis of delay without evaluating the relevant contextual factors. Whether the High Court correctly determined the maximum possible sentence and the applicability of the specific provision of the Official Secrets Act. Whether appellate intervention is permissible in terms of setting time-limits or mandating acquittal in criminal proceedings.
Ratio Decidendi:
The Supreme Court held that the right to a speedy trial under Article 21 does not mandate automatic quashing of criminal proceedings on the ground of delay. Courts must examine the reasons for delay, the nature of the offence, and other relevant circumstances before concluding that a trial is oppressive. Trial courts retain discretion to apply substantive criminal laws after assessing facts, and appellate courts should not impose rigid time-limits or interfere with the trial process unless the delay is shown to be wholly unjustified and oppressive.
Result:
The appeal is allowed to the extent of setting aside the High Courts quashing order. The matter is remitted to the High Court for a fresh adjudication after permitting the parties to place relevant materials, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the substantive charges.
JUDGMENT
Arijit Pasayat, J.-Leave granted.
2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court whereby the proceedings against the respondent No. 1 were quashed, primarily on ground that there was unnecessary delay in conclusion of the trial by court. Reliance was placed on a decision of this Court in "Common Cause" A registered Society through its Director vs. Union of India and Ors. [(1996) 4 SCC 33] as modified in "Common Cause" A registered Society through its Director vs. Union of India and Ors. [(1996) 6 SCC 775] to hold so. A brief reference to the factual aspects would suffice.
3. According to the prosecution, respondent No.1 committed offences under Sections 3 and 5 of the Official Secrets Act 1923 (in short Secrets Act ) and Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short IPC ) read with the aforesaid provisions. The Chief Metropolitan Magistrate by his order dated 16.8.1999 took cognizance and issued processes against the accused persons including the respondent No.1 herein. Respondent No.1 approached the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short Cr.P.C. ) for passing an order against the cognizance taken by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. The High Court quashed the proceedings, inter alia, on the ground that there has been unnecessary delay in the proceedings. Stand of the prosecution before the High Court was that the case is of very serious nature and the respondent No.1, who at the relevant time, was Adviser in the Department of Electronics, Government of India parted with a copy of a sensitive secret document namely "User Evaluation Trial Report on RATAC-S Battle Field Surveillance Radar (BFSR) Phase-I", which was being evaluated by the Army Authorities with reference to certain specific parameter required by the Army Authorities and the same was dispatched to an expert in Paris, France through courier service, who brought it to the notice of the police. As such the case involved offences which relate to security of the State. A large number of documents were to be exhibited. There was no unusual delay. But the High Court did not accept the same. Placing reliance on a decision of this Court in Abdul Rehman Antulay and Ors. vs. R.S. Nayak and Anr. (1992) 1 SCC 225, it was held that the right of speedy trial has been infringed. It was noted that merely because about 100 witnesses spread all over the India were to be examined, that cannot be a relevant ground justifying the delay. Maximum punishment for the alleged offence is 3 years and the respondent No.1 has suffered custody of about 2 years in addition to agony of facing prosecution for about 12 years.
4. Mr. Harish N. Salve, learned Solicitor General submitted that the approach of the High Court is clearly erroneous. It cannot be said to be a rule of universal application that whenever there is delay, whatever be the justification for the same, the proceedings are to be quashed. Additionally there was no material before the High Court to come to the conclusion that the maximum sentence is 3 years and not 15 years. It was not the case of the respondent No.1 before the High Court that his case would fall under sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the Secrets Act. In any event that was a matter for trial to be determined on consideration of the materials which are to be placed.
5. Per contra Mr. K. Ramamoorthy, learned senior counsel for the respondent submitted that the right to speedy trial is inbuilt in Article 21 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short the Constitution ) and, therefore, the High Court had committed no error in directing the proceedings to the quashed. According to him, it was specifically pleaded before the High Court as to how the alleged offence was covered by sub-section (3) of Section 5 of Secrets Act.
6. Recently a 7-Judges Bench of this Court in P. Ramachandra Rao vs. State of Karnataka JT 2002(4) SC 92 held as under:
"No person shall be deprived of his life or his personal liberty except according to procedure established by law - declares Article 21 of the Constitution. Life and liberty , the words employed in shaping Article 21, by the founding fathers of the Constitution, are not to be read narrowly in the sense drearily dictated by dictionaries; they are organic terms to be construed meaningfully. Embarking upon the interpretation thereof, feeling the heart-throb of the Preamble, deriving strength from the Directive Principles of state policy and alive to their constitutional obligation, the courts have allowed Article 21 to stretch its arms as wide as it legitimately can. The mental agony, expense and strain which a person proceeded against in criminal law has to undergo and which, coupled with delay, may result in impairing the capability or ability of the accused to defend himself have persuaded the constitutional courts of the country in holding the right to speedy trial a manifestation of fair, just and reasonable procedure enshrined in Article 21. Speedy trial, again, would encompass within its sweep all its stages including investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and re-trial -in short, everything commencing with an accusation and expiring with the final verdict - the two being respectively the terminus a quo and terminus ad quem -of the journey which an accused must necessarily undertake once faced with an implication. The constitutional philosophy propounded as right to speedy trial has though grown in age by almost two and a half decades, the goal sought to be achieved is yet a far - off peak. Myriad fact-situations bearing testimony to denial of such fundamental right to the accused persons, on account of failure on the part of prosecuting agencies and executive to act, and their turning an almost blind eye at securing expeditious and speedy trial so as to satisfy the mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution have persuaded this Court in devising solutions which go to the extent of almost enacting, by judicial verdict bars of limitation beyond which the trial shall not proceed and the arm of law shall lose its hold. In its zeal to protect the right to speedy trial of an accused, can the court devise and almost enact such bars of limitation though the Legislature and the statutes have not chosen to do so - is a question of far-reaching implications which has led to the constitution of this bench of seven-judge strength."
7. It was held that the decisions in the two "Common Cause" cases and Raj Deo Sharma v. State of Bihar JT 1998(7) SC 1 and Raj Deo Sharma (II) v. State of Bihar JT 1999 (7) SC 317, were not correctly decided on certain aspects. It is neither advisable nor feasible, nor judicially permissible or draw or prescribe an outer limit for conclusion of all criminal proceedings. The time-limits or bars of limitation prescribed in the several directions made in the aforesaid four cases could not have been so prescribed or drawn and, therefore, are not good law. Criminal courts are not obliged to terminate trial of criminal proceedings merely on account of lapse of time, as prescribed by the directions made in the aforesaid cases.
8. As was observed in P. Ramchandra Rao s case (supra), at the most periods of time prescribed in those decisions can be taken by the Courts in seisin of the trial or proceedings to act as reminder when they may be persuaded to apply to their judicial mind to the facts and circumstances of the case before them and determine by taking into consideration several relevant factors as pointed in A.R. Antulay s case (supra) and decide whether the trial or proceedings have become so inordinately delayed as to be called oppressive and unwarranted. Such time limits cannot and will not be treated by any court as a bar to further trial or proceedings and as mandatorily obliging the court to terminate the same and acquit or discharge the accused.
9. While considering the question of delay the court has a duty to see whether the prolongation was on account of any delaying tactics adopted by the accused and other relevant aspects which contributed to the delay. Number of witnesses examined, volume of documents likely to be exhibited, nature and complexity of the offence which is under investigation or adjudication are some of the relevant factors. There can be no empirical formula of universal application in such matters. Each case has to be judged in its own background and special features if any. No generalization is possible and should be done. It has also to be borne in mind that the criminal courts exercise available powers such as those under Sections 309, 311 and 258 of the Cr.P.C. to effectuate right to speedy trial.
10. These aspects have not been considered by the High Court while quashing the proceedings. On that score the judgment under challenge is vitiated. Additionally while dealing with the question as to the proper provision applicable to the case, the Court has come to a definite finding about maximum sentence. Normally, these aspects are to be left to be decided by the trial court. In the case at hand we find that the High Court came to the conclusion about applicability of a particular provision. Mr. Ramamoorthy has rightly submitted that the court can, in a given case, where factual aspects and the law applicable are clear, come to the conclusion about the provision applicable to the facts. But for coming to such conclusion the factual position must be clear and no doubt should exist about the applicability of a particular provision to the factual scenario. The complex nature of the offence should be deterrent to the courts while going into the question of applicability of a provision.
11. Be that as it may, in view of the conclusion that order of the High Court is to be quashed, we do not think it necessary to bestow our attention to the question as to which provision is applicable to the facts of the case.
12. Accordingly the judgment of the High Court is quashed and the matter is remitted back to the High Court. The High Court shall hear the matter afresh, permit the parties to place materials which according to it will be relevant for the purpose of determination of the dispute before it, and take a fresh decision in accordance with law. As mentioned above, we are not expressing any opinion on the merits of the case.
13. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above.
(N.K.R.) Appeal is allowed. Case remanded.
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Parallel Citations of other Journals :
State through CBI v. Dr. Narayan Waman Nerukar & Anr., 2002(5) Supreme 517 : 2002(6) JT 242 : (2002) 7 SCC 6 : AIR 2002 SC 2977 : 2002 SCC (Crl.) 1542 : 2002(3) JCC 1652 : 2002(4) Crimes 1 : 2002(4) All.Crl.L.R. 243 : 2002(2) UJ (SC) 1376 : 2002 Crl.L.J. 4099 : 2002(4) SCJ 39
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