1951 JTR(SC) 82
1952 AIR(SC) 52 ; 1952 AllLJ 190 ; 1952 CrLJ 331 ; 1952 1 MLJ 426 ; 1952 MWN 156 ; 1952 MWN(Cri) 32 ; 1952 SCA 100 ; 1952 SCJ 32 ; 1952 SCR 193 ; 1951 KLT(Online)(SC) 841 ; 1951 KLT(Online) 841 ; 1952 KHC 298
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Saiyid Fazal Ali, Vivian Bose, JJ.
Surajpal Singh and others – Appellant
Versus
The State – Respondent
Criminal Appeal No. 16 of 1950
Decided On : 20-12-1951
Act Referred :CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE : S.417
Preventive Detention Act (1950) S. 11-A(2) as amended by Second Amendment Act, 61 of 1952-Applicability-Order of detention confirmed-Period not specified in order-Effect-Validity of S. 11-A Constitution of India, Art. 14.
The petitioner was detained on 16. 10.51 under the Preventive Detention Act of 1950 as amended in 1951. No period was specified in the detention order. The order of confirmation was passed on 4. 1. 1952 and there again no period was specified. The petitioner contended that as no period was specified in the order her period of detention expired on 31.3.1952 because of the Amending Act of 1951 ; or at the outside on 30.9.1952 because of Act 34 of 1952 which effected a further amendment, The reply on behalf of the State of Bombay was that the Preventive Detention Act of 1950 was again amended by Act 61 of 1952 and that the effect of this amendment was to carry the petitioners detention on to 31.3.1953 because of S. 11-A which was added to the original Act of 1950.
Held: (2) "The life of the Act of 1950, which was the principal Act, was extended till 1.10.1952 by S. 2 of the amending Act (Act 34 1952) and the effect of S. 3 was to prolong the life of all detentions in force on t4.3.1952 (provided they had been confirmed before that date) for so long as the principal Act was in force. At that date this meant till 1.10.1952. But the second amending Act ofl952 extended the life of the principal Act till 31.12.1954. Therefore, in the absence of S. 11-A all those detentions would have been extended till that date. But S. 11-A modified that and put 1.4.1953 as the latest date for these old detentions. It therefore, conferred a benefit and cannot be deemed unreasonable. Subsection (3) of S. 11-A shows that that was the object. (per Bose J.).
(2) "But the petitioner attacked the provisions on the ground of discrimination. She said that even assuming the new classification or detentions into those before and after 30.9.1952 to be good, S. 11-A is nevertheless discriminatory because it discriminates amongst those in her class, namely those whose detentions were made and confirmed before the 30th of September. She put it in this way. Taking the case of her own detention, she pointed out that, if S. 11-A is good, it will continue till 1.4.1953, that is to say, her detention will have been for a period of 11/2 months from 16.10.51 till 1.4.53. On the other hand, a person detained after her on, say 1.9.52, would also be due for release on 1.4.53 and so would have had only six months detention.
"This, in our opinion, is not discrimination within the meaning of Art. 14. A maximum can be fixed, either by specifying a particular period, such as twelve months, or by setting outside limit and it is inevitable in such a case that the length of detention will vary in each individual case. Those taken into detention at a later date are bound to be detained for a shorter time. Government is not bound to detain everybody for the same length of time. It has a discretion. Moreover, the appropriate Government has been left power to revoke or modify the detention order at any earlier time. This point was considered in Shamrao V. Parulkar v. District Magistrate Thana, Bombay, 1079 at pp. 691 and 693, and was decided against the detenue." (bid).
The petitioner was detained on 16. 10.51 under the Preventive Detention Act of 1950 as amended in 1951. No period was specified in the detention order. The order of confirmation was passed on 4. 1. 1952 and there again no period was specified. The petitioner contended that as no period was specified in the order her period of detention expired on 31.3.1952 because of the Amending Act of 1951 ; or at the outside on 30.9.1952 because of Act 34 of 1952 which effected a further amendment, The reply on behalf of the State of Bombay was that the Preventive Detention Act of 1950 was again amended by Act 61 of 1952 and that the effect of this amendment was to carry the petitioners detention on to 31.3.1953 because of S. 11-A which was added to the original Act of 1950.
Held: (2) "The life of the Act of 1950, which was the principal Act, was extended till 1.10.1952 by S. 2 of the amending Act (Act 34 1952) and the effect of S. 3 was to prolong the life of all detentions in force on t4.3.1952 (provided they had been confirmed before that date) for so long as the principal Act was in force. At that date this meant till 1.10.1952. But the second amending Act ofl952 extended the life of the principal Act till 31.12.1954. Therefore, in the absence of S. 11-A all those detentions would have been extended till that date. But S. 11-A modified that and put 1.4.1953 as the latest date for these old detentions. It therefore, conferred a benefit and cannot be deemed unreasonable. Subsection (3) of S. 11-A shows that that was the object. (per Bose J.).
(2) "But the petitioner attacked the provisions on the ground of discrimination. She said that even assuming the new classification or detentions into those before and after 30.9.1952 to be good, S. 11-A is nevertheless discriminatory because it discriminates amongst those in her class, namely those whose detentions were made and confirmed before the 30th of September. She put it in this way. Taking the case of her own detention, she pointed out that, if S. 11-A is good, it will continue till 1.4.1953, that is to say, her detention will have been for a period of 11/2 months from 16.10.51 till 1.4.53. On the other hand, a person detained after her on, say 1.9.52, would also be due for release on 1.4.53 and so would have had only six months detention.
"This, in our opinion, is not discrimination within the meaning of Art. 14. A maximum can be fixed, either by specifying a particular period, such as twelve months, or by setting outside limit and it is inevitable in such a case that the length of detention will vary in each individual case. Those taken into detention at a later date are bound to be detained for a shorter time. Government is not bound to detain everybody for the same length of time. It has a discretion. Moreover, the appropriate Government has been left power to revoke or modify the detention order at any earlier time. This point was considered in Shamrao V. Parulkar v. District Magistrate Thana, Bombay, 1079 at pp. 691 and 693, and was decided against the detenue." (bid).
Shri S. P. Sinha, Senior Advocate (Shri G. C. Mathur, Advocate, with him), instructed by Shri Rajinder Narain, Agent - for Appellant 2, 3 and 4; Shri K. B. Asthana, Advocate, instructed by Shri P. A. Mehta, Agent - for Respondent.
Judgment
Fazl Ali, J. - This is an appeal against a judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad reversing the decision of the Sessions Judge of Aligarh in a criminal case. The appellants were tried by the Sessions Judge on charges under S. 302 read with S. 149, S. 148, Ss. 325 & 326 read with S. 149, and S. 201, Penal Code, but were acquitted. On appeal by the State Government, the High Court reversed the Sessions Judge s decision, and convicted the appellants and sentenced them to transportation for life under S. 302 read with S. 149 to five years rigorous imprisonment under Ss. 325 and 326 read with S. 149, and to two years rigorous imprisonment under S. 147, Penal Code, all the sentences being made to run concurrently. The appellants thereafter applied to the Privy Council for special leave, which was granted on 28-10-1947.
2. The facts which were put before the Court on behalf of the prosecution may be briefly stated as follows : There is a plot No. 518 in Nagaria Patti Chaharum, village Shahgarh in the district of Aligarh which is about 30 bighas in area and is known as the "teesa" field. This plot was the "sir" land of several landlords including Mt. Bhagwati Kuer and Ratan Singh and had been let out to certain tenants. In 1944, Mt. Bhagwati Kuer, Ratan Singh and their co-sharers filed a suit for the ejectment of the tenants, and the suit was decreed. On 7-6-1945, possession over the plot was delivered by the Amin to Surajpal Singh, appellant 1, who was the mukhtar-i-am of Mt. Bhagwati Kuer. It was contended on behalf of Surajpal Singh that he took possession on behalf of all the co-sharers, but certain statements made by Ratan Singh in his evidence do not support this contention. However that may be, it appears that on 17-6-1945, Ratan Singh reported to the police, that he had sent his labourers to irrigate the "teesa" field, and while they were irrigating it Surajpal Singh and certain other persons came and tried to stop the irrigation and damaged the ploughs of Ratan Singh. On 18th June at about 7 A. M., the occurrence which is the subject-matter of the present trial took place. The prosecution version of the occurrence was that while Ratan Singh s labourers were working in the field under the supervision of one Behari Singh, the appellants with many other persons came armed with guns, spears and lathis, and some of the members of the appellant s party entered the field, out off the nosestrings of the bullocks and abused and assaulted the labourers, most of whom ran away. Thereupon, Deva Sukh, who was there to supply water to the labourers, protested and was beaten with lathis. At that point of time, Bihari Singh and 10 to 15 persons came and a fight took place between the parties. During the fight, one of the accused persons, Rajendra Singh, a young lad, fired his gun twice in the air, and thereafter Surajpal Singh took the gun from him and fired two shots hitting Nawab Mewati, who died instantaneously, and Behari Singh, who died later in the date. Three other persons, Zorawar, Rajpal and Lakhan also received gun-shot injuries. Sometime later, Surajpal Singh along with the other three appellants came to the spot and removed the dead body of Nawab in a cart. The body was thrown into a river and was recovered on 20-6-1945. After investigations 26 persons including the appellants were set up for trial.
3. After hearing the evidence in the case, the Sessions Judge delivered judgement on 20-2-1946. He held that the "teesa" field was in the possession of Surajpal Singh, that Behari Singh and Ratan Singh s men were aggressors and wished to take forcible possession of the field, that when resisted they had attacked the appellant s party, that the person who fired the gun had done so in self-defence and not with a view to killing Behari Singh and Nawab Mewati, and that the evidence adduced by the prosecution was so unsatisfactory that it was unsafe to convict the accused upon it. As to the charge of concealing evidence of the offence of murder by the removal of the dead body of Nawab, the Sessions Judge expressed the opinion that in order to convict a person on that charge it must be proved that the offence, the evidence of which the accused is alleged to have caused to disappear, had actually been committed, but since in the present case the charge of murder was not proved the accused could not be convicted for having caused disappearance of evidence connected with it. The Judge also held that the evidence being unreliable the charge under S. 201. Penal Code, had not been established beyond reasonable doubt.
4. The High Court delivered its judgement on 8-5-1947, allowing the appeal of the State Government. Shortly stated, the conclusion arrived at by the High Court was that Ratan Singh had as much right to the possession of the field as Bhagwati-Kuer, that both parties were trying to take exclusive possession of the field, that both parties were prepared for all contingencies to vindicate and enforce their rights, and hence the question of possession was wholly immaterial and no right of private defence could be successfully pleaded by the appellants.
5. A perusal of the two judgements before us shows that while the Sessions Judge took great pains to discuss all the important aspects of the case and to record his opinion on every material point, the learned Judges of the High Court have reversed his decision without displacing the very substantial reasons given by him in support of his conclusion. The difference in the treatment of the case by the two Courts below is particularly noticeable in the manner in which they have dealt with the prosecution evidence. We find that while the Sessions Judge took up the evidence of each witness and recorded his findings with regard to his credibility after discussing the minutest details of the evidence, all that the learned Judges of the High Court have to say about the prosecution evidence as a whole is as follows :
"In Prag Dat s case, (20 All. 459), their Lordships observed : "As usual in cases of this kind the police have found it difficult to secure independent testimony of what did take place. Those of the villagers who were present and looking on would probably by sympathy and bias be so attached to one or other of the disputing parties that it would be hopeless to get disinterested and reliable evidence from them."
"This difficulty the police find in most riot cases and this case is not free from it. But as in Prag Dat s case in this case there are four witnesses, viz., Deo Sukh, Rori Singh, Ram Singh and Ratan Singh, who could be characterised as independent witnesses and they support the case for the prosecution, in the main. In our judgement their testimony is on the whole worthy of credence and sufficient to justify the conviction of the respondents."
6. In view of the summary treatment of the evidence by the High Court, we had to read the evidence adduced in the case with great care, and what we find is that the four witnesses, whose evidence has been accepted by the High Court, are just the persons against whom very serious criticism was offered by the Sessions Judge. (His Lordship discussed the evidence of the witnesses and proceeded.)
7. It is well established that in an appeal under S. 417, Criminal P. C. the High Court has full power to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded, but it is equally well-settled that the presumption of innocence of the accused is further reinforced by his acquittal by the trial Court, and the findings of the trial Court which had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and hearing their evidence can be reversed only for very substantial and compelling reasons.
8. On the whole, was are inclined to hold that the Sessions Judge had taken a reasonable view of the facts of the case, and in our opinion there were no good reasons for reversing that view. The assessors with whose aid the trial was held, were unanimously of the opinion that the accused were not guilty, and though 25 persons were placed on trial on identical evidence, the State Government preferred an appeal only against 5 of them on the sole ground that the acquittal was against the weight of evidence of the record.
9. In the result, we allow the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentences of the appellants and acquit them of all the charges.
Appeal allowed.
For Citation : AIR 1952 SC 52