1983 JTR(SC) 191
1983 AIR(SC) 1090 ; 1983 CriLR 438 ; 1983 2 Crimes(SC) 591 ; 1983 CrLJ 1647 ; 2017 1 OLR 139 ; 1983 2 Scale 78 ; 1983 4 SCC 7 ; 1983 SCC(Cri) 757 ; 1983 1 SCC(Cri) 757 ; 1983 3 SCR 475 ; 1983 1 UJ 895 ; 1983 CLJ 961
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
A.P. SEN, E.S. VENKATARAMIAH AND R.B. MISRA, JJ.
Jharia, Petitioner
Versus
State of Rajasthan and another, Respondents.
Writ Petn. (Criminal) No. 1632 of 1981,
D/- 21-7-1983.
Act Referred :CONSTITUTION OF INDIA : Art.136, Art.32
(A) The petition invokes Article 32 of the Constitution to challenge a conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, despite prior disposal of the matter through a special leave petition under Article 136 and a review petition, invoking the principles in Krishna Govind Patil, Maina Singh, and Fiara Singh, where the combined effect of these statutory provisions and precedents bars re-agitation of the same adjudication in collateral proceedings.
(B) The core legal principles include the finality of judgments from the highest court on the same facts, the inability to use Article 32 to relitigate matters already decided under Article 136, the non-availability of fresh writ petitions against the same order after dismissal of special leave, and the inapplicability of merits-based review where procedural remedies are exhausted.
Facts of the case:
A petitioner was convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code for murder, sentenced to life imprisonment, and acquitted of other charges; the conviction was upheld on appeal, special leave and review petitions were dismissed, and this Court was then invoked under Article 32 to set aside the conviction and sentence.
Findings of Court:
The Court found the petition non-maintainable, held that the High Courts conviction and sentence were not open to challenge in this forum, and observed that seeking a writ against the same order from the same Bench was an abuse of process.
Issues:
Whether an order already finally decided by the Supreme Court under Article 136 can be challenged afresh under Article 32, and whether the doctrine of finality applies to bar re-litigation of the same merits after exhaustion of remedies.
Ratio Decidendi:
Proceedings under Article 32 cannot be used to re-argue and relitigate the same conviction and sentence after a final decision by the Court through special leave and review, as this would undermine judicial finality and invite abuse of the remedial jurisdiction.
Result:
The writ petition is dismissed.
(A) The petition invokes Article 32 of the Constitution to challenge a conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, despite prior disposal of the matter through a special leave petition under Article 136 and a review petition, invoking the principles in Krishna Govind Patil, Maina Singh, and Fiara Singh, where the combined effect of these statutory provisions and precedents bars re-agitation of the same adjudication in collateral proceedings.
(B) The core legal principles include the finality of judgments from the highest court on the same facts, the inability to use Article 32 to relitigate matters already decided under Article 136, the non-availability of fresh writ petitions against the same order after dismissal of special leave, and the inapplicability of merits-based review where procedural remedies are exhausted.
Facts of the case:
A petitioner was convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code for murder, sentenced to life imprisonment, and acquitted of other charges; the conviction was upheld on appeal, special leave and review petitions were dismissed, and this Court was then invoked under Article 32 to set aside the conviction and sentence.
Findings of Court:
The Court found the petition non-maintainable, held that the High Courts conviction and sentence were not open to challenge in this forum, and observed that seeking a writ against the same order from the same Bench was an abuse of process.
Issues:
Whether an order already finally decided by the Supreme Court under Article 136 can be challenged afresh under Article 32, and whether the doctrine of finality applies to bar re-litigation of the same merits after exhaustion of remedies.
Ratio Decidendi:
Proceedings under Article 32 cannot be used to re-argue and relitigate the same conviction and sentence after a final decision by the Court through special leave and review, as this would undermine judicial finality and invite abuse of the remedial jurisdiction.
Result:
The writ petition is dismissed.
S.K.JAIN
Judgment
SEN, J.:- This petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution is clearly not maintainable and must be dismissed but in view of the growing trend of filing such frivolous applications, we deem it necessary to state the reasons therefor.
2. It appears that the petitioner along with two others was arraigned before the Sessions Judge of Alwar in Sessions Trial No. 120 of 1976 for having committed an alleged offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, alternatively, under S. 302 read with S. 34 of the Code. By his finding and sentence dated April 21, 1977 the learned Sessions Judge convicted the petitioner and his two associates for having committed the murder of the deceased Jharia in furtherance of their common intention under Section 302 read with Section 34, and sentenced each of them to undergo imprisonment for life, while recording their acquittal under S. 302. On appeal, a Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court (Jaipur Bench) in Criminal Appeal No. 219 of 1977 by judgment dated July 3, 1980. maintained the conviction of the petitioner under S. 302 read with Section 34 but acquitted his two associates giving them the benefit of doubt. Dissatisfied with the judgment of the High Court, the petitioner applied to this Court for grant of special leave under Art. 136 of the Constitution. The special leave petition was dismissed by this Court on February 23, 1981. An application for review was also dismissed on November 1-9-1981. Thereafter, the petitioner filed this petition under Article 32 assailing his conviction and sentence. The petitioner seeks the issuance of a writ directing the State of Rajasthan to forbear from giving effect to the judgment and sentence passed by the learned Sessions Judge as also the judgment of the High Court as well as the order passed by this Court dismissing the special leave petition. He further seeks a declaration that his conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34 by the High Court was illegal and therefore his detention in jail was without the authority of law and in violation of Art. 21 read with Arts. 14 and 19 of the Constitution.
3. The petitioner contends that in view of the decisions of this Court reported in (1964) 1 SCR 678 - Krishna Govind Patil v. State of Maharashtra; (1976) 3 SCR 651 - Maina Singh v. State of Rajasthan and (1980) 2 SCC 401 - Fiara Singh v. State of Punjab, his conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34 was illegal as he had been charged with two other named persons who have been acquitted by the High Court and therefore he cannot be convicted of an offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34. Upon this basis, the contention is that the petitioner has been deprived of his life and liberty without the authority of law in violation of Art. 21 read with Arts. 14 and 19 of the Constitution. It is represented to us that the contention based upon the decisions of this Court had been advanced during the course at the hearing of the special leave petition, but both the special leave petition and the application for review have been dismissed and therefore the petitioner has no other remedy except to approach this Court for appropriate writ, direction or order under Art. 32 of the Constitution.
4. We fail to appreciate the propriety of asking for a declaration in these proceedings under Art 32 that conviction of the petitioner by the High Court for an offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code is illegal, particularly when this Court has declined to grant special leave under Art. 136 Nor can the petitioner be heard to say that his detention in Jail amounts to deprivation of the fundamental right to life and liberty without following the procedure established by law in violation of Art. 21 read with Arts. 14 and 19. When a special leave petition is assigned to the learned Judges sitting in a Bench, they constitute the SC and there is a finality to their judgment which cannot be upset in these proceedings under Art. 32. Obviously, the Supreme, Court cannot issue a writ, direction or order to itself in respect of any judicial proceedings and the learned Judges constituting the Bench are not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court
5. In Shankar Ramenandra Abhyankar v. Krisknaji Dattatraya Bapat (1970) 1 SCR 322 this court laid down that if there are two modes of invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court and one of those modes has been chosen as exhausted, it would not be a proper and sound exercise of discretion to grant relief in the other set of proceedings in respect of the same order of the Subordinate Court. In that case, the respondent had already chosen the remedy under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, but a learned single Judge dismissed the revision. Thereupon, the respondent moved the High Court by a petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution challenging the same order of the appellate court. A Division Bench of the High Court held that in spite of the dismissal of the revision petition, it could interfere under Arts. 226 and 227 an a proper case being made out, and after going, into the merits of the case, it granted relief to the respondent. On appeal to this Court, the contention was that the High Court could not have interfered under Arts. 226 and 227. That contention of the appellant prevailed and the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court was set aside. It was observed :
"The refusal to grant relief in such circumstances would be in consonance with the anxiety of the court to prevent abuse of process as also to respect and accord finality to its own decisions."
6. There is no reason why the same principle should not equally apply to proceedings under Art. 32 of the Constitution which are initiated after the Court has declined to interfere under Art. 136.
7. For these reasons, the writ petition fails and is dismissed.
Petition dismissed.
For Citation : AIR 1983 SC 1090