1983 JTR(SC) 315
1984 AIR(SC) 45 ; 1983 CriLR 480 ; 1984 1 Crimes(SC) 146 ; 1983 CrLJ 1730 ; 1984 MLJ(Cri) 597 ; 1983 2 Scale 539 ; 1984 1 SCC 31 ; 1984 SCC(Cri) 27 ; 1984 KHC 770 ; 1983 KLT(Online) 1286
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
V.D. TULZAPURKAR, V. BALAKRISHNA ERADI AND D.P. MADON, JJ.
Ranjit Singh, Appellant
Versus
Union Territory of Chandigarh, Respondent.
Criminal Appeal No. 418 of 1982
Decided on 30-9-1983.
Act Referred :INDIAN PENAL CODE : S.302, S.303
(A) The provisions of Indian Penal Code Sections 302 and 303 are directly relevant to this case, as Section 303 prescribes the death penalty for an offender who commits murder while under a sentence of life imprisonment, a provision that was held unconstitutional in Mithu v. State of Punjab, rendering Section 303 void and requiring the sentence to be treated as punishable under Section 302, which allows for life imprisonment or death at the court's discretion based on the gravity of the crime.
(B) Key legal principles include the doctrine of proportionality in sentencing, the concept of rarest of the rare cases guiding the imposition of the death penalty, the principle that previous convictions and parole violations may aggravate punishment but do not automatically mandate the highest penalty, and the rule that concurrent sentences may be inappropriate where the gravity of the subsequent offence warrants a distinct and sequential punishment.
Facts of the case:
Two accused persons assaulted a deceased individual with knives, inflicting 32 injuries resulting in immediate death, with both acting with identical motive of vendetta and revenge; one accused had a prior conviction under Section 302 and was out on parole at the time of the offence, while the other was a first offender.
Findings of Court:
Both accused were found guilty of murder under Section 302, the death sentence imposed on the appellant was deemed excessive given that life imprisonment was the appropriate punishment, the distinction drawn by the prosecution between the accused and the co-accused was not sufficient to justify a different sentence, and the sentence of life imprisonment should run sequentially to the prior life sentence.
Issues:
Whether Section 303 of the Indian Penal Code is constitutional, whether the case falls within the rarest of the rare category deserving the death penalty, and whether the appellant's sentence should be differentiated from that of the co-accused based prior conviction and parole status.
Ratio Decidendi:
The court held that the death penalty is not warranted where the crime, while brutal, does not meet the threshold of rarest of the rare, and that the appellant's prior conviction and parole violation, while reprehensible, do not justify a sentence higher than life imprisonment when compared to the co-accused, leading to the substitution of death with rigorous life imprisonment.
Result:
The appeal is allowed, the death sentence is commuted to rigorous imprisonment for life, and the sentence is ordered to commence only after the completion of any remission or commutation of the earlier life sentence.
(A) The provisions of Indian Penal Code Sections 302 and 303 are directly relevant to this case, as Section 303 prescribes the death penalty for an offender who commits murder while under a sentence of life imprisonment, a provision that was held unconstitutional in Mithu v. State of Punjab, rendering Section 303 void and requiring the sentence to be treated as punishable under Section 302, which allows for life imprisonment or death at the court's discretion based on the gravity of the crime.
(B) Key legal principles include the doctrine of proportionality in sentencing, the concept of rarest of the rare cases guiding the imposition of the death penalty, the principle that previous convictions and parole violations may aggravate punishment but do not automatically mandate the highest penalty, and the rule that concurrent sentences may be inappropriate where the gravity of the subsequent offence warrants a distinct and sequential punishment.
Facts of the case:
Two accused persons assaulted a deceased individual with knives, inflicting 32 injuries resulting in immediate death, with both acting with identical motive of vendetta and revenge; one accused had a prior conviction under Section 302 and was out on parole at the time of the offence, while the other was a first offender.
Findings of Court:
Both accused were found guilty of murder under Section 302, the death sentence imposed on the appellant was deemed excessive given that life imprisonment was the appropriate punishment, the distinction drawn by the prosecution between the accused and the co-accused was not sufficient to justify a different sentence, and the sentence of life imprisonment should run sequentially to the prior life sentence.
Issues:
Whether Section 303 of the Indian Penal Code is constitutional, whether the case falls within the rarest of the rare category deserving the death penalty, and whether the appellant's sentence should be differentiated from that of the co-accused based prior conviction and parole status.
Ratio Decidendi:
The court held that the death penalty is not warranted where the crime, while brutal, does not meet the threshold of rarest of the rare, and that the appellant's prior conviction and parole violation, while reprehensible, do not justify a sentence higher than life imprisonment when compared to the co-accused, leading to the substitution of death with rigorous life imprisonment.
Result:
The appeal is allowed, the death sentence is commuted to rigorous imprisonment for life, and the sentence is ordered to commence only after the completion of any remission or commutation of the earlier life sentence.
A.N.Mulla, Anil Jain, M.P.Jha, NAVIN VADHAVANI, PREM MALHOTRA, RAGHBIR SINGH GUPTA, SINGH VALIA
JUDGMENT
TULZAPURKAR, J.:— The only point raised by counsel for the appellant in this appeal relates to the question of sentence. The appellant on conviction under S. 303, I.P.C. has been sentenced to death Counsel has contended that in view of this Courts decision in Mithu v. State of Punjab, (1983) 2 SCC 277. S. 303. I.P.C. has been held to be unconstitutional and the appellants case in so far as the sentence is concerned will have to be regarded as any other case falling under S. 302, I.P.C. Secondly, counsel has urged that the instant case does not fall within the category of rarest of the rare cases so as to attract extreme penalty of death. Thirdly, counsel has brought to our notice that Brahmi, a co-accused along with the appellant both of whom were involved in the incident in which 32 injuries came to be inflicted to the deceased Ashok Kumar alias Shoki has been awarded life imprisonment and as regards the circumstances concerning the assault on Ashok Kumar the case of the appellant is not distinguishable from that of Brahmi and, therefore, the appellant deserves to be awarded lesser punishment, namely, imprisonment for life.
2. After hearing counsel on both the sides and after considering the facts and circumstances relating to the offence in question we are inclined to agree with the submission of counsel for the appellant that the appellant should be awarded the lesser punishment. The only manner in which the counsel for the prosecution sought to distinguished the case of the appellant from that of his co-accused. Brahmi was that whereas Brahmi was the first offender the appellant had been convicted earlier under Sec. 302 I.P.C. and secondly the appellant had committed the offence in question when he was out on parole while serving life imprisonment under his first conviction which is reprehensible as during the parole he should have behaved like a law-abiding citizen. In our view these two aspects in the facts and the circumstances of this case are not sufficient to take a different view in the matter of sentence qua the appellant. Both the accused were actuated to commit the crime in question with identical motive of vendetta and revenge and both have behaved in a cruel manner in inflicting as many as 32 injuries with knives on the deceased who died immediately as result of the assault on him. In all the circumstances of the case, we feel that life imprisonment would be the proper sentence that should be imposed upon the appellant. We accordingly reduce the sentence of death imposed upon him and sentence him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life. However, since the present murder was committed by him within a span of one year of his earlier conviction and that too when he was released on parole we are clearly of the view that the instant sentence of imprisonment for life awarded to him should not run concurrently with his earlier sentence of life imprisonment. We, therefore, direct that in case any remission or commutation in respect of his earlier sentence is granted to him the present sentence should commence thereafter.
3. The appeal is dismissed subject to the commutation of death sentence as indicated above.
Appeal dismissed.
For Citation: AIR 1984 SC 45