1985 JTR(SC) 227
1985 AIR(SC) 1279 ; 1985 2 CurCC(SC) 432 ; 1985 22 ELT 327 ; 1985 2 Scale 304 ; 1985 3 SCC 590 ; 1985 Supp2 SCR 109 ; 1985 UJ 894 ; 1985 KHC 670
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
V. BALAKRISHNA ERADI AND SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, JJ.
Sakuru, Appellant
Versus
Tanaji, Respondent.
Civil Appeal No. 1852 of 1979, D/- 10-7-1985.
Act
Referred
:ANDHRA PRADESH TELANGANA AREA TENANCY AND AGRICULTURAL LANDS ACT : S.93, S.90
LIMITATION ACT : S.5
(A) The Limitation Act, 1963, Section 5, read alongside the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 (Act 21 of 1950), specifically Section 90, governs the condonation of delay in filing an appeal before the Collector. The Collector exercises appellate jurisdiction under the Act, but is not a Civil or Criminal Court within the meaning of the Limitation Act. Consequently, the general provisions of the Limitation Act do not apply unless expressly made applicable by the special statute. Here, Section 93 of the Act was the only relevant provision, and it applies only the computation rules from the Limitation Act, not Section 5 which deals with condonation of delay. The subsequent amendment in 1979 to Section 93 expressly extended Section 5 to such appeals, but this amendment was prospective and did not affect the period governed by the original 1950 Act version.
(B) Key legal principles include: (i) Limitation Act provisions apply strictly to Courts, not to quasi-judicial or executive bodies unless expressly provided; (ii) Section 93 of the Act limits its reference to the computation of limitation periods; (iii) Section 5, being non-computational, requires a specific enabling provision to apply; (iv) Amendments to statutes are presumed prospective unless otherwise stated.
Facts of the case:
The respondent was declared owner of certain lands under Section 38-E. An appeal to the Collector under Section 90 was maintainable but not filed by the appellant. Instead, a writ petition was dismissed. Later, an appeal was filed with a condonation application after the prescribed period, which was initially allowed by the Collector. A revision petition was then filed and allowed, holding that the Collector lacked jurisdiction to condone delay under Section 5. The appellant challenged this, leading to this appeal.
Findings of Court:
The Division Bench of the High Court correctly held that the Limitation Act, as such, has no application to appeals before the Collector. Section 93 does not extend Section 5 to such proceedings. The appeal filed after the prescribed period was not maintainable, and the Collector lacked the power to condone the delay. The subsequent amendment to Section 93 does not assist the appellant as it was prospective.
Issues:
Whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act applies to an appeal before the Collector under Section 90 of the Act, and whether the condonation of delay can be granted under that section in the absence of an express provision.
Ratio Decidendi:
The Collector is not a Court, and the Limitation Act applies only to Courts. Section 93 of the Act does not incorporate Section 5, which relates to condonation of delay. Therefore, the Collector had no jurisdiction to condone the delay, and the appeal was invalid.
Result:
The appeal is dismissed without any order as to costs.
(A) The Limitation Act, 1963, Section 5, read alongside the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 (Act 21 of 1950), specifically Section 90, governs the condonation of delay in filing an appeal before the Collector. The Collector exercises appellate jurisdiction under the Act, but is not a Civil or Criminal Court within the meaning of the Limitation Act. Consequently, the general provisions of the Limitation Act do not apply unless expressly made applicable by the special statute. Here, Section 93 of the Act was the only relevant provision, and it applies only the computation rules from the Limitation Act, not Section 5 which deals with condonation of delay. The subsequent amendment in 1979 to Section 93 expressly extended Section 5 to such appeals, but this amendment was prospective and did not affect the period governed by the original 1950 Act version.
(B) Key legal principles include: (i) Limitation Act provisions apply strictly to Courts, not to quasi-judicial or executive bodies unless expressly provided; (ii) Section 93 of the Act limits its reference to the computation of limitation periods; (iii) Section 5, being non-computational, requires a specific enabling provision to apply; (iv) Amendments to statutes are presumed prospective unless otherwise stated.
Facts of the case:
The respondent was declared owner of certain lands under Section 38-E. An appeal to the Collector under Section 90 was maintainable but not filed by the appellant. Instead, a writ petition was dismissed. Later, an appeal was filed with a condonation application after the prescribed period, which was initially allowed by the Collector. A revision petition was then filed and allowed, holding that the Collector lacked jurisdiction to condone delay under Section 5. The appellant challenged this, leading to this appeal.
Findings of Court:
The Division Bench of the High Court correctly held that the Limitation Act, as such, has no application to appeals before the Collector. Section 93 does not extend Section 5 to such proceedings. The appeal filed after the prescribed period was not maintainable, and the Collector lacked the power to condone the delay. The subsequent amendment to Section 93 does not assist the appellant as it was prospective.
Issues:
Whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act applies to an appeal before the Collector under Section 90 of the Act, and whether the condonation of delay can be granted under that section in the absence of an express provision.
Ratio Decidendi:
The Collector is not a Court, and the Limitation Act applies only to Courts. Section 93 of the Act does not incorporate Section 5, which relates to condonation of delay. Therefore, the Collector had no jurisdiction to condone the delay, and the appeal was invalid.
Result:
The appeal is dismissed without any order as to costs.
J.RAMA CHANDRA RAO, K.RAM KUMAR, S.Markandaya, T.S.KRISHNAMURTHY IYER
Judgment
BALAKRISHNA ERADI, J.:- In this appeal filed by special leave granted by this Court against the judgment dated April 12, 1978 of a learned single Judge of the High Court, of Andhra Pradesh, the sole question arising for decision is whether the provisions of S. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 can be invoked for condoning the delay in the filing of an appeal before the Collector under S. 90 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 -Act 21 of 1950 (hereinafter called the Act).
2. The facts which have led up to the present controversy may now be briefly set out. The Revenue Divisional Officer, Adilabad declared the respondent-Tanaji to be the owner of an extent of 6 acres, 39 guntas comprised in Survey Nos. 289 and 290 of Hasnapur village under S. 38-E of the Act on the ground that he (the respondent) was a "protected tenant" Though an appeal lay to the Collector under S. 90 of the Act against the said order passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer the appellant land holder did not prefer an appeal but, instead, filed a Writ Petition - W. P. No. 2064 of 1976 before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh challenging the legality and correctness of the order passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer. That Writ Petition was dismissed by a learned single Judge of the High Court on July 1, 1976. Writ Appeal No. 385 of 1976 filed against the decision of the learned single Judge was subsequently dismissed by a Division Bench of the High Court on December 6, 1976. Long thereafter, on August 22, 1978, the appellant preferred an appeal before the District Collector purporting to be one filed against the order dated January 22,1975 passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer together with an application for condonation of delay under S. 5 of the Limitation Act. That application and the appeal were opposed by the respondent herein. But his objections were overruled, the delay was condoned and the appeal was allowed by the Collector on October, 24, 1977. The respondent-Tanaji thereupon moved the High Court by filing a revision petition under S. 91 of the Act. By the judgment impugned in this appeal, the learned single Judge of the High Court allowed that revision petition holding that the Collector had no jurisdiction to condone the delay in the filing of the appeal by invoking S. 5 of the Limitation Act following an earlier ruling of a Division Beach of the same High Court reported in K. Venkaiah v. K. Venkateswara Rao AIR 1978 Andh Pra 166. In that decision the Division Bench of the High Court had taken the view that the Limitation Act applies only to proceedings before a Civil or Criminal Court and since the Collector before whom an appeal is filed under S. 90 of the Act, is not a Civil or Criminal Court, the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 have no application to the proceedings before him unless there is express provision in the special enactment whereunder the Collector is exercising appellate jurisdiction, making any particular section of the Limitation Act specifically applicable to such proceedings. It was further held by the Division Bench that S. 93 of the Act, as it then stood, made, applicable to proceedings before the Collector only those provisions of the limitation Act which related to the computation of the period of limitation and since S. 5 did not fall within the group of sections (Sections 12 to 24 of the Limitation Act) dealing with computation of the period of limitation, the provisions of S. 5 were not applicable to the proceedings before the Collector. The learned counsel for the appellant has canvassed before us the correctness of the view so taken by the Division Bench in Venkaiahs case.
3. After hearing both sides we have unhesitatingly come to the conclusion that there is no substance in this appeal and that the view taken by the Division Bench in Venkaiahs case is perfectly correct and sound. It is well settled by the decisions of this Court in Town Municipal Council, Athani v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Hubli (1970) 1 SCR 51 Nityananda M. Joshi v. Life Insurance Corpn. of India (1970) 1 SCR 396 and Sushila Devi v. Ramanandan Prasad (1976) 2 SCR 845 that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 apply only to proceedings in "Courts" and not to appeals or applications before bodies other than Courts such as quasi-judicial Tribunals or executive authorities, notwithstanding the fact that such bodies or authorities may be vested with certain specified. powers conferred on Courts under the Codes of Civil or Criminal Procedure. The Collector before whom the appeal was preferred by the appellant herein under S. 90 of the Act not being a Court, the Limitation Act, as such, hid no applicability to the proceedings before him. But even in such a situation the relevant special statute may contain an express provision conferring on the appellate authority, such as the Collector, the power to extend the prescribed period of limitation on sufficient cause being shown by laying down that the provisions of S. 5 of the Limitation Act shall be applicable to such proceedings. Hence it becomes necessary to examine whether the Act contains any such provision entitling the Collector to invoke the provisions of S. 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of the delay in the filing of the appeal, The only provision relied on by the appellant in this connection is S. 93 of the Act which, as it stood at the relevant time, was in the following terms :-
"93. Limitation - Every appeal and every application for revision under this Act shall be filed within sixty days from the date of the order against which the appeal or application is filed and the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 shall apply for the purpose of the computation of the said period."
On a plain reading of the section it is absolutely clear that its effect is only to render applicable to the proceedings before the Collector, the provisions of the Limitation Act relating to computation of the period of limitation . The provisions relating to computation of the period of limitation are contained in Ss. 12 to 24 included in Part III of the Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5 is not a provision dealing with computation of the period of limitation. It is only after the process of computation is completed and it is found that an appeal or application has been filed after the expiry of the prescribed period that the question of extension of the period under S. 5 can arise. We are, therefore, in complete. agreement with the view expressed by the Division Bench of the High Court in Venkaiahs case that S. 93 of the Act did not have the effect of rendering the provision of Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applicable to the proceedings before the Collector.
4. Our attention was drawn to the fact that subsequent to the decision of the High Court, the State Legislature has enacted the Andhra Pradesh Tenancy Laws, (Amendment) Act, 1979 - Act 2 of 1979, whereby Section 93 of the Act has been. amended and the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 have now been expressly made applicable to appeals and revisions preferred under Ss. 90 and 91 of the Act. We see no force in the contention advanced on behalf of the appellant that the said amendment is clarificatory in nature. The provisions of S. 93 as they stood prior to this amendment were free from any ambiguity and called for no clarification. The Legislature has also not given any indication of any intention to clarify but, on the other hand, what has been done by it, is to amend the section with only prospective effect. The amended provisions of S. 93 are, therefore, of no assistance to the appellant in this case which is governed by the section as it was originally anacted.
5. The conclusion that emerges from the foregoing discussion is that this appeal is devoid of merits and has only to be dismissed. We accordingly dismiss this appeal but in the circumstances without any order as to costs.
Appeal dismissed.
For Citation : AIR 1985 SC 1279
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