1985 JTR(SC) 389
1986 AIR(SC) 289 ; 1986 1 APLJ 11 ; 1986 BankJ 182 ; 1986 BBCJ(SC) 1 ; 1986 CriLR 82 ; 1986 CriLR(Cal) 3 ; 1986 1 Crimes(SC) 289 ; 1986 CrLJ 255 ; 1986 EastCrC(SC) 442 ; 1986 1 LLN 471 ; 1986 MLJ(Cri) 361 ; 1986 PLJR(SC) 9 ; 1986 1 RCR(Cri) 343 ; 1985 2 Scale 1264 ; 1986 1 SCC 654 ; 1986 SCC(Cri) 64 ; 1985 Supp3 SCR 818 ; 1986 1 UJ 449 ; 1986 KHC 628
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
E.S. VENKATARAMIAH AND R.B. MISRA, JJ.
S. Guin and others, Appellants
Versus
Grindlays Bank Ltd., Respondent.
Criminal Appeal No.848 of 1985
Decided on 11-12-1985.
Act
Referred
:BANKING REGULATIONS ACT : S.36(a)(d)
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE : S.378, S.482, S.386
INDIAN PENAL CODE : S.341
(A) The case involves the application of Section 341 of the Indian Penal Code, relating to wrongful restraint, and Section 36AD of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, concerning the obstruction of bank operations. The prosecution alleged that the accused obstructed bank officers from entering premises and disrupted business transactions during a strike. Procedurally, the matter reached the Supreme Court after the High Court, exercising powers under Section 386 of the Criminal Procedure Code, set aside an acquittal and ordered a retrial. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court should have instead utilized its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code to drop the proceedings due to the stale nature of the case and the inordinate delay in the appellate process.
(B) A criminal proceeding that has become stale due to significant delays, especially after an acquittal, may be terminated to prevent harassment and abuse of the judicial process, even if the original acquittal was legally flawed.
Facts of the case:
A complaint was filed against twelve individuals for allegedly obstructing bank officers and disrupting business operations during a strike. The Metropolitan Magistrate acquitted all the accused. The bank appealed to the High Court, which, after six years, set aside the acquittal and remanded the case for a fresh trial on charges of wrongful restraint. The accused then appealed to the Supreme Court.
Findings of Court:
The Court observed that the High Court's order for retrial after a six-year delay was unjust. It noted that the pendency of the appeal for six years was regrettable and that a fresh trial seven years after the incident would result in harassment and an abuse of the judicial process. The Court found that the nature of the offences and the difficulty in securing witnesses after such a long period warranted the termination of proceedings.
Issues:
Whether a case should be remanded for retrial after an inordinate delay of several years following an acquittal, or whether the proceedings should be dropped to secure the ends of justice.
Ratio Decidendi:
When a criminal case becomes stale and the pursuit of a retrial would cause undue harassment or result in an abuse of the judicial process, the court should prioritize the ends of justice and the prevention of harassment over the technical correctness of an acquittal, particularly in cases involving minor offences and long delays.
Result:
The judgment of the High Court was set aside, and the original order of acquittal passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate was restored.
(A) The case involves the application of Section 341 of the Indian Penal Code, relating to wrongful restraint, and Section 36AD of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, concerning the obstruction of bank operations. The prosecution alleged that the accused obstructed bank officers from entering premises and disrupted business transactions during a strike. Procedurally, the matter reached the Supreme Court after the High Court, exercising powers under Section 386 of the Criminal Procedure Code, set aside an acquittal and ordered a retrial. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court should have instead utilized its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code to drop the proceedings due to the stale nature of the case and the inordinate delay in the appellate process.
(B) A criminal proceeding that has become stale due to significant delays, especially after an acquittal, may be terminated to prevent harassment and abuse of the judicial process, even if the original acquittal was legally flawed.
Facts of the case:
A complaint was filed against twelve individuals for allegedly obstructing bank officers and disrupting business operations during a strike. The Metropolitan Magistrate acquitted all the accused. The bank appealed to the High Court, which, after six years, set aside the acquittal and remanded the case for a fresh trial on charges of wrongful restraint. The accused then appealed to the Supreme Court.
Findings of Court:
The Court observed that the High Court's order for retrial after a six-year delay was unjust. It noted that the pendency of the appeal for six years was regrettable and that a fresh trial seven years after the incident would result in harassment and an abuse of the judicial process. The Court found that the nature of the offences and the difficulty in securing witnesses after such a long period warranted the termination of proceedings.
Issues:
Whether a case should be remanded for retrial after an inordinate delay of several years following an acquittal, or whether the proceedings should be dropped to secure the ends of justice.
Ratio Decidendi:
When a criminal case becomes stale and the pursuit of a retrial would cause undue harassment or result in an abuse of the judicial process, the court should prioritize the ends of justice and the prevention of harassment over the technical correctness of an acquittal, particularly in cases involving minor offences and long delays.
Result:
The judgment of the High Court was set aside, and the original order of acquittal passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate was restored.
ASHOK GROVER, D.N.MUKHERJI, P.K.CHAKRAVARTI, U.R.Lalit, V.N.KOURA
JUDGMENT
VENKATARAMIAH, J.:— This appeal by special leave is filed by the appellants against the judgment and order dated December 19, 1984 in Criminal Appeal No. 315 of 1978 on the file of the Calcutta High Court setting aside the judgment of acquittal passed in C-3064 of 1977 on the file of the Metropolitan Magistrate, 12th Court, Calcutta.
2. This appeal arises out of a complaint filed before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta by one Manindra Narayan Choudhury, Operation Manager of the Grindlays Bank Ltd. against the twelve appellants, referred to above, for offences punishable under section 341, Indian Penal Code and section 36AD of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 said to have been committed by them on October 31, 1977. The complaint alleged that the appellants had without reasonable cause obstructed the officers of the Bank, particularly Shri G. Vaidya from lawfully entering the premises of the branch of the Bank at 41, Chowringhee Road, Calcutta and had obstructed the transaction of normal business at the said branch. It was also alleged that they had thereby committed the offence punishable under section 147, Indian Penal Code. The prosecution further alleged that all of them were constructively liable for the offences said to have been committed by them under section 34, Indian Penal Code. It was urged that these acts had been committed by the appellants pursuant to a call of strike given by the employees of the Bank. The Magistrate issued summons to the appellants for offences punishable under section 341, Indian Penal Code and under section 36AD, of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. After trial, the Magistrate by his judgment dated June 27, 1978 acquitted all the appellants. Against the said judgment of acquittal an appeal was filed by the Grindlays Bank Ltd. before the High Court of Calcutta in Criminal Appeal No. 315 of 1978. The said appeal came to be disposed of after nearly six years on December 19, 1984. The High Court felt that the trial Court had missed the essence of the offences with which the appellants had been charged and therefore there was failure of justice. Hence it set aside the judgment of acquittal passed by the Magistrate and remanded the case for retrial for offences punishable under section 341 read with section 34 or section 149, Indian Penal Code. Aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court, the appellants have filed this appeal.
3. After going through the judgment of the Magistrate and of the High Court we feel that whatever might have been the error committed by the Magistrate, in the circumstances of the case, it was not just and proper for the High Court to have remanded the case for fresh trial, when the order of acquittal had been passed nearly six years before the judgment of the High Court. The pendency of the Criminal Appeal for six years before the High Court is itself a regrettable feature of this case. In addition to it, the order directing retrial has resulted in serious prejudice to the appellants. We are of the view that having regard to the nature of the acts alleged to have been committed by the appellants and other attendant circumstances, this was a case in which the High Court should have directed the dropping of the proceedings in exercise of its inherent powers under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code even if for some reason it came to the conclusion that the acquittal was wrong. A fresh trial nearly seven years after the alleged incident is bound to result in harassment and abuse of judicial process. We may at this stage refer to the decision of this Court in S. Veerabadran Chettiar v. E. V. Ramaswami Naicker, 1959 SCR 1211. In that case this Court disagreed with the High Court on the interpretation of section, 295 of the Indian Penal Code and the order of dismissal of complaint by the Courts below, but it proceeded to observe at page 1218 (of SCR) thus :
"But the question still remains whether, even after expressing our strong disagreement with the interpretation of the section by the Courts below, this Court should direct a further inquiry into the complaint, which has stood dismissed for the last about 5 years. The action complained of against the accused persons, if true, was foolish, to put if mildly, but as the case has become stale, we do not direct further inquiry into this complaint. If there is a recurrence of such a foolish behaviour on the part of any section of the community, we have no doubt that those charged with the duty of maintaining law and order, will apply the law in the sense in which we have interpreted the law. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed."
4. We are of the view that following the above principle the High Court should have dismissed the appeal before it even if it disagreed with the view taken by the trial Court with regard to the gist of the offence punishable under section 341 Indian Penal Code, having regard to the inordinate delay of nearly six years that had ensued after the judgment of acquittal, the nature and magnitude of the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellants and the difficulties that may have to be encountered in securing the presence of witnesses in a case of this nature nearly 7 years after the incident. The termination of the criminal proceedings in that way would secure the ends of justice as it would bring about reconciliation between the management and the employees and also put an end to a stale criminal proceeding in which the public had no longer sufficient interest. We accordingly set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore the order of acquittal passed in this case by the Metropolitan Magistrate without however expressing any opinion on the issues of fact and law involved in the case.
5. The appeal is accordingly allowed.
Appeal allowed.
For Citation : AIR 1986 SC 289