1987 JTR(SC) 820
1988 1 CLR 229 ; 1988 CriLR 73 ; 1988 1 CurCC(SC) 216 ; 1987 32 ELT 229 ; 1988 172 ITR 624 ; 1987 4 JT 232 ; 1988 1 KLT 124 ; 1988 PLJR(SC) 27 ; 1987 RLR 644 ; 1987 2 Scale 901 ; 1987 4 SCC 609 ; 1988 SCC(Cri) 34 ; 1988 SCC(L&S) 80 ; 1988 SCC(Tax) 15 ; 1988 1 SCR 732 ; 1988 70 STC 189 ; 1988 1 UJ 18 ; 1988 KHC 116
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
E.S. VENKATARAMIAH AND K. N. SINGH, JJ.
P. N. KUMAR AND ANOTHER
Versus
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI.
Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 8678 of 1986 in Writ Petition No. 9144 of 1983{Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India}, decided on November 2, 1987
Advocates appeared :
G. Vishwanatha Iyer, Senior Advocate (M. K. D. Namboodry and S. Balakrishnan, Advocates, with him), for the Petitioners ; R. B. Datar and V. B. Saharya, Advocates, for the Respondent.
Act Referred :CONSTITUTION OF INDIA : Art.32, Art.226
(A) The petition invokes Article 32 of the Constitution for issuance of a writ of certiorari to quash an order fixing property value and a demand notice, yet the designated statutory provisions under the referenced acts emphasize that High Courts possess broader original jurisdiction under Article 226 to entertain such petitions directly. This distinction underscores that remedies for challenging administrative assessments lie primarily before the High Court, whose wider powers under Article 226 are designed to address such disputes, while this Courts Article 32 jurisdiction is more restricted and intended for specific, exceptional cases.
(B) Key legal principles include the hierarchy of constitutional remedies, the primacy of High Court jurisdiction under Article 226 for property and tax matters, the avoidance of unnecessary burden on this Courts docket, and the preservation of institutional efficiency by ensuring that each court exercises the jurisdiction allocated to it.
Facts of the case:
Petitioners, a shareholder and company secretary of a hotel company, and the company itself, challenge an order by the Deputy Assessor and Collector fixing the rateable value of their property and demanding arrears of various taxes, seeking issuance of a writ of certiorari or alternative directions to quash the order.
Findings of Court:
The Court determined that the relief sought could be appropriately granted by the High Court, that parties dissatisfied with High Court orders may appeal to this Court, and that entertaining the petition directly would undermine the initiative, capacity, and efficiency of the High Courts.
Issues:
Whether this Court should exercise its Article 32 jurisdiction to decide a property tax assessment dispute that is more suitably heard by the High Court under Article 226.
Ratio Decidendi:
This Court should not interfere with the primary jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226, as the subject matter is within their broader scope, and disposing of the petition preserves judicial efficiency, conserves this Courts capacity for its core functions, and upholds the institutional hierarchy.
Result:
The petition is dismissed without expressing any opinion on the merits, with liberty reserved to approach the High Court under Article 226.
(A) The petition invokes Article 32 of the Constitution for issuance of a writ of certiorari to quash an order fixing property value and a demand notice, yet the designated statutory provisions under the referenced acts emphasize that High Courts possess broader original jurisdiction under Article 226 to entertain such petitions directly. This distinction underscores that remedies for challenging administrative assessments lie primarily before the High Court, whose wider powers under Article 226 are designed to address such disputes, while this Courts Article 32 jurisdiction is more restricted and intended for specific, exceptional cases.
(B) Key legal principles include the hierarchy of constitutional remedies, the primacy of High Court jurisdiction under Article 226 for property and tax matters, the avoidance of unnecessary burden on this Courts docket, and the preservation of institutional efficiency by ensuring that each court exercises the jurisdiction allocated to it.
Facts of the case:
Petitioners, a shareholder and company secretary of a hotel company, and the company itself, challenge an order by the Deputy Assessor and Collector fixing the rateable value of their property and demanding arrears of various taxes, seeking issuance of a writ of certiorari or alternative directions to quash the order.
Findings of Court:
The Court determined that the relief sought could be appropriately granted by the High Court, that parties dissatisfied with High Court orders may appeal to this Court, and that entertaining the petition directly would undermine the initiative, capacity, and efficiency of the High Courts.
Issues:
Whether this Court should exercise its Article 32 jurisdiction to decide a property tax assessment dispute that is more suitably heard by the High Court under Article 226.
Ratio Decidendi:
This Court should not interfere with the primary jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226, as the subject matter is within their broader scope, and disposing of the petition preserves judicial efficiency, conserves this Courts capacity for its core functions, and upholds the institutional hierarchy.
Result:
The petition is dismissed without expressing any opinion on the merits, with liberty reserved to approach the High Court under Article 226.
G.VISHVANATHA IYER, M.K.D.NAMBUDIRY, R.B.DATAR, S.BALAKRISHNAN, V.B.SAHARYA
ORDER
1. In this writ petition the petitioners have prayed for the issue of a writ in the nature of certiorari or any other appropriate order or direction quashing the order No. Tax/HQ/Spl. Cell/83-1948 dated August 4, 1983 issued by the Deputy Assessor and Collector of the Assessment and Collection Department of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi fixing the rate able value of the property of the petitioners at Rs 12,10,300 with effect from June 9, 1981 and the consequent bill 180/II dated August 4, 1983 served on the petitioners making a demand of arrears of Rs 14,07.328 as a composite amount of property tax, fire tax, water tax, scavenging tax and education tax and making any other order as the court deems fit. The first petitioner is a shareholder and company secretary of the company M/s Siddharth Intercontinental Hotels (India) Ltd. and the second petitioner is M/s Siddharth Intercontinental Hotels (India) Ltd. On October 26, 1987 we passed an order adjourning the case to November 2, 1987 to hear the learned counsel for the parties on the question whether the above petition under Article 32 of the Constitution should be decided by this Court or whether we should direct the petitioners to approach the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Accordingly we have heard the learned counsel.
2. We are of the view that this petition should be disposed of without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case reserving liberty to the petitioners to file a petition, if so advised, before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. We accordingly dispose of this petition for the following reasons:
(1) The scope of the powers of the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution is wider than the scope of the powers of this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution.
(2) The relief prayed for in the petition is one which may be granted by the High Court and any of the parties who is dissatisfied with the judgment of the High Court can approach this Court by way of an appeal. The fact that some case involving the very same point of law is pending in this Court is no ground to entertain a petition directly by-passing the High Court.
(3) If the parties get relief at the High Court, they need not come here and to that extent the burden on this Court is reduced.
(4) The hearing of the case at the level of the High Court is more convenient from several angles and will be cheaper to the parties. It saves a lot of time too. It will be easier for the clients to give instructions to their lawyers.
(5) Our High Courts are High Courts. Each High Court has its own high traditions. They have judges of eminence who have initiative, necessary skills and enthusiam. Their capacity should be harnessed to deal with every type of case arising from their respective areas, which they are competent to dispose of.
(6) Every High Court Bar has also its high traditions. There are eminent lawyers practising in the High Courts with wide experience in handling different kinds of cases, both original and appellate. They are fully aware of the history of every legislation in their States. Their services should be made available to the litigants in the respective States.
(7) This Court has no time today even to dispose of cases which have to be decided by it alone and by no other authority. Large number of cases are pending from 10 to 15 years. Even if no new case is filed in this Court hereafter, with the present strength of Judges it may take more than 15 years to dispose of all the pending cases.
(8) If the cases which can be filed in the High Courts are filed in the High Court and not in this Court this Courts task of acting as an original court which is a time-consuming process can be avoided and this Court will also have the benefit of the decision of the High Court when it deals with an appeal filed against such decision.
(9) (9) If cases which may be filed in the High Courts are filed in this Court it would affect the initiative of the High Courts. We should preserve the dignity, majesty and efficiency of the High Courts. The taking-over by this Court of the work which the High Courts can handle may undermine the capacity and efficiency of the High Courts and that should therefore be avoided.
(10) Lastly, the time saved by this Court by not entertaining the cases which may be filed before the High Courts can be utilised to dispose of old matters in which parties are crying for relief.
3. These are some of the reasons which have compelled us to pass this order.
For Citation : (1987) 4 SCC 609.