1988 JTR(SC) 436
1988 ACJ 1079 ; 1988 AIR(SC) 1729 ; 1988 2 APLJ 26 ; 1988 BLJR 602 ; 1988 CriLR 506 ; 1989 CriLR(Cal) 26 ; 1988 2 Crimes(SC) 950 ; 1988 CrLJ 1803 ; 1988 3 JT 342 ; 1988 2 RCR(Cri) 401 ; 1988 RLR 464 ; 1988 2 Scale 113 ; 1988 4 SCC 36 ; 1988 SCC(Cri) 889 ; 1988 Supp1 SCR 477 ; 1988 2 UJ 593 ; 1988 KHC 1025
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
SABYASACHI MUKHARJI AND S. RANGANATHAN, JJ.
Srinivas Pal, Appellant
Versus
Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh (Now State), Respondent.
Criminal Appeal No. 385 of 1988 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Cri) No. 3215 of 1987), D/- 18-7-1988.
Advocates appeared
Mr. R. Ramachandran, Advocate, for Appellant; Mr. B. Datta, Solicitor General, Mr. Kitty Kumar Marylar and Ms. A. Subhashini, Advocates with him, for Respondents.
Act
Referred
:CONSTITUTION OF INDIA : Art.21
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE : S.473, S.190, S.468
INDIAN PENAL CODE : S.304(a), S.338, S.279
(A) The appeal involves the application of limitation provisions under Section 468 read with Section 473 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, alongside the penal provisions of Sections 279, 304A, and 338 of the Indian Penal Code, in the context of a rash and negligent driving offence occurring in the State of Arunachal Pradesh. Section 32 of the Assam Frontier (Administration of Justice) Regulation, 1945, guides procedure in the territory, requiring principles of the Criminal Procedure Code to be applied consistently with the Regulation. The core dispute concerns the timing of cognizance, where the period of limitation is held to commence from the date cognizance is truly taken, and the High Courts finding that cognizance was taken on 31st March 1986, attracting a three-year limitation under Section 468(2)(c), is not challenged. Further, Section 473 empowers the Court to extend the period of limitation where the delay is properly explained or where it is necessary in the interests of justice, and the Court examines whether such an extension must precede the taking of cognizance or can follow it, referencing principles from other jurisdictions. Ultimately, the proceedings are barred unless the delay is condoned, and the Court balances the need for timely justice under Article 21 against the statutory limits on prosecution.
(B) Key legal principles include: cognizance is a judicial act requiring application of mind by the Magistrate; the period of limitation under Section 468 runs from the date of cognizance unless earlier; offences punishable with imprisonment exceeding one year are subject to a three-year limitation; Section 473 provides discretionary power to condone delay and extend the period where necessary in the interests of justice; and the spirit of the Criminal Procedure Code, including fairness of trial under Article 21, demands that vexatious or unreasonably delayed prosecutions be barred.
Facts of the case:
On 20th November 1976, the appellant, posted as an Executive Engineer in Arunachal Pradesh, was driving a jeep in which an accident occurred within Bomdila Police Station, causing the death of J. K. Jain and grievous injuries to S. Karim. The police alleged rash and negligent driving and registered a case, with a report submitted on 22nd November 1976. The appellant was charged under Sections 279, 304A, and 338 of the Indian Penal Code. The date of cognizance was disputed, with the High Court holding it was taken on 31st March 1986, and the chargesheet was filed in September 1977. There was an inordinate delay of approximately nine and a half years before the trial commenced, with no explanation offered for the delay.
Findings of Court:
The High Court held that cognizance was taken on 31st March 1986, and that the delay exceeded the three-year limitation under Section 468(2)(c) without sufficient explanation or reliance on Section 473. The Court noted that the offence was neither grave nor heinous, yet the protracted delay prejudiced the accused and undermined the fairness of trial. The proceedings were therefore barred, and the charges could not proceed.
Issues:
When was cognizance taken in this case, and whether the delay was within the limitation period; whether Section 473 applies to condone delay before or after the taking of cognizance; and whether the appellant is entitled to the protection of Section 468 on the facts of the case.
Ratio Decidendi:
The statutory period of limitation under Section 468 applies to prosecutions for rash and negligent driving, and where the delay is unexplained and extends beyond three years, the Court lacks jurisdiction to proceed. The spirit of Article 21 and the object of preventing vexatious prosecutions require that the case be quashed when there is an inordinate and unexplained delay in initiating trial.
Result:
The appeal is allowed, the High Court order is set aside, and the proceedings against the appellant are quashed.
(A) The appeal involves the application of limitation provisions under Section 468 read with Section 473 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, alongside the penal provisions of Sections 279, 304A, and 338 of the Indian Penal Code, in the context of a rash and negligent driving offence occurring in the State of Arunachal Pradesh. Section 32 of the Assam Frontier (Administration of Justice) Regulation, 1945, guides procedure in the territory, requiring principles of the Criminal Procedure Code to be applied consistently with the Regulation. The core dispute concerns the timing of cognizance, where the period of limitation is held to commence from the date cognizance is truly taken, and the High Courts finding that cognizance was taken on 31st March 1986, attracting a three-year limitation under Section 468(2)(c), is not challenged. Further, Section 473 empowers the Court to extend the period of limitation where the delay is properly explained or where it is necessary in the interests of justice, and the Court examines whether such an extension must precede the taking of cognizance or can follow it, referencing principles from other jurisdictions. Ultimately, the proceedings are barred unless the delay is condoned, and the Court balances the need for timely justice under Article 21 against the statutory limits on prosecution.
(B) Key legal principles include: cognizance is a judicial act requiring application of mind by the Magistrate; the period of limitation under Section 468 runs from the date of cognizance unless earlier; offences punishable with imprisonment exceeding one year are subject to a three-year limitation; Section 473 provides discretionary power to condone delay and extend the period where necessary in the interests of justice; and the spirit of the Criminal Procedure Code, including fairness of trial under Article 21, demands that vexatious or unreasonably delayed prosecutions be barred.
Facts of the case:
On 20th November 1976, the appellant, posted as an Executive Engineer in Arunachal Pradesh, was driving a jeep in which an accident occurred within Bomdila Police Station, causing the death of J. K. Jain and grievous injuries to S. Karim. The police alleged rash and negligent driving and registered a case, with a report submitted on 22nd November 1976. The appellant was charged under Sections 279, 304A, and 338 of the Indian Penal Code. The date of cognizance was disputed, with the High Court holding it was taken on 31st March 1986, and the chargesheet was filed in September 1977. There was an inordinate delay of approximately nine and a half years before the trial commenced, with no explanation offered for the delay.
Findings of Court:
The High Court held that cognizance was taken on 31st March 1986, and that the delay exceeded the three-year limitation under Section 468(2)(c) without sufficient explanation or reliance on Section 473. The Court noted that the offence was neither grave nor heinous, yet the protracted delay prejudiced the accused and undermined the fairness of trial. The proceedings were therefore barred, and the charges could not proceed.
Issues:
When was cognizance taken in this case, and whether the delay was within the limitation period; whether Section 473 applies to condone delay before or after the taking of cognizance; and whether the appellant is entitled to the protection of Section 468 on the facts of the case.
Ratio Decidendi:
The statutory period of limitation under Section 468 applies to prosecutions for rash and negligent driving, and where the delay is unexplained and extends beyond three years, the Court lacks jurisdiction to proceed. The spirit of Article 21 and the object of preventing vexatious prosecutions require that the case be quashed when there is an inordinate and unexplained delay in initiating trial.
Result:
The appeal is allowed, the High Court order is set aside, and the proceedings against the appellant are quashed.
Cognizance - Explains the meaning of 'taking cognizance' as judicial application of mind by a Magistrate to facts in a complaint with a view to taking further action.
Cognizance - Discusses the Magistrate's options when a police report is forwarded under S. 173(2)(i), including taking cognizance or dropping proceedings.
Limitation - Observes that the object of limitation bars in the Criminal P.C. is to prevent belated prosecutions and protect accused from harassment and stale evidence.
Limitation - Cited on the point that exercise of power under S. 473 to extend limitation should precede the taking of cognizance of the offence.
Jurisdiction - Cited for the proposition that cognizance taken by a Magistrate without deciding the point of limitation is beyond his jurisdiction.
Limitation - Observes that statutes of limitation shut out belated claims to save the accused from unnecessary harassment and risk of trial with lost evidence.
Cognizance - Cited for the proposition that taking cognizance without condoning delay is bad and without jurisdiction.
A.Subhashini, B.DUTTA, KITTY KUMARAMANGALAM, R.RAMACHANDRAN
Judgment
SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J.:- Special leave granted. The appeal is disposed of by the order passed herein.
2. On 20th of November, 1976, the appellant was posted in the State of Arunachal Pradesh as an Executive Engineer (Elect). An accident took place in the jeep which was alleged to have been driven by the appellant. The accident took place within the Bomdila Police Station in Arunachal Pradesh. In the said accident one of the occupants, J. K. Jain, Assistant Engineer (Elect.) died and another S. Karim, driver sustained grievous injuries. According to the police the accident is attributable to rash and negligent driving of the appellant. As per the case file, Shri R.B. Singh, Sub-Inspector submitted a report to the Deputy Commissioner, Bomdila on 22nd November, 1976, who according to the learned Magistrate took cognizance of the offence under S. 32(c) of Regulation I of 1945 and the police registered the case. The learned Magistrate held that cognizance was taken on 22nd November, 1976. This finding, however, was not sustained by the High Court. The police is alleged to have registered the case and took up investigations and submitted the chargesheet in September, 1977 which, however, appears to have been placed before the Deputy Commissioner on 31st March, 1986, and it was on that date that the cognizance of the offence was taken, according to the High Court. The learned Magistrate in his order stated that the reason why report could not be placed before the Court promptly merited detailed probing, which showed that cognizance was taken on 22nd November, 1976 by the competent authority but the court proceedings thereof commenced on 31st March, 1986. The appellant was chargesheeted under S. 279 read with S. 304A/338 of the Penal Code. According to the appellant cognizance was only taken on 31st March, 1986. The first question, therefore, in this case is when was the cognizance taken. By the order of the learned Magistrate, the appellant was directed to appear on the next date of hearing, that is on 8th September, 1986. The order was passed on 14th July, 1986.
3. Challenging the said order, the appellant moved the High Court of Gauhati under S. 482 of the Criminal P.C. read with Art. 227 of the Constitution for quashing the charges framed by the Magistrate 1st Class, Bomdila. The High Court in its judgment and order dated 14th August, 1987 held that the investigations started on 22nd November, 1976 on the registration of the case under Ss. 279, 304A and 338 of the I.P.C. and the investigation was completed on 8th September, 1977 and cognizance was taken on 31st March, 1986 when the Deputy Commissioner passed the following order : "Records perused. Issue summons to the accused to appear at Kameng on 9th May, 1986." Therefore, the first question that arises is, when was the cognizance taken, on 22nd November, 1976 or 31st March, 1986. The High Court held that cognizance was taken on 31st March, 1986. The offence under S. 279 is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months, or with fine, or with both. Offence under S. 304A is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years, or with fine, or with both. Offence under S. 338 is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years, or with fine or with both. In the aforesaid view of the matter, the period of limitation for taking cognizance of the offences would be three years. S. 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides as follows :
"468. Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation. (1) Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code, no Court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-section (2), after the expiry of the period of limitation.
(2) The period of limitation shall be
(a) six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only;
(b) one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year;
(c) three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years."
4. There is, however, a provision for extension of the period of limitation in certain cases, where on the facts and circumstances of the case, the delay has been properly explained or it is necessary in the interest of justice to do so. This is provided in S. 473 of the Criminal P.C. in the following terms:
"473. Extension of period of limitation in certain cases. Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this Chapter, any Court may take cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the period of limitation, if it is satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that the delay has been properly explained or that it is necessary so to do in the interests of justice."
5. It was contended before us that the first question that arises in this appeal is : when the cognizance of the offence was taken in this case. This Court in Tula Ram v. Kishore Singh, (1977) 4 SCC 459 explained the meaning of the words "taking cognizance" and held that it means judicial application of mind of the Magistrate to the facts mentioned in the complaint with a view to taking further action. In this connection reference may also be made to the observations of this Court in Bhagwant Singh v. Commr. of Police, (1985) 3 SCR 942: It was held by this Court as follows:
"Now, when the report forwarded by the officer-in-charge of a police station to the Magistrate under sub-section (2)(i) of S. 173 comes up for consideration by the Magistrate, one of two different situations may arise. The report may conclude that an offence appears to have been committed by a particular person or persons and in such a case, the Magistrate may do one of three things : (1) he may accept the report and take cognizance of the offence and issue process or (2) he may disagree with the report and drop the proceeding or (3) he may direct further investigation under sub-section (3) of S. 156 and require the police to make a further report. The report may on the other hand state that, in the opinion of the police, no offence appears to have been committed and where such a report has been made, the Magistrate again has an option to adopt one of three courses; (1) he may accept the report and drop the proceeding or (2) he may disagree with the report and taking the view that there is sufficient ground for proceeding further, take cognizance of the offence and issue process or (3) he may direct further investigation to be made by the police under sub-section (3) of S. 156 ..................But if the Magistrate decides that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding further and drops the proceeding or takes the view that though there is sufficient ground for proceeding against some, there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against others mentioned in the First Information Report, the informant would certainly be prejudiced because the First Information Report lodged by him would have faded of its purpose, wholly or in part ...........There can, therefore, be no doubt that when, on a consideration of the report made by the officer in charge of a police station under sub-section (2)(i) of S. 173, the Magistrate is not inclined to take cognizance of the offence and issue process, the informant must be given an opportunity of being heard so that he can make his submissions to persuade the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence and issue process."
6. The High Court was of the view that really cognizance in this case was taken on 31st March, 1986. The High Court has set out the facts on which it is relied. The said finding of the High Court has not been challenged. The appellant in this case before this Court has proceeded on that basis Shri B. Datta, Additional Solicitor General contended that cognizance was taken at early in September, 1977. It was contended before us on behalf of the respondent, as it was said before the High Court that if the cognizance was taken in 1986, then it was clearly beyond the time. If the principles of the Criminal P.C. applied, the taking of cognizance of the offence was barred by S. 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
7. It was submitted before the High Court of Gauhati and reiterated before us that the provisions of the Criminal P.C. do not apply to the State of Arunachal Pradesh. In this connection reliance was placed on S. 32 of the Assam Frontier (Administration of Justice) Regulation, 1945. S. 32 of the Regulation provides that the High Court, the Deputy Commissioner and the Assistant Commissioner shall be guided in regard to procedure by the principles of the Criminal; P.C. so far as these are applicable to the circumstances of the District and consistent with the provisions of the Regulation. There are exceptions to S. 32. Those exceptions irrelevant for the present purpose. The High Court held and in our opinion rightly, that S. 32 of the said Regulation should be guided by the spirit of the Code and it will be proper to throw out a complaint if there was inordinate or undue delay, which was not explained. Indeed, this Court in State of Punjab v. Sarwan Singh, (1981) 3 SCR 349 observed at page 351 of the report that the object of the Criminal P.C. inputting a bar of limitation on prosecutions was clearly to prevent the parties from filing cases after a long time, as a result of which material evidence may disappear and also to prevent abuse of the process of the court by filing vexatious and belated prosecutions long after the date of the offence. This Court reiterated that the object which the statutes seek to subserve is clearly in consonance with the concept of fairness of trial as enshrined in Art. 21 of the Constitution. Shri Raju Ramachandran submitted that the exercise of the power under S. 473 of the Criminal P.C. extending the period of limitation by condoning the delay in launching the prosecution, should precede the taking of cognizance of the offence. Reliance was placed on the bench decision of the Madras High Court in Kathamuthu v. Balammal, 1987 Cri LJ 360. It was held by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Ghansham Dass v. Sham Sundar Lal, 1982 Cri LJ 1717 that cognizance taken by the Magistrate without deciding the point in limitation was beyond his jurisdiction. In this connection, reliance may be placed to the decision of this Court in Surinder Mohan Vikal v. Ascharaj Lal Chopra, (1978) 2 SCC 403 where at page 407 of the report, while dealing with the provisions of S. 468 of the Criminal P.C. this Court observed that it is hardly necessary to say that statutes of limitation have legislative policy behind them. For instance, they shut out belated and dormant claims in order to save the accused from unnecessary harassment. They also save the accused from the risk of having to face trial at a time when his evidence might have been lost because of the delay on the part of the prosecutor. As has been stated, a bar to the taking of cognizance has been prescribed under S. 468 of the Criminal P.C. and there is no reason why the appellant should not be entitled to it in the facts and circumstances of this case. Our attention was also drawn to the case of Vijay Kumar Agarwalla v. State of Assam, (1986) 1 Gauhati LR 421, where the Court held that taking of cognizance without condoning delay was bad and without jurisdiction.
8. The High Court in the instant judgment under appeal held that this aspect of the matter was not considered by the Magistrate and the High Court quashed the charges against the appellant and remitted the case to the Magistrate for considering the case afresh. In the instant case, the broad facts that emerge are that the alleged offence took place in November, 1976, and until the High Courts order in August, 1987 no investigation had taken place. The offence is of rash and negligent driving. It is, as such, neither a grave and heinous offence nor an offence against the community as such, though all criminal offences are crimes against society.
9. It is not necessary in the facts and circumstances of the case to decide, whether cognizance was properly taken. It is also not necessary to decide whether the extension of period of limitation under S. 473 must precede of taking of the cognizance of the offence. It is also not necessary to decide whether cognizance in this case was taken on 8th Sept. 1977 as held by the learned Magistrate or on 31st March, 1986 as held by the High Court. Having regard to the nature of offence there is enormous delay in proceeding with the criminal prosecution by the appellant 91/2 years for a trial for rash and negligent driving, is too long a time. Quick justice is a sine qua non of Art. 21 of the Constitution. Keeping a person in suspended animation for 91/2 years without any cause at all and none was indicated before the learned Magistrate or before the High Court or before us cannot be with the spirit of the procedure established by law. In that view of the matter, it is just and fair and in accordance with equity to direct that the trial or prosecution of the appellant to proceed no further. We do so accordingly.
10. In the aforesaid view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the proceedings cannot be proceeded any further. We allow the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court of Gauhati, dated 14th August, 1987 and quash the proceedings against the appellant. The proceedings against the appellant are hereby quashed.
Appeal allowed.
For Citation : AIR 1988 SC 1729