1988 JTR(SC) 508
1988 AIR(SC) 2045 ; 1989 1 ArbLR 34 ; 1988 2 CurCC(SC) 492 ; 1988 3 JT 743 ; 1988 2 KLT(SN) 58 1 ; 1988 2 Scale 586 ; 1988 4 SCC 462 ; 1988 Supp2 SCR 462 ; 1988 2 UJ 625 ; 1988 KHC 719
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
SABYASACHI MUKHARJI AND S. RANGANATHAN, JJ.
M/s. Neelkantan and Bros. Construction, Petitioner
Versus
Superintending Engineer, National Highways, Salem and others, Respondents.
Spl. Leave Petn. (Civil) Nos. 11650-58 of 1987, D/- 16-8-1988.
Act
Referred
:ARBITRATION ACT : S.33, S.30
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA : Art.136
(A) The Arbitration Act provisions govern the challenge to the arbitrator's jurisdiction and the validity of the award in this appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution. Sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, are specifically invoked to contest the award on grounds of jurisdiction and natural justice. The reference to these sections by the High Court indicates that the challenge was framed as a suit seeking to set aside or confirm the award, and the Supreme Court's jurisdiction under Article 136 is engaged to determine if the High Court's order was legally sound. The interplay between the appointing authority, successor arbitrator, and the procedural aspects of arbitration is evaluated within the framework of these statutory provisions.
(B) The core legal principles include the doctrine of acquiescence, where prior knowledge and participation in proceedings preclude later objection to the arbitrator's jurisdiction. The principle that the court cannot review the merits of an award absent patent error or a gross miscarriage of justice is emphasized. The successor arbitrator is competent to proceed if the parties had notice and did not protest, and an award stands unassailable unless it suffers from a clear legal error.
Facts of the case:
The petitioner company was engaged in highway work divided into multiple reaches, with separate agreements for each reach. The appointed arbitrator was transferred mid-proceeding, and a successor arbitrator was appointed. The petitioner participated in the proceedings after being informed of the change and did not object. The successor arbitrator completed the award after seeking and obtaining an extension of time. A challenge was raised before the District Judge and subsequently the High Court on the ground that the successor arbitrator lacked jurisdiction.
Findings of Court:
The District Judge and the High Court held that the successor arbitrator was competent to conclude the arbitration. The Supreme Court agreed, finding that the petitioner's participation with full knowledge of the facts amounted to acquiescence, and the award was not open to challenge on the grounds raised.
Issues:
Whether a successor arbitrator can conclude an arbitration proceeding after the original arbitrator's transfer, and whether the petitioner's acquiescence precludes a challenge based on lack of jurisdiction.
Ratio Decidendi:
The petitioner's active participation and failure to protest the change in arbitrator, coupled with notice and consent, amount to acquiescence, validating the successor arbitrator's jurisdiction and rendering the award unchallengeable on the stated grounds.
Result:
The appeals are dismissed, and the High Court's order upholding the award is affirmed.
(A) The Arbitration Act provisions govern the challenge to the arbitrator's jurisdiction and the validity of the award in this appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution. Sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, are specifically invoked to contest the award on grounds of jurisdiction and natural justice. The reference to these sections by the High Court indicates that the challenge was framed as a suit seeking to set aside or confirm the award, and the Supreme Court's jurisdiction under Article 136 is engaged to determine if the High Court's order was legally sound. The interplay between the appointing authority, successor arbitrator, and the procedural aspects of arbitration is evaluated within the framework of these statutory provisions.
(B) The core legal principles include the doctrine of acquiescence, where prior knowledge and participation in proceedings preclude later objection to the arbitrator's jurisdiction. The principle that the court cannot review the merits of an award absent patent error or a gross miscarriage of justice is emphasized. The successor arbitrator is competent to proceed if the parties had notice and did not protest, and an award stands unassailable unless it suffers from a clear legal error.
Facts of the case:
The petitioner company was engaged in highway work divided into multiple reaches, with separate agreements for each reach. The appointed arbitrator was transferred mid-proceeding, and a successor arbitrator was appointed. The petitioner participated in the proceedings after being informed of the change and did not object. The successor arbitrator completed the award after seeking and obtaining an extension of time. A challenge was raised before the District Judge and subsequently the High Court on the ground that the successor arbitrator lacked jurisdiction.
Findings of Court:
The District Judge and the High Court held that the successor arbitrator was competent to conclude the arbitration. The Supreme Court agreed, finding that the petitioner's participation with full knowledge of the facts amounted to acquiescence, and the award was not open to challenge on the grounds raised.
Issues:
Whether a successor arbitrator can conclude an arbitration proceeding after the original arbitrator's transfer, and whether the petitioner's acquiescence precludes a challenge based on lack of jurisdiction.
Ratio Decidendi:
The petitioner's active participation and failure to protest the change in arbitrator, coupled with notice and consent, amount to acquiescence, validating the successor arbitrator's jurisdiction and rendering the award unchallengeable on the stated grounds.
Result:
The appeals are dismissed, and the High Court's order upholding the award is affirmed.
A.K.SEN GUPTA, A.V.RANGAM, V.BALACHANDRAN, V.KRISHNAMURTHY
Judgment
SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J.:- These are petitions under Art. 136 of the Constitution seeking leave to appeal against the judgment and order of the High Court of Madras dated 31st July, 1987. The petitioner company undertook the work of widening and strengthening pavement in National Highway No. 7, Madurai-Kanyakumari Road from Reaches 37.6 k.m. to 213 k.m. on the Madurai-Kanyakumari Road and the work was divided into fourteen Reaches and 14 separate agreements were entered into between the petitioner and the Superintending Engineer, National Highways, Tirunelveli, respondent No. 3 to the present petitions. There is not much dispute on this point. At the relevant time, according to the petitioner, the Superintending Engineer, National Highways, Salem was one Thiru Mohan. He entered into reference. He took up the matter for arbitration and called for statements from the parties. Statements were filed before him and evidence was also adduced before him. But before he could complete the adjudication he was transferred and was succeeded by the Thiru J.R. Cornelius, Superintending Engineer. The contention of the petitioner in this case was that he had no jurisdiction to proceed and complete the arbitration. It appears however, that he entered into the task of adjudication with the knowledge and consent of the petitioner and the petitioner had his active participation in the proceeding before him. From the notices served by Thiru Mohan previously and subsequently by Thiru Cornelius, it is apparent that the petitioner had knowledge of the change of the incumbent of the Superintending Engineer who was to arbitrate in the matter. This is evident from the documents appearing at pages 164 and 165 of the present paper book and both the parties had notice of the succession in office. The arbitrator could not complete the award within time and there was need for extension of time. He wrote a letter to the petitioner on 1st May, 1977 stating "extension of time was necessary to pass orders on reference and hearing has been concluded." In reply to that letter on 11th May, 1977 the petitioner agreed to such extension. The petitioner rest content with that situation and never asked for any further or fresh opportunity either to make any submission or to adduce any evidence. In that light the arbitrator has made the award. This was challenged before the learned District Judge by means of a suit under Ss. 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 that the previous arbitrator Thiru Mohan having entered into reference Thiru Cornelius had no jurisdiction to conclude. It was violative of the principles of natural justice, it was submitted. But as mentioned hereinbefore, the petitioner had knowledge of the change of the incumbent. He did not protest and the proceedings went on before Thiru Cornelius. It is apparent from the terms of the agreement between the parties that the Superintending Engineer of the Circle for the time being was the named arbitrator. The learned District Judge held that Thiru Cornelius was competent to pass the award. The High Court also upheld that and rejected the challenge to the award on this ground made by the petitioner.
2. Shri A.K. Sen, learned counsel for the petitioner urged before us that once an arbitrator had entered into reference, the next incumbent could not conclude the said arbitration proceeding without a fresh agreement. In the facts of this case, as the petitioner had knowledge of the alleged defect and had acquiesced in the proceedings before the successor, namely, Thiru Cornelius, we are of the opinion, that this contention of Shri Sen cannot be entertained. It was contended that there was violation of the principles of natural justice. This objection cannot be entertained. If the parties to the reference either, agree beforehand to the method of appointment, or afterwards acquiesce in the appointment made, with full knowledge of all the circumstances, they will be precluded from objecting to such appointment as invalidating subsequent proceedings. Attending and taking part in the proceedings with full knowledge of the relevant fact will amount to such acquiescence, explains Russell on Arbitration. 18th Edition at page 105. This was stated by the Judicial Committee long ago in Chowdhury Murtaza Hossein v. Mussumat Bibi Bechunnissa, (1876) 3 Ind App 209. See also the observations of P.B. Mukharji, J. in the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Jupiter General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Corpn. of Calcutta, AIR 1956 Cal 470 at p. 472. This court held in N. Challappan v. Secy. Kerala State Electricity Board, (1975) 1 SCC 289 that acquiescence defeated the right of the appellant at a later stage. See also the observations of this Court in Prasun Roy v. Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority, (1982) 2 Scale 125).* See also Russell on Arbitration, 20th Edition, pages 432-435. Shri Sen contended that no notice was issued after the appointment of the new arbitrator. This was factually incorrect, as mentioned before. Then, it was said that the award was bad as it did not consider all the claims. This also cannot be entertained. It must be assumed that the arbitrator had considered all the evidence adduced before him. There was no disregard of any principle of law. There was nothing to indicate that the arbitrator had not considered all the evidence. Unless there was a patent mistake of law and gross misstatement of facts resulting in miscarriage of justice or of equity, the award remains unassailable. In this case the arbitrator gave no reason for the award. There is no legal proposition which is the basis of the award, far less a legal proposition which is erroneous. There is no appeal from the verdict of the arbitrator. The Court cannot review, in such circumstances, the award and correct any mistake in the adjudication by the arbitrator - See Champsey Bhara & Company v. Jivray Ballo Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd., 50 Ind App 324 : and the observations of Bachawat, J. in Firm Madanlal Roshanlal Mahajan v. Hukumchand Mills Ltd., Indore, (1967) 1 SCR 105 : of this Court.
3. In the facts and circumstances of the case, in our opinion, this award is not assailable. The High Court was, therefore, right in upholding the District Judges dismissal of the challenge to the award. These petitions, therefore, fail and are dismissed accordingly, without any order as to costs.
Appeal dismissed.
For Citation : AIR 1988 SC 2045