1988 JTR(SC) 654
1989 AIR(SC) 142 ; 1989 CriLR 73 ; 1988 3 Crimes(SC) 771 ; 1989 CrLJ 870 ; 1989 EastCrC(SC) 269 ; 2010 5 JKJ(SC) 911 ; 1988 4 JT 112 ; 1988 RLR 628 ; 1988 2 Scale 907 ; 1988 4 SCC 574 ; 1989 SCC(Cri) 25 ; 1988 KHC 1065 ; 1988 2 KLT(Online) 1129
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
G.L. OZA, M.M. DUTT, K.N. SINGH, K. JAGANNATHA SHETTY AND L.M. SHARMA, JJ.
Smt. Triveniben, Petitioner
Versus
State of Gujarat, Respondent.
Writ Petn. (Cri) No. 1566 of 1985 with Cri Misc. Petn. No. 3543 of 1986 and Writ Petn. (Cri) Nos. 186, 191 of 1986 and 338 of 1988 and Writ Petn. (Cri) No. 649 of 1987 with Cri Misc. Petn. No. 4576 of 1987
Decided on 11-10-1988.
AND
Harbhajan Singh, Petitioner
Versus
State of J. and K., Respondents.
AND
Dal Singh, Petitioner
Versus
Union of India and another, Respondents.
AND
Indian Council of Family and Social Welfare, Petitioner
Versus
State of T.N., Respondent. 143
AND
Gurcharan Singh and Pritam Singh (rep. by their mother), Petitioners
Versus
State Punjab, Respondent.
Mr. R.K. Jain, Sr. Advocate, Mrs. Urmila Sirur, Mr. Mohd. Naseem, Mr. Rakesh K. Khanna, Mr. P.K. Jain, Mr. Mukul Mudgal, Mr. Sanjay Parikh, Mr. B.P. Singh, Mr. P. Krishna Rao, Mr. B.K. Prasad, Ms. Malini Podwal and Mr. Lalit Kumar Gupta, Advocates with him, for Petitioners; Mr. B. Datta, Addl. Solicitor General, Mr. V.C. Mahajan, Mr. T.U. Mehta, Sr. Advocates, Ms. A. Subhashini, Mr. A.K. Srivastava, Mr. M.N. Shroff and Mr. Mahabir Singh Advocates with them for Respondents; Mr. A.K. Goel, and Mr. Ajit Pudissery, Advocates, for Intervenors in W.P. No. 1566 of 1985.
Act Referred :CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE : S.414, S.413
(A) The Criminal Procedure Code provisions referenced govern the adjudication of appeals and writs concerning the execution of death sentences, specifically addressing the jurisdiction of the court to examine inordinate delay and its impact on the sentence. These sections provide the procedural and substantive framework for determining whether prolonged delay in carrying out a death sentence warrants mitigation to life imprisonment, thereby shaping the court's review process in this constitutional matter.
(B) The core legal principles include: (i) undue delay in execution of a death sentence permits the accused to approach the court under Article 32, (ii) the court may examine the nature and circumstances of the delay but cannot re-open the merits of the death sentence confirmation, (iii) the court may consider inordinate delay in light of all circumstances to decide between carrying out the death sentence or substituting it with life imprisonment, and (iv) no fixed period of delay automatically renders a death sentence inexecutable.
Facts of the case:
A death sentence was awarded and finally confirmed by the judicial process, followed by allegations of prolonged delay in execution. The accused challenged the sentence on the grounds that the inordinate delay warranted mitigation to life imprisonment.
Findings of Court:
The court acknowledged the right to approach under Article 32 for examining delay but held that it would not re-open the death sentence confirmation. It emphasized a holistic review of circumstances to determine whether execution should proceed or be commuted to life imprisonment, noting that Vatheeswaran's case was overruled to the extent it fixed a rigid period.
Issues:
Whether prolonged delay in execution of a death sentence automatically entitles the accused to life imprisonment, and whether the court has jurisdiction to examine the delay without re-opening the death sentence confirmation.
Ratio Decidendi:
The court ruled that while an accused can approach under Article 32 to challenge inordinate delay, the court will only assess the delay's nature and circumstances to decide on commutation, without revisiting the death sentence's final confirmation, thereby rejecting a fixed-delay rule and substituting the death sentence with life imprisonment in the present case.
Result:
The death sentence was quashed and substituted with imprisonment for life, while all other writ petitions were dismissed.
(A) The Criminal Procedure Code provisions referenced govern the adjudication of appeals and writs concerning the execution of death sentences, specifically addressing the jurisdiction of the court to examine inordinate delay and its impact on the sentence. These sections provide the procedural and substantive framework for determining whether prolonged delay in carrying out a death sentence warrants mitigation to life imprisonment, thereby shaping the court's review process in this constitutional matter.
(B) The core legal principles include: (i) undue delay in execution of a death sentence permits the accused to approach the court under Article 32, (ii) the court may examine the nature and circumstances of the delay but cannot re-open the merits of the death sentence confirmation, (iii) the court may consider inordinate delay in light of all circumstances to decide between carrying out the death sentence or substituting it with life imprisonment, and (iv) no fixed period of delay automatically renders a death sentence inexecutable.
Facts of the case:
A death sentence was awarded and finally confirmed by the judicial process, followed by allegations of prolonged delay in execution. The accused challenged the sentence on the grounds that the inordinate delay warranted mitigation to life imprisonment.
Findings of Court:
The court acknowledged the right to approach under Article 32 for examining delay but held that it would not re-open the death sentence confirmation. It emphasized a holistic review of circumstances to determine whether execution should proceed or be commuted to life imprisonment, noting that Vatheeswaran's case was overruled to the extent it fixed a rigid period.
Issues:
Whether prolonged delay in execution of a death sentence automatically entitles the accused to life imprisonment, and whether the court has jurisdiction to examine the delay without re-opening the death sentence confirmation.
Ratio Decidendi:
The court ruled that while an accused can approach under Article 32 to challenge inordinate delay, the court will only assess the delay's nature and circumstances to decide on commutation, without revisiting the death sentence's final confirmation, thereby rejecting a fixed-delay rule and substituting the death sentence with life imprisonment in the present case.
Result:
The death sentence was quashed and substituted with imprisonment for life, while all other writ petitions were dismissed.
A.K.GOHIL, A.K.SRIVASTAVA, A.Subhashini, AJIT PUDDSSERY, B.DUTTA, B.K.PRASAD, B.P.SINGH, L.K.GUPTA, M.N.SHROFF, Mahabir Singh, MALINI PODVAL, MOHD.NASIM, Mukul Mudgal, P.K.JAIN, P.KRISHNA RAO, R.K.JAIN, Rakesh K.Khanna, Sanjay Parikh, T.U.Mehta, URMILA SIRUR, V.C.MAHAJAN
JUDGMENT
OZA, J. :— In view of the conflicting decisions in (i) T. V. Vatheeswaran v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1983) 2 SCR 348; (ii) Sher Singh v. State of Punjab (1983) 2 SCR 582; and (iii) Javed Ahmed Abdul Hamid Pawala v. State of Maharashtra, (1985) 2 SCR 9 question as to whether prolonged delay in execution of death sentence entitles the accused to the lesser sentence of life imprisonment has come up for consideration before the Constitution Bench. We have examined the question carefully in the light of the submissions made by counsel on both sides. We have also examined the individual cases listed for consideration. We now give only our conclusion to avoid further delay in these matters. The reasons in support of the conclusion will follow later.
2. We are of the opinion that :
1. Undue long delay in execution of the sentence of death will entitle the condemned person to approach this Court under Article 32 but this Court will only examine the nature of delay caused and circumstances ensued after sentence was finally confirmed by the judicial process and will have no jurisdiction to re-open the conclusions reached by the Court while finally maintaining the sentence of death. This Court, however, may consider the question of inordinate delay in the light of all circumstances of the case to decide whether the execution of sentence should be carried out or should be altered into imprisonment for life. No fixed period of delay could be held to make the sentence of death inexecutable and to this extent the decision in Vatheeswarans case cannot be said to lay down the correct law and therefore to that extent stands overruled.
3. In the light of these principles and giving our anxious consideration to every one of these cases, we allow in part only W. P. (Cri) No. 186 of 1986 and quash the sentence of death awarded to the accused (Harbhajan Singh). In the place of the sentence of death, we substitute the sentence of imprisonment for life to that accused.
4. We dismiss all other writ petitions.
Order accordingly.
For Citation : AIR 1989 SC 142