1990 JTR(SC) 300
1990 AIR(SC) 1321 ; 1990 2 CurCC(SC) 291 ; 1990 2 JT 330 ; 1990 2 PLJR(SC) 69 ; 1990 2 RRR 31 ; 1990 Supp1 Scale 102 ; 1990 3 SCC 617 ; 1990 3 SCR 20 ; 1990 2 UJ 145 ; 1990 KHC 866 ; 1990 1 KLT(Online) 1054
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
L.M. SHARMA AND M.M. PUNCHHI, JJ.
Neelagangabai and another, Appellants
Versus
State of Karnataka and others, Respondents.
Civil Appeal No. 1561 of 1988, D/- 3-5-1990.
Act
Referred
:LAND ACQUISITION ACT : S.20(c)
LAND ACQUISITION MYSORE EXTENSION AND AMENDMENT ACT : S.22
URBAN LAND CEILING AND REGULATIONS ACT : S.10, S.11
(A) The Land Acquisition Act, 1897, read alongside the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, governs the present dispute concerning compensation for land acquired from appellants who were held to possess surplus land. Under Section 20(c) of the Land Acquisition Act, a notice must be served on the authority for whom acquisition is made when the acquisition is not for Government purposes, ensuring its right to be heard. Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act allows for reference of compensation matters to a civil court, while Section 11 of the Urban Land Ceiling Act and Section 22 of the Land Acquisition (Mysore Extension and Amendment) Act regulate vesting and determination of surplus land. Prior to the declaration of vesting under the Ceiling Act, appellants initiated acquisition proceedings, making them eligible for compensation under the Land Acquisition Act. The court must ensure compliance with procedural safeguards, including notice to all persons interested, as underscored by Section 10 of the Urban Land Ceiling Act.
(B) Key legal principles include that an authority for whom land is acquired is a 'person interested' under Section 20(c) of the Land Acquisition Act and must be notified before a reference is determined; failure to provide such notice renders the judgment illegal; and a compromise decree cannot be maintained if it prejudices statutory rights. The determination of compensation requires adherence to procedural fairness, and the court of reference must record findings on valuation rather than relying solely on consent.
Facts of the case:
The appellants owned land declared as surplus urban land under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, which vested in the State Government. Before the vesting declaration was published, acquisition steps were initiated for a municipal corporation, making the appellants eligible for compensation under the Land Acquisition Act, 1897. Compensation was determined by a civil court on reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1897, based on the consent of the landowners and the State, without issuing a notice to the municipal corporation. The State filed an appeal against the compensation award, which was dismissed as a compromise decree. The municipal corporation moved a writ petition challenging the compensation order.
Findings of Court:
The High Court held that the civil court of reference was mandated to serve a notice on the municipal corporation, the authority for whom the acquisition was made, as required under Section 20(c) of the Land Acquisition Act. The absence of such notice deprived the corporation of an opportunity to present its case, rendering the judgment illegal. The court relied on the liberal interpretation of 'person interested' but emphasized the specific procedural requirement under clause (c). The appeal against the compensation award was not maintainable, and the reference proceedings were set aside.
Issues:
Whether an authority for whom land is acquired constitutes a 'person interested' requiring service of notice under Section 20(c) of the Land Acquisition Act; whether a compensation award determined without notifying such authority is legally valid; and whether a compromise decree in such reference proceedings is maintainable.
Ratio Decidendi:
The court determined that Section 20(c) of the Land Acquisition Act expressly requires service of notice on the authority for whom acquisition is made, ensuring its right to be heard. Procedural fairness demands strict compliance, and failure to notify renders the determination void. The judgment of the reference court was illegal, necessitating a fresh determination of compensation with proper notice.
Result:
The appeal is dismissed with costs. The matter is remanded to the Principal Civil Judge, Hubli, to reopen the reference proceedings, provide the municipal corporation a chance to record evidence on valuation, and decide afresh within three weeks.
(A) The Land Acquisition Act, 1897, read alongside the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, governs the present dispute concerning compensation for land acquired from appellants who were held to possess surplus land. Under Section 20(c) of the Land Acquisition Act, a notice must be served on the authority for whom acquisition is made when the acquisition is not for Government purposes, ensuring its right to be heard. Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act allows for reference of compensation matters to a civil court, while Section 11 of the Urban Land Ceiling Act and Section 22 of the Land Acquisition (Mysore Extension and Amendment) Act regulate vesting and determination of surplus land. Prior to the declaration of vesting under the Ceiling Act, appellants initiated acquisition proceedings, making them eligible for compensation under the Land Acquisition Act. The court must ensure compliance with procedural safeguards, including notice to all persons interested, as underscored by Section 10 of the Urban Land Ceiling Act.
(B) Key legal principles include that an authority for whom land is acquired is a 'person interested' under Section 20(c) of the Land Acquisition Act and must be notified before a reference is determined; failure to provide such notice renders the judgment illegal; and a compromise decree cannot be maintained if it prejudices statutory rights. The determination of compensation requires adherence to procedural fairness, and the court of reference must record findings on valuation rather than relying solely on consent.
Facts of the case:
The appellants owned land declared as surplus urban land under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, which vested in the State Government. Before the vesting declaration was published, acquisition steps were initiated for a municipal corporation, making the appellants eligible for compensation under the Land Acquisition Act, 1897. Compensation was determined by a civil court on reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1897, based on the consent of the landowners and the State, without issuing a notice to the municipal corporation. The State filed an appeal against the compensation award, which was dismissed as a compromise decree. The municipal corporation moved a writ petition challenging the compensation order.
Findings of Court:
The High Court held that the civil court of reference was mandated to serve a notice on the municipal corporation, the authority for whom the acquisition was made, as required under Section 20(c) of the Land Acquisition Act. The absence of such notice deprived the corporation of an opportunity to present its case, rendering the judgment illegal. The court relied on the liberal interpretation of 'person interested' but emphasized the specific procedural requirement under clause (c). The appeal against the compensation award was not maintainable, and the reference proceedings were set aside.
Issues:
Whether an authority for whom land is acquired constitutes a 'person interested' requiring service of notice under Section 20(c) of the Land Acquisition Act; whether a compensation award determined without notifying such authority is legally valid; and whether a compromise decree in such reference proceedings is maintainable.
Ratio Decidendi:
The court determined that Section 20(c) of the Land Acquisition Act expressly requires service of notice on the authority for whom acquisition is made, ensuring its right to be heard. Procedural fairness demands strict compliance, and failure to notify renders the determination void. The judgment of the reference court was illegal, necessitating a fresh determination of compensation with proper notice.
Result:
The appeal is dismissed with costs. The matter is remanded to the Principal Civil Judge, Hubli, to reopen the reference proceedings, provide the municipal corporation a chance to record evidence on valuation, and decide afresh within three weeks.
C.K.Suchitra, MOHAN V.KATARIA, N.D.B.RAJU, N.GANAPATHI, P.R.RAMASESHESH.S.PARIHARHAR, RAJESHWAR THAKUR
Judgment
SHARMA, J.:- This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Karnataka dated 4-3-1987 in W.P. No. 10292 of 1980 filed by the respondent No. 3, Hubli Dharwar Municipal Corporation, setting aside an award made under the Land Acquisition Act, 1897 in respect of the compensation payable to the present appellants and directing to reopen the proceeding before the civil court on a reference under Section 18 of the Act, for fresh disposal in accordance with law. The appellants were the owners of the land in question. In a proceeding under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, the appellants were held to be having surplus land, which by virtue of the provisions of the Act vested in the State Government. However, before the publication of the aforesaid declaration in the official gazette, steps for acquisition were taken for meeting the requirements of the respondent-Corporation appellants thus escaped the consequences of the declaration made under the Ceiling and became entitled to the compensation payable in accordance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. Steps were accordingly taken for determination of the compensation, and on an application by the appellants under Section 18 of the and Acquisition Act, reference was made to the civil court.
2. It is common ground that after the case was received by the civil court on reference, no notice was issued to the respondent-Corporation. The court did not, however, proceed to take evidence and record its own finding on the valuation, as it was conceded on behalf of the State Government that the market value of the land could be calculated at the rate of Rs. 3,800/- per guntha. The court answered the reference on the basis of the consent of the land owners and the State. The State, however, was not satisfied with the award and filed an appeal which was dismissed on ground of being not maintainable as the impugned judgment was held to be a compromise decree. An attempt by the respondent Corporation to intervene also failed. The Corporation thereafter moved the High Court with a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, inter alia, challenging the validity of the civil courts judgment directing higher compensation to be paid.
3. Admittedly the land was acquired for the purpose of the respondent-Corporation and the burden of payment of the compensation is on the Corporation. In this background the High Court has held that it was mandatory for the court of reference to have caused a notice served on the respondent Corporation before proceeding to determine the compensation claim. Since no notice was given to the respondent-Corporation and it was thus deprived of an opportunity to place its case before the court, the judgment rendered in the reference case was illegal and not binding on the Corporation. We are in agreement with this view. Section 20 of the Land Acquistion Act as applicable to the State of Karnataka reads as follows:-
"20. Service of notice. - The court shall thereupon cause a notice, specifying the day on which the court will proceed to determine the reference, and directing their appearance before the Court on that day, to be served on the following persons, namely:
(a) the Deputy Commissioner;
(b) all persons interested in the reference; and
(c) if the acquisition is not made for Government, the person or authority for whom it is made."
In view of the clear language used in clause (c) of Section 20, mentioned above, there cannot be any doubt that the respondent-Corporation was entitled to be heard before the reference could be determined. The High Court has also relied upon the decision in Himalayan Tiles and Marbles (P) Ltd. v. Francis Victor Coutinho (dead) by Lrs, (1980) 3 SCR 235: (AIR 1980 SC 1118), wherein the expression "person interested" was interpreted liberally so as to include an authority like the Corporation in the present case, but in view of the further provision specifically mentioning in clause (c) the authority for whom the acquisition is made it is not necessary to interpret clause (b) of Section 20 in the present appeal. We accordingly confirm the direction of the High Court as contained in the impugned judgment that the Principal Civil Judge, Hubli, should re-open the proceedings in the L.A. Case No. 64 of 1979 and decide the matter afresh after giving the Corporation a chance to lead its evidence on the question of valuation. Since the matter is an old one, the respondent-Corporation is hereby directed to appear in the said case within 3 weeks from today without waiting for any further notice. The appeal is dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
For Citation : AIR 1990 SC 1321