1990 JTR(SC) 326
1990 AIR(SC) 1849 ; 1990 AllCJ 716 ; 1990 2 APLJ 70 ; 1990 BBCJ(SC) 135 ; 1990 2 ChdLR 315 ; 1990 CriLR 577 ; 1990 CrLJ 1756 ; 1990 2 CurCC(SC) 702 ; 1990 2 FAC 118 ; 1990 JLJ 567 ; 1990 3 JT 298 ; 1990 2 KLJ 775 ; 1990 2 MWN(Cri) 69 ; 1990 2 RCR(Cri) 568 ; 1990 2 RCR(Cri) 604 ; 1990 2 Scale 88 ; 1990 4 SCC 21 ; 1990 SCC(Cri) 522 ; 1990 3 SCR 263 ; 1990 KHC 319 ; 1990 2 KLT(Online) 1124
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, CJI., AND K.N. SAIKIA, J.
State of M.P. and others, Appellants
Versus
Rameshwar Rathod, Respondents
Civil Appeal No.679 of 1978, D/- 10-7-1990.
Act
Referred
:CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE : S.516(a), S.457, S.451, S.4, S.23
ESSENTIAL COMMODITIES ACT : S.6(a), S.6(a)(1), S.7
(A) The Essential Commodities Act, 1955, as amended by Amendment Act No. 30 of 1974, governs the seizure and confiscation of goods in respect of alleged contraventions. Section 6A of the Principal Act, read with Section 6(a) and Section 7, outlines the powers of the District Collector to issue notices and proceed towards confiscation, while Section 523 read with Section 516A of the Criminal Procedure Code, read in light of Section 4 and Section 23, delineates the jurisdiction of criminal courts to entertain applications for return of seized property. Section 4 of the Amendment Act specifies that amendments operate prospectively from a specified date, and Section 7 of the Act contemplates an inquiry by the criminal court, indicating that criminal jurisdiction is not completely ousted. The applicability of the provisions depends on the date of the alleged offence, with only the provisions in force on that date applying, and amendments do not operate retrospectively unless clearly stated. The impugned notice and confiscation proceedings under the Act and the concurrent criminal proceedings are thus to be examined in this statutory framework.
(B) Key legal principles include that statutes are presumed to be prospective unless clearly retrospective; amendments do not operate retrospectively unless expressly provided; criminal courts retain jurisdiction unless necessarily ousted by clear implication; and the criminal court has the power to entertain an application for return of seized property under Section 523 CrPC read with Section 516A, even when parallel proceedings under the Essential Commodities Act are ongoing. The ouster of jurisdiction must be necessarily implied from the new statutory scheme.
Facts of the case:
The respondent owned a truck allegedly used in contravention of the Essential Commodities Act on the night of 15th March, 1972. The vehicle was seized by the Police on 10th December, 1974. The respondent filed applications under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India in the High Court to quash orders of the Judicial Magistrate and the Sessions Judge rejecting his request for return on furnishing security, and to quash the orders of the District Collector under Section 6A of the Act for confiscation, or alternatively to direct the disposal of the application by the Magistrate. The High Court examined the interplay between the amended Act and the Criminal Procedure Code.
Findings of Court:
The High Court held that Section 4 of the Amendment Act of 1974 was prospective only and did not apply to an offence dated 15th March, 1972, as the amendment came into effect on a later date. It also held that the criminal court retained jurisdiction under Section 7 of the Act and was not completely ousted by the provisions of Section 6A read with Section 7, and that the vehicle could be returned on furnishing security. The appeal before this Court was based on these findings.
Issues:
Whether Section 6A of the Essential Commodities Act, as amended by the Amendment Act No. 30 of 1974, is prospective or retrospective; whether the criminal Court had jurisdiction to entertain an application under Section 523 CrPC read with Section 516A of the CrPC for return of the seized vehicle pending the final decision of the criminal case; and whether the respondent was entitled to the return of the vehicle on the merits.
Ratio Decidendi:
The amendment Act operates prospectively and does not apply to offences committed prior to its commencement; the criminal court retains jurisdiction to entertain applications for return of seized property under the CrPC where the statute does not necessarily oust its jurisdiction; and the vehicle can be returned on furnishing security where the criminal court exercises its jurisdiction under the relevant provisions of the CrPC.
Result:
The appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.
(A) The Essential Commodities Act, 1955, as amended by Amendment Act No. 30 of 1974, governs the seizure and confiscation of goods in respect of alleged contraventions. Section 6A of the Principal Act, read with Section 6(a) and Section 7, outlines the powers of the District Collector to issue notices and proceed towards confiscation, while Section 523 read with Section 516A of the Criminal Procedure Code, read in light of Section 4 and Section 23, delineates the jurisdiction of criminal courts to entertain applications for return of seized property. Section 4 of the Amendment Act specifies that amendments operate prospectively from a specified date, and Section 7 of the Act contemplates an inquiry by the criminal court, indicating that criminal jurisdiction is not completely ousted. The applicability of the provisions depends on the date of the alleged offence, with only the provisions in force on that date applying, and amendments do not operate retrospectively unless clearly stated. The impugned notice and confiscation proceedings under the Act and the concurrent criminal proceedings are thus to be examined in this statutory framework.
(B) Key legal principles include that statutes are presumed to be prospective unless clearly retrospective; amendments do not operate retrospectively unless expressly provided; criminal courts retain jurisdiction unless necessarily ousted by clear implication; and the criminal court has the power to entertain an application for return of seized property under Section 523 CrPC read with Section 516A, even when parallel proceedings under the Essential Commodities Act are ongoing. The ouster of jurisdiction must be necessarily implied from the new statutory scheme.
Facts of the case:
The respondent owned a truck allegedly used in contravention of the Essential Commodities Act on the night of 15th March, 1972. The vehicle was seized by the Police on 10th December, 1974. The respondent filed applications under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India in the High Court to quash orders of the Judicial Magistrate and the Sessions Judge rejecting his request for return on furnishing security, and to quash the orders of the District Collector under Section 6A of the Act for confiscation, or alternatively to direct the disposal of the application by the Magistrate. The High Court examined the interplay between the amended Act and the Criminal Procedure Code.
Findings of Court:
The High Court held that Section 4 of the Amendment Act of 1974 was prospective only and did not apply to an offence dated 15th March, 1972, as the amendment came into effect on a later date. It also held that the criminal court retained jurisdiction under Section 7 of the Act and was not completely ousted by the provisions of Section 6A read with Section 7, and that the vehicle could be returned on furnishing security. The appeal before this Court was based on these findings.
Issues:
Whether Section 6A of the Essential Commodities Act, as amended by the Amendment Act No. 30 of 1974, is prospective or retrospective; whether the criminal Court had jurisdiction to entertain an application under Section 523 CrPC read with Section 516A of the CrPC for return of the seized vehicle pending the final decision of the criminal case; and whether the respondent was entitled to the return of the vehicle on the merits.
Ratio Decidendi:
The amendment Act operates prospectively and does not apply to offences committed prior to its commencement; the criminal court retains jurisdiction to entertain applications for return of seized property under the CrPC where the statute does not necessarily oust its jurisdiction; and the vehicle can be returned on furnishing security where the criminal court exercises its jurisdiction under the relevant provisions of the CrPC.
Result:
The appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.
S.K.AGNIHOTRI
JUDGMENT
SABYASACHI MUKHARJ1, C.J.I. :- This is an appeal by special leave from the judgment and order of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, dated 30th September, 1976 in Miscellaneous Petition No. 63 of 1976.
2. The respondent was the owner of a truck which was seized by the Police Sorwa on 10th December, 1974 for alleged contravention of the provisions of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (hereinafter called the Act) in connections with Crime No. 42 of 1972. The respondent made applications under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, to the High Court to quash the orders of the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Alirajpur and the Sessions Judge, Jhabua respectively rejecting his request for the return of the vehicle on furnishing security and to quash the order of the District Collector and restrain him from proceeding further in pursuance of the notice issued by him under Section 6A of the Act for confiscation of the vehicle and ask for return of the vehicle, or in the alternative to direct the District Judicial Magistrate to dispose of the, application in accordance with law.
3. The High Court after setting out the facts addressed itself to three questions, namely, (1) whether Section 6A of the Essential Commodities Act as amended by the Amendment Act No. 30 of 1974 was prospective or retrospective? (2) whether in the facts and circumstances, the criminal Court had jurisdiction to entertain an application under Section 523 read with Section 516A of the Criminal Procedure Code for the return of the vehicle seized by the Police pending final decision of the criminal case? and (3) whether the respondent was entitled on the merits for the return of the vehicle as prayed for?
4. On the first question, the High Court was of the view that it was a fundamental rule of law that no Statute should be construed to have a retrospective operation unless such a construction appeared very clearly in the terms of the Act, or arose by necessary implication, direct or indirect. The High Court referred to several decisions which it is not necessary, for us to refer to. It is well settled that the normal rule of construction is that a provision in a statute is prospective but not retrospective, but however, in the case of statutes which are merely declaratory or which relate to only matters of procedure or of evidence, it may have retrospective effect if there are indications to that effect or the manifest purpose compels one to construe the Act as such.
5. On an examination of the statute and the provisions referred to herein, the High Court found that there was no retroactivity. We are of the opinion that for the reasons given by the High Court, it is difficult to accept the position that there was no retroactivity. Indeed, Mr. Deshpande appearing for the appellant did not seriously challenge this finding of the High Court. There is no dispute in this case that the contravention of the provisions of the Act is alleged to have taken place in the instant case on the night of 15th March, 1972. The vehicle was seized on 10ih December, 1974. The High Court examined Section 4 of the Amendment Act, along with Section 6A of the Principal Act and came to the conclusion that there was no retrospective effect. We are of the opinion that the High Court was right in holding that Section 4 of the Amendment Act, 1974 was only prospective and not retrospective. Not only that there were no specific words to indicate the provisions of retrospective effect, but the positive provisions of sub-sec. (2) of S. I were to the effect that the amendment must be deemed to have come in effect on a particular date is a pointer and that puts the matter beyond doubt. The provisions of Section 6A as it stood on 15th March, 1972 only were applicable to the present case and Section 4 of the Amendment Act, 1974 could not, therefore, be applied as the Act was not in force on the date of offence. The challenge to the High Court order on this aspect cannot, I therefore, be entertained.
6. It was next contended by the respondent before the High Court that the Criminal Court was empowered under Section 7 of the Act to confiscate the vehicle after due and proper inquiry and therefore the proceedings by the District Collector under Section 6A and Section 68 of the Act should be quashed. Reliance was placed on several decisions and authorities. Our attention was drawn to the decision of the Mysore High Court in the case of The State v. Abdul Rasheed, AIR 1967 Mysore 231, Sri Bharat Mahey v. State of U.P. 1975 Cri LJ 890 (All) as well as the decision of the learned single Judge in State of M.P. v. Basant Kumar, 1972 Jab LJ Short Note No. 99. On a consideration of the relevant authorities, the High Court came to the conclusion that the criminal Court had jurisdiction to deal with the matter. Mr. Deshpande sought to argue that in view of the enactment of the provisions of Section 6A as well as Section 7 of the Act, it cannot be held that the criminal Court continued to retain jurisdiction. He submitted that in view of the enactment of these provisions, it would be useless to hold that the criminal Court continued to retain jurisdiction, otherwise the very purpose of enacting Section 6A read with Section 7 would be defeated. We are, however, unable to accept this contention because, normally under the Criminal Procedure Code, the Criminal Courts of the country have the jurisdiction and the ouster of the ordinary criminal Court in respect of a crime can only be inferred if that is the irresistible conclusion flowing from necessary implication of the new Act. In view of the language used and in the context in which this language has been used, we are of the opinion that the High Court was right in coming to the conclusion that the Criminal Court retained jurisdiction and was not completely ousted of the jurisdiction. In that view of the matter, the High Court was therefore right in passing the order under consideration and in the facts and circumstances of the case to return the vehicle to the respondent on furnishing the security. In the premise the appeal must fail and is dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
Appeal dismissed.
For Citation : AIR 1990 SC 1849
Vikas Info Solutions Pvt. Ltd.