1990 JTR(SC) 586
1991 AIR(SC) 993 ; 1991 1 AllCJ 320 ; 1991 1 APLJ 45 ; 1991 CivCC 235 ; 1990 3 CurCC(SC) 676 ; 1991 1 CurLJ 395 ; 1990 4 JT 406 ; 1990 2 KLT 968 ; 1991 9 LCD 1 ; 1990 RD 484 ; 1990 2 Scale 928 ; 1991 1 SCC 494 ; 1990 Supp2 SCR 213 ; 1990 KHC 509
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
M.H. KANIA AND N.D. OJHA, JJ.
Smt. Isabella Johnson, Appellant
Versus
M.A. Susai (dead) by Lrs., Respondent.
Civil Appeal No. 2771 of 1981
Decided on 9-10-1990
Act
Referred
:ANDHRA PRADESH BUILDINGS LEASE, RENT AND EVICTION CONTROL ACT : S.3
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE : S.11
EVIDENCE ACT : S.115
(A) The applicability of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings Lease, Rent and Eviction Control Act, Section 3, was central to determining whether the suit for eviction fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Rent Controller. The Civil Procedure Code, Section 11, and the Evidence Act, Section 115, framed the procedural and evidentiary context for evaluating the plea of estoppel and the question of jurisdiction. The learned single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that once the respondent pleaded before the Rent Controller that the matter fell within the Rent Controllers exclusive jurisdiction, and that plea was upheld, the subsequent inconsistent plea before the City Civil Court was barred. However, this court examined whether a decision on a pure question of law, namely jurisdiction, can attract res judicata.
(B) A pure question of law, particularly concerning the jurisdiction of a court, is not subject to the doctrine of res judicata, and a party cannot be estopped from challenging the jurisdiction of a court on the ground of inconsistency. The principles of estoppel do not apply to jurisdictional errors of law, and an erroneous decision on jurisdiction does not preclude a party from challenging the validity of that order in a subsequent proceeding.
Facts of the case:
The appellant, as the owner, filed a suit against the respondent for eviction from suit premises on grounds of non-payment of rent and nuisance. The respondent filed a preliminary objection before the City Civil Court contending that the suit fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Rent Controller. Earlier petitions before the Rent Controller had been rejected on the ground that the tenancy was void under Section 3 of the A.P. Rent Control Act, and the respondent had taken a plea before the Rent Controller that the Rent Controller alone had jurisdiction, which was upheld. The suit was decreed by the City Civil Court, a decision upheld on appeal, but the High Court held that estoppel does not apply to questions of jurisdiction.
Findings of Court:
The High Court was correct in holding that estoppel cannot be applied to a pure question of law relating to jurisdiction. The decisions of the Rent Controller on jurisdiction, being decisions on a question of law, are not res judicata and do not estop the parties from challenging them in a subsequent suit. An erroneous decision on jurisdiction does not confer jurisdiction, nor can it be validated by the doctrine of estoppel or res judicata.
Issues:
Whether the doctrine of estoppel applies to a plea concerning the jurisdiction of the court in a subsequent suit after the same issue has been decided by the Rent Controller. Whether a decision on a pure question of law relating to jurisdiction is res judicata between the same parties in a subsequent suit.
Ratio Decidendi:
A court which has no jurisdiction in law cannot be conferred with jurisdiction by applying principles of res judicata or estoppel. Questions of law, especially jurisdictional questions, are not subject to estoppel, and an erroneous decision on jurisdiction does not bar a party from challenging that decision in a subsequent proceeding.
Result:
The appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.
(A) The applicability of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings Lease, Rent and Eviction Control Act, Section 3, was central to determining whether the suit for eviction fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Rent Controller. The Civil Procedure Code, Section 11, and the Evidence Act, Section 115, framed the procedural and evidentiary context for evaluating the plea of estoppel and the question of jurisdiction. The learned single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that once the respondent pleaded before the Rent Controller that the matter fell within the Rent Controllers exclusive jurisdiction, and that plea was upheld, the subsequent inconsistent plea before the City Civil Court was barred. However, this court examined whether a decision on a pure question of law, namely jurisdiction, can attract res judicata.
(B) A pure question of law, particularly concerning the jurisdiction of a court, is not subject to the doctrine of res judicata, and a party cannot be estopped from challenging the jurisdiction of a court on the ground of inconsistency. The principles of estoppel do not apply to jurisdictional errors of law, and an erroneous decision on jurisdiction does not preclude a party from challenging the validity of that order in a subsequent proceeding.
Facts of the case:
The appellant, as the owner, filed a suit against the respondent for eviction from suit premises on grounds of non-payment of rent and nuisance. The respondent filed a preliminary objection before the City Civil Court contending that the suit fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Rent Controller. Earlier petitions before the Rent Controller had been rejected on the ground that the tenancy was void under Section 3 of the A.P. Rent Control Act, and the respondent had taken a plea before the Rent Controller that the Rent Controller alone had jurisdiction, which was upheld. The suit was decreed by the City Civil Court, a decision upheld on appeal, but the High Court held that estoppel does not apply to questions of jurisdiction.
Findings of Court:
The High Court was correct in holding that estoppel cannot be applied to a pure question of law relating to jurisdiction. The decisions of the Rent Controller on jurisdiction, being decisions on a question of law, are not res judicata and do not estop the parties from challenging them in a subsequent suit. An erroneous decision on jurisdiction does not confer jurisdiction, nor can it be validated by the doctrine of estoppel or res judicata.
Issues:
Whether the doctrine of estoppel applies to a plea concerning the jurisdiction of the court in a subsequent suit after the same issue has been decided by the Rent Controller. Whether a decision on a pure question of law relating to jurisdiction is res judicata between the same parties in a subsequent suit.
Ratio Decidendi:
A court which has no jurisdiction in law cannot be conferred with jurisdiction by applying principles of res judicata or estoppel. Questions of law, especially jurisdictional questions, are not subject to estoppel, and an erroneous decision on jurisdiction does not bar a party from challenging that decision in a subsequent proceeding.
Result:
The appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.
Jurisdiction - The judgment discusses but does not follow this case because it was decided by a smaller bench and overlooked a prior three-judge bench decision, making it not good law on the point of res judicata regarding jurisdiction.
ResJudicata - The judgment relies on this case to hold that a decision on a pure question of jurisdiction is not res judicata in a subsequent suit.
Jurisdiction - The judgment refers to this case as reiterating the same view as Mathura Prasad that a decision on a pure question of law regarding jurisdiction is not res judicata.
A.SUBBA RAO, J.K.Agarwal
JUDGMENT
KANIA, J.:—This is an appeal by special leave from the decision of a learned single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Second Appeal No. 526 of 1977.
2. As we are, with respect, in agreement with the conclusions arrived at by the learned single Judge of the High Court, we propose to set out only the bare facts essential for the purposes of our judgment.
3. The appellant was the plaintiff and the respondent was the defendant in Suit O.S. No. 789 of 1973 filed in the Court of the Third Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. The appellant prayed for a decree for recovery of possession of the suit premises from the respondent and for mesne profits till the delivery of possession of the premises. The case of the appellant was that she was the owner of the suit premises and the respondent was in the occupation of the said premises on payment of Rs. 301- per month. The respondent had been irregular in the payment of the said rent and had been a source of perpetual nuisance. It was on this ground that the eviction of the premises was sought by the appellant. In his written statement the respondent took a preliminary objection that the City Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit as the suit fell within the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller at Hyderabad. Two petitions had earlier been filed by the appellant before the Rent Controller for eviction of the respondent and the Rent Controller had rejected the same on the ground that the purported tenancy of the respondent was hit by S. 3 of the A.P. Rent Control Act and hence, the eviction suit was not entertainable by the Court of Rent Controller. This conclusion was arrived at on a plea to the said effect taken by the respondent. In the Court of learned Third Assistant Judge of the City Civil Court at Hyderabad the respondent took up the plea that the suit fell exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller and hence the City Civil Court had up jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Certain pleas were made regarding amendments in the law with which we are not concerned in this appeal. What is material tonote for our purposes is that the learned Assistant Judge took the view that as the respondent had, before the Rent Controller, taken up the plea that it was not the Rent Controller but the City Civil Court which had the jurisdiction to entertain the eviction petition against him, and the said plea was upheld, it was not open to the respondent to take up the inconsistent plea before the City Civil Court that it was the Rent Controller and not the City Civil Court which had jurisdiction to entertain the proceedings. It was held that the respondent could not be allowed to approbate and reprobate and that he was estopped by way of pleading to take up an inconsistent plea regarding jurisdiction.
4. On the basis of this conclusion, and other conclusions with which we are not concerned, the suit was decreed by the learned Assistant Judge in favour of the appellant. The decision of the learned Assistant Judge was upheld in an appeal filed by the respondent in the Court of the learned Additional Chief Judge of the City Civil Court at Hyderabad. On a second appeal preferred by the respondent, the learned single Judge of the High Court took the view that in matters of jurisdiction the question of estoppel does not arise. If the City Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, the doctrine of estoppel could not be invoked so as to confer jurisdiction on the Court of City Civil Court. On the question of jurisdiction the learned Judge took the view that the City Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit as it lay exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller.
5. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the learned Judge of the High Court was in error, as the earlier decisions of the Rent Controller to the effect that it was the city Civil Court and not the Rent Controller who had the jurisdiction to entertain the suit for eviction filed by the appellant against the respondent, constituted res judicata between the parties on the question of jurisdiction. It was submitted by him that, even if that decision was wrong, the issue of jurisdiction was finally decided between the parties and that decision was that it was the Civil Court and not the Rent Controller that had the jurisdiction to entertain and dispose of the suit for eviction. He further submitted that the respondent could not be permitted to take inconsistent pleas as he was barred by the principles of estoppel from taking up the plea before the Civil Court that it was the Rent Controller who had the exclusive jurisdiction to entertain the suit. He placed reliance on a decision rendered by a Division Bench comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Avtar Singh v. Jagjit Singh, (1979) 4 SCC 83, which took the view that the Civil Courts decision regarding lack of jurisdiction will operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit. In that case the Civil Court declined jurisdiction. The Civil Court took the view that it had no jurisdiction to try the suit in question and directed the return of the plaint for representation to the appropriate Revenue Court. When the claim was filed in the Revenue Court, the Court took the view that it had no jurisdiction to try the claim. Thereupon, a suit was again instituted in the Civil Court for the same relief. This suit failed throughout on the ground of res judicata. The High Court affirmed the dismissal and the Division Bench of this Court took the view that the High Court was right in taking the view that the principles of res judicata were-applicable to the issue of jurisdiction. In our opinion, the contention of learned counsel for the appellant cannot be upheld. We find that in Mathura Prasad Baioo Jaiswal v. Dossibai N. B. Jeejeebhoy, (1976) 3 SCR 830 at p. 836, a Bench comprising three learned Judges of this Court has taken the view that a decision on the question of jurisdiction of the Court or a pure question of law unrelated to the right of the parties to a previous suit is not res judicata in the subsequent suit. The Court observed:-
"It is true that in determining the application of the rule of resjudicata the Court is not concerned with the correctness or otherwise of the earlier judgment. The matter in issue, if it is one purely of fact, decided in the earlier proceeding by a competent court must in a subsequent litigation between the same parties be regarded as finally decided and cannot be reopened. A mixed question of law and fact determined in, the earlier proceeding between the same parties may not, for the same reason, be questioned in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties. But, where the decision is on a question of law, i.e. the interpretation of a statute, it will be res judicata in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties where the cause of action is the same, for the expression "the matter in issue" in S. 1 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure means the right litigated between the parties, i.e. the facts on which the right is claimed or denied and the law applicable to the determination of that issue. Where, however, the question is one purely of law and it relates to the jurisdiction of the Court or a decision of the Court sanctioning something which is illegal, by resort to the rule of res judicata a party affected by the decision will not be precluded from challenging the validity of that order under the rule of res judicata, for a rule of procedure cannot supersede the law of the land."
6. The same view has been reiterated by a Bench comprising three learned Judges of this court in Sushil Kumar Mehta v. Gobind Ram Bohra (dead) through his lrs, (1990) 1 SCC 193. We find that the decision of three learned Judges of this Court is Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal v. Dossibai, N. B. Jeejeebhoy (AIR 1971 SC 2355) has not been noticed at all by the Division Bench compris:rig two learned Judges of this Court which delivered the judgment in Avtar Singh v. Jagjit Singh (AIR 1979 SC 191 1) and hence, to the extent, that the judgment in Avtar Singhs Case takes the view that the principle of res judicata is applicable to an erroneous decision on jurisdiction, it cannot be regarded as good law. In our opinion a court which has no jurisdiction in law cannot be conferred with the jurisdiction by applying principles of res judicata. It is well settled that there can be no estoppel on a pure question of law and in this case the question of jurisdiction is a pure question of law.
7. In our view, therefore, the High Court was, with respect, right in its conclusions arrived at and the appeal must be dismissed.
8. The appeal is dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.
Appeal dismissed.
For Citation: AIR 1991 SC 993