1995 JTR(SC) 98
1995 AIR(SC) 2243 ; 1995 AIR(SCW) 1757 ; 1995 1 CCC(SC) 656 ; 1995 1 CurCC(SC) 656 ; 1996 1 CurLJ 89 ; 1995 2 JT 93 ; 1995 2 RRR 75 ; 1995 1 Scale 409 ; 1995 2 SCC 422 ; 1995 1 SCR 401 ; 1995 1 UJ 547 ; 1995 KHC 788
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
K. RAMASWAMY AND N. VENKATACHALA, JJ.
Mirza Majid Hussain, Appellant
Versus
State of M.P. and another, Respondents.
Civil Appeal No. 72 of 1992
Decided on 18-1-1995.
Act
Referred
:CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE : S.115
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA : Art.226
LAND ACQUISITION ACT : S.18(3)
(A) The Land Acquisition Act, read with Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, governs the adjudication of compensation awards and provides the sole statutory mechanism for challenging an order of the Collector, where the High Court's supervisory jurisdiction under Article 226 is expressly made subject to the provisions of the Code. The legislative amendment to Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act explicitly brought orders of the Collector within the appellate ambit of the High Court as if the Collector were a subordinate court, thereby excluding the concurrent jurisdiction of any other forum and crystallizing the exclusive, hierarchical route of appeal to the High Court for any revision of the award. This framework establishes a time-bound procedural ecosystem where the District Judge or the High Court, as the designated appellate authority, is the final arbiter of the legality and validity of the acquisition proceedings.
(B) The core legal principles revolve around the doctrine of procedural bar, the doctrine of laches, the doctrine of jurisdictional limitation, and the principle of administrative finality. The court underscored that an appeal or revision to the High Court under Article 226 is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, which is lost by inordinate and unexplained delay. The order of the High Court, when exercised, is not subject to further collateral attack on the ground of jurisdictional error if the procedure is substantially complied with. The inherent powers under Article 226 are not a substitute for the statutory revision mechanism and must be exercised sparingly, particularly where the aggrieved party has slept over their rights for an extended period.
Facts of the case:
The appellant was awarded compensation under a notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act for land acquisition for the Barna Dam Irrigation Project. After the Collector rejected his revision petition, the appellant filed a Writ Petition in the High Court after a significant delay. The High Court dismissed the petition on the ground of inordinate delay, a decision challenged on appeal.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the District Judge lacked jurisdiction to entertain the revision petition following the amendment to Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, which vested exclusive revisional jurisdiction in the High Court under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. The court further held that the dismissal of the Writ Petition was justified on the ground of inordinate and unreasonable delay, which amounted to a complete bar on the exercise of judicial discretion.
Issues:
Whether the District Judge had jurisdiction to pass an order on the revision petition after the amendment to the Land Acquisition Act. Whether the High Court was justified in refusing relief on the ground of inordinate delay.
Ratio Decidendi:
The exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the District Judge was a nullity as the statute had exclusively conferred such power on the High Court. Consequently, the only valid avenue for challenge was the High Court's discretion under Article 226, which the court justifiably withheld due to the appellant's inordinate delay of over 10 years, establishing that delay going to the root of the application defeats the grant of relief.
Result:
The appeal is dismissed with no costs awarded.
(A) The Land Acquisition Act, read with Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, governs the adjudication of compensation awards and provides the sole statutory mechanism for challenging an order of the Collector, where the High Court's supervisory jurisdiction under Article 226 is expressly made subject to the provisions of the Code. The legislative amendment to Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act explicitly brought orders of the Collector within the appellate ambit of the High Court as if the Collector were a subordinate court, thereby excluding the concurrent jurisdiction of any other forum and crystallizing the exclusive, hierarchical route of appeal to the High Court for any revision of the award. This framework establishes a time-bound procedural ecosystem where the District Judge or the High Court, as the designated appellate authority, is the final arbiter of the legality and validity of the acquisition proceedings.
(B) The core legal principles revolve around the doctrine of procedural bar, the doctrine of laches, the doctrine of jurisdictional limitation, and the principle of administrative finality. The court underscored that an appeal or revision to the High Court under Article 226 is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, which is lost by inordinate and unexplained delay. The order of the High Court, when exercised, is not subject to further collateral attack on the ground of jurisdictional error if the procedure is substantially complied with. The inherent powers under Article 226 are not a substitute for the statutory revision mechanism and must be exercised sparingly, particularly where the aggrieved party has slept over their rights for an extended period.
Facts of the case:
The appellant was awarded compensation under a notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act for land acquisition for the Barna Dam Irrigation Project. After the Collector rejected his revision petition, the appellant filed a Writ Petition in the High Court after a significant delay. The High Court dismissed the petition on the ground of inordinate delay, a decision challenged on appeal.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the District Judge lacked jurisdiction to entertain the revision petition following the amendment to Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, which vested exclusive revisional jurisdiction in the High Court under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. The court further held that the dismissal of the Writ Petition was justified on the ground of inordinate and unreasonable delay, which amounted to a complete bar on the exercise of judicial discretion.
Issues:
Whether the District Judge had jurisdiction to pass an order on the revision petition after the amendment to the Land Acquisition Act. Whether the High Court was justified in refusing relief on the ground of inordinate delay.
Ratio Decidendi:
The exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the District Judge was a nullity as the statute had exclusively conferred such power on the High Court. Consequently, the only valid avenue for challenge was the High Court's discretion under Article 226, which the court justifiably withheld due to the appellant's inordinate delay of over 10 years, establishing that delay going to the root of the application defeats the grant of relief.
Result:
The appeal is dismissed with no costs awarded.
GAUTAM BOSE, K.K.Mohan, M.K.KRISHNAMURTHY, PRAMOD SHARMA, RAJSHRI BHATNAGAR, S.K.AGNIHOTRI, Sakesh Kumar, SHYAMALA PAPPU
JUDGMENT
This appeal by special leave arises from the order of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in Misc. Petition No.484 of 1987, dated 5-1-1988.
2. Notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was issued acquiring a large extent of 837.50 acres of land for submergence of Barna Dam Irrigation Project in the State of M.P. The Land Acquisition Officer by his award dated 5-9-1969 awarded compensation to the appellant. Thereafter, it would appear that the appellant had received the compensation granted by the Land Acquisition Officer without protest but, according to the appellant, it was under protest. Be it as it may, on the rejection on the reference, the appellant filed a revision before the District Judge in 1982. By order dated 20-6-1982, the District Judge rejected the revision. In 1987, the appellant filed the Writ Petition in the High Court which was dismissed by the High Court on the ground of inordinate delay. It was held that though the Collector had rejected the reference on 2-4-75, the revision was filed in the Tribunal and the Distt. Judge rejected it on 29-6-83. The petitioner who had slept over the matter for more than 5 years, filed the Writ Petition. From the date of the order of the L.A. Collector till date of filing the writ petition more than 10 years have elapsed. On that ground the High Court refused to grant the relief.
3. The State Legislature of M.P. amended Clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 18 and inserted sub-section (3) thus :
"Any order made by the Collector on the application under this section shall be subject to the revision by the High Court as if the collector were the Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Section 115, C.P.C.".
Thus, it could be seen that against the order of the rejection of reference by the Collector on 2-5-75 only jurisdiction that could be exercised as per the amendment is by the High Court under S.115, C.P.C. Thereby, the exercise of the power of District Judge in this behalf is clearly without authority of law or jurisdiction. The Order of the District Judge, therefore, is a nullity.
4. Then we have to see whether the appellant was justified in approaching the High Court after an inordinate delay of more than 10 years from the date of the order of the Collector or at any rate from the date of the order passed by the District Judge. The High Court exercised its jurisdiction under Art.226 but not under S.115, C.P.C. Even if it is to be converted as a revision under Section 115, C.P.C., the order of the High Court is not vitiated by any error of jurisdiction or material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The High Court has rightly refused to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction after an inordinate delay of more than 5 years from the date of the order of the District Judge and more than 10 years from the date of the order of the Land Acquisition Collector. Under these circumstances, we do not think that it is a case warranting interference by this Court under Article 136.
5. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
Appeal dismissed.
For Citation: AIR 1995 SC 2243