1987 JTR(SC) 62
1987 1 AICLR 173 ; 1987 AIR(SC) 692 ; 1987 CriLR 567 ; 1987 1 Crimes(SC) 250 ; 1987 CrLJ 537 ; 1987 1 CurLJ 576 ; 1987 2 GLH 284 ; 1987 1 JT 214 ; 1987 1 RCR(Cri) 372 ; 1987 1 Scale 89 ; 1987 1 SCC 467 ; 1987 SCC(Cri) 181 ; 1987 ShimLC 196 ; 1987 KHC 852
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
A. P. Sen and S. Natarajan, JJ.
Surinder Kumar - Appellant
versus
State (Delhi Administration) -Respondent
Criminal Appeal No. 321 of 1986
Decided on 20.1.1987
IMPORTANT POINT
It cannot be a case of accidental fire where the dying declaration clearly sets out that the accused/husband was in the habit of ill-treating her and that on the morning in question he had abused her and he also poured kerosene over her and set fire to her.
Act
Referred
:CONSTITUTION OF INDIA : Art.136
EVIDENCE ACT : S.32
INDIAN PENAL CODE : S.302
(A) The Indian Penal Code Section 302, read with Article 136 of the Constitution of India and supported by Evidence Act Section 32, governs the adjudication of appeals against convictions for murder where the death of the accused is in question. Section 302 defines the offence of murder and its punishment, Article 136 empowers the Supreme Court to grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, and Section 32 of the Evidence Act validates dying declarations as relevant evidence, permitting their use to convict when corroborated. In this appeal by special leave, the appellant was convicted under Section 302 I.P.C. for killing his wife by pouring kerosene and setting fire to her, with the conviction resting substantially on a dying declaration recorded under Section 161(3) Cr. P.C., while the sentence of life imprisonment was reviewed and the fine component was modified.
(B) Key legal principles include the admissibility and high evidentiary value of dying declarations, the standard of proof in murder trials, the scope of appellate jurisdiction under Article 136, and the principles of proportionality and reasonableness in sentencing for offences punishable under Section 302 I.P.C.
Facts of the case:
The appellant married the deceased and was alleged to have ill-treated her due to insufficient dowry. On the day of the incident, the deceased sustained extensive burn injuries after kerosene was poured over her and set alight. She made a dying declaration identifying the appellant as the perpetrator, which was recorded by the police and corroborated by medical officers and witnesses. The accused was arrested, and the trial and high court confirmed his conviction under Section 302 I.P.C. with a sentence of life imprisonment and a fine.
Findings of Court:
The court found the dying declaration to be truthful and credible, sufficient to convict the appellant of murder. It confirmed the conviction but held that the imposition of a fine was inappropriate in the circumstances, modifying the sentence to life imprisonment alone and ordering a refund if the fine had been paid.
Issues:
Whether the dying declaration was reliable and sufficient for conviction, whether the accused was present and responsible for the injuries, whether the evidence excluded accident or suicide, and whether the sentence of life imprisonment with a fine was proportionate and just.
Ratio Decidendi:
The apex court affirmed that the cumulative evidence, particularly the dying declaration, established the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt under Section 302 I.P.C. It held that while conviction was justified, the additional fine was not necessary, and thus only the life sentence was appropriate.
Result:
The appeal was dismissed with modification: the conviction was upheld, the fine was set aside, and the sentence of life imprisonment was confirmed.
(A) The Indian Penal Code Section 302, read with Article 136 of the Constitution of India and supported by Evidence Act Section 32, governs the adjudication of appeals against convictions for murder where the death of the accused is in question. Section 302 defines the offence of murder and its punishment, Article 136 empowers the Supreme Court to grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, and Section 32 of the Evidence Act validates dying declarations as relevant evidence, permitting their use to convict when corroborated. In this appeal by special leave, the appellant was convicted under Section 302 I.P.C. for killing his wife by pouring kerosene and setting fire to her, with the conviction resting substantially on a dying declaration recorded under Section 161(3) Cr. P.C., while the sentence of life imprisonment was reviewed and the fine component was modified.
(B) Key legal principles include the admissibility and high evidentiary value of dying declarations, the standard of proof in murder trials, the scope of appellate jurisdiction under Article 136, and the principles of proportionality and reasonableness in sentencing for offences punishable under Section 302 I.P.C.
Facts of the case:
The appellant married the deceased and was alleged to have ill-treated her due to insufficient dowry. On the day of the incident, the deceased sustained extensive burn injuries after kerosene was poured over her and set alight. She made a dying declaration identifying the appellant as the perpetrator, which was recorded by the police and corroborated by medical officers and witnesses. The accused was arrested, and the trial and high court confirmed his conviction under Section 302 I.P.C. with a sentence of life imprisonment and a fine.
Findings of Court:
The court found the dying declaration to be truthful and credible, sufficient to convict the appellant of murder. It confirmed the conviction but held that the imposition of a fine was inappropriate in the circumstances, modifying the sentence to life imprisonment alone and ordering a refund if the fine had been paid.
Issues:
Whether the dying declaration was reliable and sufficient for conviction, whether the accused was present and responsible for the injuries, whether the evidence excluded accident or suicide, and whether the sentence of life imprisonment with a fine was proportionate and just.
Ratio Decidendi:
The apex court affirmed that the cumulative evidence, particularly the dying declaration, established the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt under Section 302 I.P.C. It held that while conviction was justified, the additional fine was not necessary, and thus only the life sentence was appropriate.
Result:
The appeal was dismissed with modification: the conviction was upheld, the fine was set aside, and the sentence of life imprisonment was confirmed.
B.P.SINGH, C.V.SUBBA RAO, N.L.Kakkar, RANJIT GHOSAL, S.Madhusudan Rao
JUDGMENT
Natarajan, J. - In this Appeal by Special Leave against the judgment of the High Court of Delhi in Criminal Appeal No. 169 of 1982 the appellant Surinder Kumar challenges his conviction under Section 302 I.P.C. and the sentence of life imprisonment and fine of Rs. 500/- in default of payment R.I. for 3 months, awarded there for. The appellant bas been found guilty of having committed the murder of his wife Chander Kanta by pouring kerosene over her and setting fire to her at about 7.10 A.M. on 7.10.1979, in a one-room apartment in house No. B.5/165, Paschim Vihar in New Delhi occupied by them. The conviction and sentence awarded by the Sessions Judge have been confirmed by the High Court, and hence this Appeal by Special Leave.
2. The appellant who had married Chander Kanta on 26.11.1978 was ill treating her because she had not brought adequate dowry and cash from her parents house. As per Chander Kantas statement the appellant was addicted to drinking and gambling.
3. On the day of occurrence P.W. 3 Sardar Gurbax Singh, the landlord of the house heard the cries of Channer Kanta and rushed out of his room adjoining the tenanted portion. He saw Chander Kanta lying engulfed in flames in the verandah adjoining the leased portion. He rushed to the verandah and along with the appellant who was also there he put out the flames. The appellant took Chander Kanta in a taxi to the Ram Manohar Lohia Hospital (previously known as Willingdon Hospital). Chander Kanta was examined by P.W. 7 Dr. Sharma and admitted in the Hospital. Intimation was sent to the Police Station about the admission of Chander Kanta in the Hospital. At 1.10 AM. P.W. 4 Dr. Surinder Singh certified that Chander Kanta was fit enough to make a statement. P.W 22 Om Prakash S.I. of Police recorded a statement Exhibit P.W. 1/A from Chander Kanta in the presence of P.W. 4 Dr. Surinder Singh, P.W. 16 Dr. J.C. Parida and P.W. 1 Gulam Chand. On the basis of Exhibit P.W. 1/A, a case was registered against the appellant, under Section 301 I.P.C. Chander Kanta died on 25.10.1919 due to septaecemia cased by burn injuries and thereafter the case was altered into one under Section 302 I.P.C.
4. The main evidence in the case is the dying declaration Exhibit P.W. 1/A given by Chander Kanta. The fact of Chander Kanta making the statement has been spoken to by the two doctors PWs. 4 and 16 and by the S.I. of Police P.W. 22. Besides, P.W. 2 Sham Sunder and P.W. 5 Chaman Lal, the brother and father respectively of Chander Kanta have also stated that they went and saw Chander Kanta at the Hospital on 7.10.1919 and she told them that it was the appellant who had poured kerosene over her and set fire to her.
5. The dying declarations of Chander Kanta, oral as well as written have been held to be truthful statements by the Sessions Judge and the High Court and constituting adequate evidence to convict the appellant for the offence of murder.
6. The conviction is, however, challenged by the appellant in this appeal and Shri Ranjit Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant sought to assail the findings of the Sessions Judge and High Court on various grounds. The several contentions advanced before us had been raised before the trial judge as well as the High Court and have been found to be unsustainable. Even so the learned counsel re-iterated those contentions and hence we shall briefly deal with them.
7. It was first submitted that Chander Kanta should have sustained the burns due to an accident or due to attempted suicide. If indeed Chander Kanta had sustained the burns in one of the suggested modes it is incomprehensible she would have accused her husband of having set fire to her after pouring kerosene over her. Moreover she was found to have sustained burn injuries on the face, neck, trunk and left lower and upper limbs. Her clothes were found by the Chemical Examiner to contain kerosene oil. Such extensive injuries and presence of kerosene in the clothes would not have been found if the stove had burst and Chander Kanta had sustained the injuries accidentally. As regards the theory of suicide there is no evidence that there was any proximate cause for her to attempt to end her life on that morning.
8. The learned counsel then argued that the appellant was not at home when Chander Kanta sustained the burns. Such an argument was raised on the basis of P.W. 3s interested statement that when he rushed to the help of Chander Kanta, the appellant came from outside and he also joined him in putting out the fire. The statement of P. W. 3, apart from being at variance with his statement under Section 161 (3) Cr. P.C. cannot carry weight because the appellant could not have really gone out anywhere at that hour and dramatically made his appearance just at the moment his wife was in flames. It was also urged that the appellant would not have put out the flames if he had really set fire to his wife. This argument over looks the fact that after the arrival of P. W. 3 on the scene the appellant could not have remained a passive spectator to the plight of his wife.
9. The dying declaration Exhibit P.W. 1/A was sought to be assailed on various grounds. It was urged that in the M.L.C P.W. 7 had made an entry that it was "Alleged history of being burnt while working in the kitchen". P. W. 7 has stated that this information was given by the person who brought the patient to the hospital viz. the appellant. No doubt he has added that he verified the correctness of the statement from the victim also but we think the Sessions Judge and the High Court were right in refusing to give credence to this part of the statement of P.W. 7. In her state of shock and pain Chander Kanta could not have made any clear statement. Moreover, she would also have been afraid to reveal the truth in the presence of her husband.
10. It was then argued that P.Ws 2 and 5 had met Chander Kanta before she gave the statement Exhibit P.W. 1/A and hence they would have tutored her to give a false statement against the appellant. We see no merit in this contention because P.Ws. 2 and 5 had no motive to falsely implicate the appellant in a case of attempted murder. Even assuming that they had tried to poison the mind of Chander Kanta she would not have yielded to their evil advice and falsely accused her husband of setting fire to her.
11. As regards the actual recording of the Exhibit P.W. 1/A it was contended that P.W. 1 one of the attesters had not known anything about it, as he has deposed that he was not present in the ward when the statement was recorded and secondly the statement itself could not have been recorded on 7.10.1979 because the doctors have stated in their statements under Section 161(3) Cr. P.C. dated 8.10.1979 that the dying declaration was recorded on that day. These contentions have no merit because P.W. 1s attestation is not very material in the light of the attestations made by P.Ws. 4 and 16. As regards the mistake in the date, the carbon copies of the statements contain the word "KAL" (yesterday) and not the word "AAJ" (today) and the correction proves the mistake. Moreover the appellant had been taken into custody on the evening of 7.10.79 itself. He would not have been arrested unless Exhibit P.W. 1/A had been recorded at 1.10 P.M. on 7.10.79 itself.
12. Another criticism that was leveled was that the prosecution has failed to explain why it had failed to have the statement of Chander Kanta recorded by a Judicial Magistrate even though she was alive till 25.10.79. No doubt the prosecution has laid itself open to criticism in this behalf but the lapse can not in any way affect the truth of Chander Kantas statement or the value to be given to it.
13. The recovery of the stove with its lid removed and burnt match sticks from the kitchen of the appellants house clearly goes to show that the kerosene in the stove had been poured over Chander Kanta and then lighted match sticks had been applied to her. We have already stated, that it cannot be a case of accidental fire and likewise there was no reason for Chander Kanta to have attempted to commit suicide. The dying declaration clearly sets out that the appellant was in the habit of ill-treating her and that on the morning in question be had abused her and beat her and on top of everything be had also poured kerosene over her and set fire to her.
14. We are, therefore, fully satisfied that the evidence on record conclusively establishes the guilt of the appellant and that he has been rightly convicted under Section 302 I.P.C. However, in so far as the sentence is concerned, we do not think there was any need to have imposed a sentence of fine of Rs. 500/- ever and above the sentence of life imprisonment. Hence we set aside that part of the sentence and confirm only the sentence of life imprisonment awarded to the appellant. If the fine amount has been paid it will be refunded to the appellant. Except to the limited extent of modification in the sentence the appeal will stand dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
For Citation : 1987 Crl. L.J. 537 = AIR 1987 SC 692 = (1987) 1 SCC 467 = 1987 SCC (Crl.) 181