( 1 ) THE second defendant is the appellant herein. The trial Court dismissed the suit but on appeal it was decreed. Thus this appeal by the second defendant against reversing appellate decree.

( 2 ) THE facts are as follows: the respondents laid the suit for declaration of their title to and possession of 16 guntas of land in Servey No. 37 and 1 acre 23 guntas of land in Survey No. 40 situated in Anantharam Village, Tandur taluk, Ranga Reddy district.

( 3 ) IT is their case that they are the successors of Pedds Sayanna One Ashanna had two sons by name Ellanna and Pedda sayanna. Plaintiffs are the heirs of Pedda sayyanna. Pedda Sayanna had no sons. He had a daughter by name Ellamma. She was married to one Chinna Sayanna ram anna, Chinna Sayanna became illatom, son-in-law to Pedda Sayanna. Chinna sayanna had two sons by name Papaiah and Ananthaiah. Plaintiff No. 3 is that ananthaiah. He died pending suit leaving plaintiff No. l his son, and plaintiff No. 2 his wife, as his successors. Initially the plaint schedule property formed part of survey No. 206. After survey, it was demarcated into Survey Nos. 36,37,38 and 40. They are the Neerati Inam lands. It is their case that it is the joint property of Ellanna and Pedda Sayanna and that therefore they are entitled to half share in the entire Survey No. 206 and that Survey no. 37 and Survey No. 40 are in their possession and enjoyment. While they were continuing in possession and enjoyment thereof, they were wrongfully dispossessed from the lands in the year 1965, thus necessitating them to file the suit for the relief referred to above.

( 4 ) IN this suit, the illatom son-in-law of Ellanna namely Neerati Narasappa is impleaded as first defendant and the appellant is impleaded as the second defendant. The first defendant remained ex parte. Pending suit he died and defendants 3 and 4 were brought on record as his legal representatives. However, they too remained ex parte. The appellant alone contested the suit. It is an admitted case that the property is a Neerati Inam land. It is the case of the appellant that the property exclusively belong to Yellanna, who has been rendering Neerati Inam service and it was granted in his name and it wes a personal grant. He has no sons he had only one daughter. The first defendant has come as Illatom son-in-law. After the demise of Yellanna, succession proceedings were taken out before the revenue authorities, where at the first defendant was recognised to be the successor to Yellanna in the proceedings ex. B-1 dated April 28, 1951. When an application was made to reopen the issue at the instance of the predecessor in interest of the plaintiffs, it was dismissed under Ex. B-5 on March 13, 1953. It was recognised in that proceedings that the plaint schedule properties are Neerati Inam lands to which the 1st defendant is the success of Yellanna. Subsequent thereto, with the collusion of Patwari in the village revenue records the names of Pedda sayyanna, Chinna Sayanna and his successors were collusively brought on record. Therefore action was taken under the records of rights Regulation for the rectification thereof. The Joint Collector, hyderabad, in his proceedings under Ex. B-6 dated April 30, 1963 allowed the application and directed mutation of the Revenue records in the name of first defendant. Those proceedings in Exs. B-1, B-5 and B-6 were allowed to become final and therefore the suit is not maintainable. It is also pleaded that the suit is barred by limitation. After framing appropriate issues and adduction of evidence by both the parties, the trial court found that the plaintiffs failed to prove the genealogy under which they claim to be the successors of Pedda sayanna. . The plaint schedule properties were granted to Ellanna as Neerati Inam lands. The plaintiffs fails to prove that chinna Sayanna had no share and was not enjoying the property jointly with Ellanna. The order of the Tahsildar under Exs. B-1 and B-5 became final. The order of the joint Collector under Ex. B-6 also became final and they operate as res judicata. it is also held that the suit is barred by limitation. It is held that the plaintiffs were never in possession. The entries in the pahani pathriks Fxs. A-1 to A-5, and a-8 to A-11 of 1950 to 1963 were not accepted by the Joint Collector in his proceedings under Px. B-6. It is also found that the suit was abated since the legal representatives, defendants 3 and 4, were brought on record without notice to the appellant and the cause title also was amended in pursuance of an order in a different I. A. other than the I. A. under which application to bring the legal representative on record was ordered. On these findings the trial Court dismissed the suit.

( 5 ) ON appeal the appellate court accepted the genealogy and held that the plaintiffs are the successors of Pedda Sayanna. Though orders" under Exs. B-1, B-5 and B-6 were allowed to become final, they do not operate as res judicata. It agreed with the finding of the trial Court that the civil court has jurisdiction to go into the question in spite of the orders under Ex. B-1 b-5 and B-6. It held th at the plaintiffs have established their title and that they are in possession. It is also held that the suit is within limitation.

( 6 ) UNDER Article 65, schedule 2 of the limitation Act. It also accepted the entries in Exs. A-11 to A-5, A-8 to A-11 and the entries in Khasra Pahanies Exs. A-6 and a-7 and held that the plaintiffs have proved their possession within statutory period. Therefore the suit is not barred by limitation. Accordingly the suit was decreed.

( 7 ) IN this appeal Sri Suryaprakasa Rao, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant, raised the following contentions. 1. The suit is abated. 2. The suit is barred by limitation. 3. The proceedings in Exs. B-1, B-5 and b-6 operate as res judicata. 4. Khasra Phani Exs. B-6 and B-7 are not documents of title and on the other hand, Ex. B-2 the Sethwar issued in the name of first defendant is a document of title and it is presumed to be correct under section 13 of A. P. (Telangana area) Records of Rights Regulation 1358 Fasli.

( 8 ) IN support of theste points Sri Suryaprakasaj rao, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant, contends that the appellant was not given notice after the demise of first defendant before D-2 and D-3 were brought on record and that therefore the suit is abated. He also further contends that the defendants 2 and 3 are not the legal representatives and that they are not entitled to come on record to represent the state of the deceased first defendant and as such the suit also gets abated. He further contends that under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 limitation begins to run only when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff. In this case by passing an order ex. B-1 on April 28, 1951 there was an adverse order passed against the plaintiffs being the successors of Pedda Sayanna and the same was reiterated in Ex. B-5 on March 13, 1953. The mutation was ordered to be effected in the name of the first defendant under B-6 on April 30, 1963. Under these circumstances, adverse to the claim of the plaintiffs the limitation begins to run as early as 1 (951. The suit was filed in 1970 and therefore the suit is clearly barred by limitation.

( 9 ) HE further contends that in Ex. B. 1 it is found that the first defendant was found to be in possession. It was also declared that he is the successor to fllanna. It is also found under B-6 the first defendant continued to be in possession inspite of the entries made in Exs. A-1 to A-5, etc. Therefore the respondents were never in possession of the plaint schedule property. Thus the finding that they are in possession is incorrect. They did not establish their possession by any clinching evidence except the documents which were set at nought in the revenue proceedings. Under these circumstances, he contends that the plaintiffs did not prove possible within the statutory period.

( 10 ) HE also further contended that Pahani pathriks Exs. A-6 and A-7 relied on by the respondents are only revenue Records which have no statutory base. The Setwhar ex. B-2 issued for the first defendant is a statutory document which came into existence by the operation of the provisions of A. P. Record of Rights Regulations, 1358 fasli and they prevail over the Pahani pathriks Ex. A-6 and A-7. He also further contended that the orders in Exs. B-1, B-5 and B-6 operate as res judicata and the civil Court cannot reopen the issue in declaring the title of the plaintiffs. In support of this contentions he relied upon the decision in Wair Service Society v. K. C, Alexander, (1969)1 S. C. J. 455- (1968)3 s. C. R. 163 A. I. R. 1968 S. C. 1165. Subrahmaniam Chettiar and Sons v. Joint commercial Tax Officer, I. L. R. (1987)1 mad. 10= (1966)2 M. L. 1502- 79 L. W. 592- a. I R. 1967 Mad. 72 ; Shyam Behari Lal v. Lalla Jaqeshwara Prasad, A. I. R. 1979 S. C. 590; Gopal Reddy v. V. Venkayya, (1967)2 an. W. R. 233; Promode Ranjam v. Mtirapada mandal. A. I. R. 1980 Cal. 181 and Hatti v. Sunder Sungh, (1971) 2 S. C. J. 1452 - (1971)2 s. C. R. 163-A. I. R. 1971 S. C. 2320.

( 11 ) ON the other hand Sri Vilas v. A. Afzulpurker learned Counsel for the respondents contends that the appellate coutt found as a fact on the consideration of the evidence on record that the respondents are in possession and it is a finding of fact based on appreciation of evidence and It does not warrant interferene. The appellate Court also fouund as a fact relying upon the genealogy filed by the respondents that they are the successors of Pedda Sayanna. Admittedly, Ellanna and Pedda Sayanna are brothers. Thier case is that it is a Neerati Inam land iotntly enjoyed by Ellanna and Pedda savanna and that they were in possession and enjoyment of Survey Nos. 37 and, 40, the Plaint schedule property. Their title is based upon their succession to pedda savanna and also established from Pahani pathrika Exs. A-5 and A-7. Their possesion also Has been proved from the revenue records. Exs. A-1 to A-5 and A-8 to A-11 etc, and revenue receipts Exs. A-11 and a-12. It is also further contended that under Fx. A-15 also a sworn statement riven before the Tahsildar in which D-l has categorically stated that he did not sell the property to the appellant and that the appellant came into possession only as a mortgagee and he has no right to the possession of the lands. He further stated that the orders in Exs. B-1, B-5 and B-6 do not operate as res judicata as the Revenue authorities have no jurisdiction or competency to, go into the question ot title or possession and they have no conclusive jurisdiction to decide the matter which operates as res judicata has no legal basis.

( 12 ) UPON these respective contentions the questions that arise for consideration is. 1. Whether the suit is barred by limitation. 2. Whether the orders in Exs. B-1 and b-2 operate as res judicata.

( 13 ) WITH regard to the first point, it can straight away be said that the plaintiffs laid the suit for declaration of title and for possession as successors tp Pedda sayanna. Therefore under, Article 65 of schedule 2 of the Limitation Act, 1963 it. is for them to establish that they have been in possession within 12 years from the date of the suit and that limitation begins to run only when the possession of the defendants becomes adverse to the plaintiffs. Though the respondents have stated that they were dispossessed from the plaint schedule property in the year 1965, specifically it is not pleaded in the written statement of the appellant as second defendant as to at what point of time they were dispossessed. The gravemen of the contention in the written statement of the appellant is that in the orders exs. B-1, B-5 and B-6 the succession of the fiest defendant as illatom son-in-law of Ellanna was accepted and the Revenue courts directed deleting the name of the successor in interest of the respondents under Ex. B-6 and they were allowed to become final. The suit ought to be filed to declare that these orders are to binding within the period prescribed either within 90 days as prescribed in the Revenue Act or within one year from the date of the order governed by under Article 100 schedule 2 of the Limitation Act. No express plea regarding possession was taken, but however, the respondents are not relieved of establishing that their claim is within limitation. It is the case of Sri suryaprakash Rao that upon the basis of the evidence on record and the finding of the lower appellate Court, the claim of the successor in interest of the appellant becomes adverse when an order Ex. B-1 was made on April 28, 1951 and reiterated in Ex. B-5 on March 13, 1983 and express deletion of the names under Ex. B-6 on april 30, 1963. Therefore the suit ought to have been filed within 12 years from the date of the order under Fx. B-1. I am unable to agree with the learned Counsel for the appellant. It is now well settled that the proceedings before the Revenue authorities is not a judicial proceeding and title to or right to any immoveable property are not determined by those proceedings. They are more only in the nature of fiscal enquiry instituted in the interests of the State for the purpose of ascertaining which of several claimants for the occupation of immoveable property may be put in occupation of it with greater confidence for the recovery of the revenue being made feasible. Even the certified copies of revenue extracts are not conclusive of title or right to the land. But such an entry is only prima facie evidence of possession and a right to hold the land, but it does not confer any title. Therefore it is for the parties who claim title to the property to establish aliundi by adducing evidence of the nature and source of title and the character of right acquired and other pieces of evidence bearing on the subject. That evidence has to be considered by the civil Court. The revenue courts have no Jurisdiction to the conclusively decide the question of title. Both the courts have concurrently found as a fact that the suit for declaration of title and possession is maintainable and I find that their approach is perfectly legal and valid. As stated earlier, the documents filed by either party are only in proof of possession. The appellate Court has also found as a fact that the respondents-plaintiffs are successors of Pedda sayanna. It is a finding of fact based on appreciation of evidence and I am bound by the same. Therefore, the question is whether they have established their title to the plaint schedule property and also possession of the same. In view of the fact that they are the successors of Pedda sayanna and that it is their case that the property was being enjoyed jointly by Ellanna and Pedda Sayanna though the grant was made initially under Ex. B-4 for a period of three years in the name of ellanna, the evidence on record, as found by the lower Appellate court, would show that the property was being jointly enjoyed by Ellanna and Pedda Sayanna. If that circumstances is established the source of their right as title has been established by the respondents plaintiffs. In Nair sendee Society v. K. C. Alexander, (1969)1 s. C. J. 455. A. I. R. 1968 S. C. 1165 a decision relied on by the learned Counsel for the appellant himself, it is held by their lordships of the Supreme Court. "a person in possession of land in assumed character of owner and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership has a perfectly good title against all the world but the rightful owner. And if the rightful owner does not come forward and assert his title by the proceeds of law within the period prescribed by the provisions of the statute of limitation applicable to the case, his right is for ever extinguished and the possessory owner acquires an absolute title. That possession may prima facie raise a presumption of title no one can deny but this presumption can hardly arise when the facts are known. "possession of land is sufficient evidence of right as against a person who has no title whatever and who is a trespasser. This settled decision helps the respondents plaintiffs when they assert that they have got title by joint enjoyment by their predecessors in title and that they have been continuing in possession and enjoyment thereafter as evidenced by the documentary evidence adduced in this behalf.

( 14 ) THE only other question is whether the respondents are in possession within the statutory period as enjoined under article 65 schedule 2 of the Limitation act. It is their specific case that they were indispossessed in the year 1965. That was a finding given by the Appellant court. As it is a finding of fact, 1 am bound thereby. If that be so the suit is filed within limitation. The decisions relied on by the counsel on either side on possessory title need not be gone into in the view I have expressed above. Acordingly I hold that the suit is within limiitation.

( 15 ) THE next question that arises for consideration is whether the orders in exs. B-1, B-5 and B-6 operate as res Judi cata. In support of this contention Sri suryaprakasa Rao, learned Counsel for appellant, relied upon j Explanation VIII to section 11, C. P. C. which reads thus:"an issue heard and finally decided by a court of limited jurisdiction, competent to decide such issue, shall operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit, notwithstanding that such court of limited jurisdiction was not competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised. "therefore the question is whether the proceedings Exs. B-1, B-5 and B-6 operate as res judicata.-

( 16 ) BEFORE invocation of Explanation VIII, it is necessary to see whether the condition mentioned in the main part- of section 11 has been complied with or not. Section 11 postulates that no court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and subsequentally in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such court. Explanation VIII only postulates a court of a limited jurisdiction. It is now well settled that courts of limited jurisdiction are given power to decide the question that ware entrusted to them for decision. It is also well settled that decisions of courts of limited jurisdiction are given power to decide the question that were entrusted to them for decision. It is also well settled that decisions of courts of limited jurisdiction are not final but conclusive to the extent of these Tribunals under estate are concerned. The civil court has jurisdiction to go into the questions of decision given by courts of limited jurisdiction. However orders of the courts of limited jurisdiction like Revenue Courts, rent Contral Tribunals or land acquisition courts etc. , are only conclusive as far as those proceedings are concerned. The revenue courts have no power or jurisdiction to decide the title conclusively. Subject to the conditions mentioned under the statute, they have got limited jurisdiction conferred thereunder. In this case, ex. B-1 order relates to the succession of first defendant for rendering Neerati service in the village. That question is not directly in issue in the present suit. Therefore the succession granted under ex. B-1 does not operate as res judicata. Similarly, as stated earlier the mutation proceedings are only for the purpose for fiscal purposes and they are made only to enable the collection of land revenue to the Government. The mutation proceedings also are not conclusive regarding title, vide Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. Kalyani, (1973)3 S. C. R. 1- (1973)1 S. C. C. 273- A. I. R. 1973 S. C. 408. Therefore even the order in Ex. B-6 also does not operate as res judicata. Therefore I hold that the Revenue courts have no jurisdiction to grant declaration of title and the finding recorded in Exs. B-1 and B.-6 do not operate as res Judicata. ,

( 17 ) THE nest question for consideration is whether the suit is abated as contended for Order 22, rule 4, C. P. C. postulates that where one of two or more defendants dies and the right to sue does not survive against the surviving defendant or defendants alone or a sole defendant or sole surviving defendant dies and the right to sue survives, the court on an application made in that behalf, shall cause the legal representative of the deceased defendant to be made a party and shall proceed with the suit. Order 22, rule 4 (2) postulates that any person so made a party may make any defence appropriate to his character as legal representative of the deceased defendant. Section 2 (11) defines a legal representative thus: " Legal, representative" means a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person, and includes any person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased and where a party sues or is sued in a representative character the person on whom the estate devolves on the death of the part so suing or sued. " the object of order under Order 22, rule 4 read with section 2 (11) is that on the demise of the sole or one of the defendants when right to sue does not survive to the surviving defendants a person who in law represents the estate of the deceased person and includes any person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased may be brought on record in a representative character to represent the estate of the deceased defendant. An order passed Order 22, rule 4 is only an order to enable the proceedings to be successfully prosecuted when it being abated by operation of limitation provided under Article 120, schedule 2 of the Limitation act. Therefore, though the defendants 2 and 3 have been brought on record. They represent only the estate of the deceased. No doubt, as seen from the judgment of the lower court, there is no notice given to the appellant before they were brought on record, but however, that does not take away the power of the court to bring the legal representatives on record so long as the application to bring them on record was filed within the period of limitation. Admittedly, the first defendant dies on 8. 8. 1976 and the application being i. A. No. 1367 of 1976 was filed on November 8, 1976 that is within 90 days therefrom and the legal representatives were rightly brought on record within limitation. As a result, the suit did not get abated.

( 18 ) THE further question that is raised in this case is whether the Khasra Pahanies exs. A-6 and A-7 and the sethwar Ex. B-2 are documents of title. In regard to these contentions, both the counsel have relied upon decisions of this court in Valianki gopal Reddy and others v. Chenchu venkayya, (1967)2 An. W. R. 233 by Jaganmohan reddy, J. as he then was and in shaik Mahboob alias Pashamian v. Jogul sailoo, (1976)1 A. P. L. J. (Sh. N.) 21. There appeared to be divergence of language. But I need not go into the question in the view I have taken that the documents of title but only they prove the possession and enjoyment. Independent of those documents and consideration of evidence the appellate court recorded a finding of fact that the respondents are in possession of the plaint schedule properties. In this view it is not necessary for me to go into that question. In view of this fact i hold that finding of the appellate Court are perfectly legal and valid and do not warrant interference in the second appeal.

( 19 ) SRI Suryaprakasa Rao, the learned counsel for the appellant further contended that when an appeal was filed in this court and inspite of the orders of stay, the respondents levied execution and took delivery of possession of the property, not only the lands covered by Survey Nos. 37. and 40 for which the decree was granted, but also part of Survey Nos. 36 and 38, and that they are in illegal possession though this court in C. M. P. No. 719 of 1982 called for a report from the lower court on various points and the lower court submitted a report, the report clearly shows that the finding of the lower court is not conclusive on that aspect and in the guide of the execution they cannot be deprived of the property covered by survey Nos. 36 and 31, The lower court in the report submitted has held that so long as the report of the surveyor is as received, it has to be construed relying upon the evidence of the Patwari, that only the property covered by Survey Nos. 37 and 40 alone was delivered in execution. But, in view of the grievance expressed by the appellant, it must be held that under the guide of execution of the decree for taking delivery of possession of the lands covered by Survey Nos. 37 and 40, the respondents are not entitled to take possession of any lands other than those covered by Survey Nos. 37 and 40. Therefore the trial Court is directed to hold further enquiry into this matter either by appointing a surveyor as a commissioner or an Advocate as a Commissioner, to make local inspection and to submit a report. After giving an opportunity to these parties, the lower court is directed to enquire into the matter and give a finding thereon whether in the execution of the decree, lands other than those covered in Survey Nos. 37 and 40 were taken possession of. If so, the appellant shall be restituted to the extent of lands not covered under the decree. Accordingly a direction is given. Accordingly the second appeal is dismissed with costs. Second Appeal dismissed.