1997 JTR(SC) 678
1997 30 AllLR 332 ; 1997 2 CLT(SC) 388 ; 1997 2 CTC 330 ; 1997 2 ICC 726 ; 1997 5 JT 100 ; 1997 1 KLT 829 ; 1997 2 MLJ 135 ; 1997 2 OLR 302 ; 1997 3 Scale 745 ; 1997 6 SCC 78 ; 1997 3 SCR 799 ; 1997 2 UJ 32 ; 1997 KHC 154 ; 1997 4 Supreme 651
1997(4) Supreme 651
Supreme Court of India
(From Kerala High Court)
K. Ramaswamy and D.P. Wadhwa, JJ.
The Sree Narayana Dharmasangam Trust -Appellant
versus
Swami Prakasananda & Ors. -Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 3013 of 1997
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 12203 of 1996)
Decided on 9-4-1997
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : P.S. Poti, Sr. Advocate, E.M.S. Anam, Fazlin Anam, Advocates.
For the Respondents : A.S. Nambiar, C.S. Ananthalingam, Sr. Advocates, (S. Balakrishnan, S. Prasad) Advocates for Mrs. S. Revathy, Advocate.
Important Point
Once the Supreme Court has passed an order though dismissing SLP in limine, order passed by High Court stands merged with order passed by Supreme Court & High Court is devoid of jurisdiction to review the order.
Act Referred :CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE : S.11, O.47 R.1
(A) The Civil Procedure Code, Order 47, Rule 1 governs the jurisdiction and procedural conduct of appeals by special leave to the Supreme Court. The instant appeal, invoked by special leave under Order 47, Rule 1, challenges the Kerala High Courts judgment dismissing the Special Leave Petition. The dismissal of the SLP in limine, as confirmed by this Court, operates as a final order between the parties, resulting in the merger of the High Courts order with the Supreme Courts order. Consequently, the High Court is divested of any power to review its own order under the Code or under the Trusts scheme framed under Order 47, Rule 1, as such review would undermine judicial discipline and operate as a res judicata as far as the parties are concerned.
(B) An appeal by special leave to the Supreme Court lies under Order 47, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code. The dismissal of a Special Leave Petition in limine without assigning reasons operates as a final order and does not attract res judicata in the nature of Article 226 proceedings, but it bars the High Court from reviewing its own order once confirmed by this Court. The principles of judicial discipline and finality prevent a Tribunal or High Court from exercising review power after an order has been confirmed by this Court.
Facts of the case:
A dispute arose regarding the election to the Committee of the Sree Narayana Dharmasangam Trust, which is governed by a scheme framed by the High Court in 1959. Following the expiry of the term of the elected body, elections were held in July 1994, which were challenged. An ad-interim injunction was granted by the subordinate court, and subsequent appeals and revisions were decided by the High Court and this Court, culminating in a dismissal of the SLP by this Court, directing the case to be disposed of expeditiously.
Findings of Court:
This Court found no merit in the appeal and held that once an SLP is dismissed in limine, the order passed by the High Court stands merged and becomes final, leaving the High Court without jurisdiction to review the order even when communicated of the dismissal. The Court reiterated that review powers cannot be exercised after confirmation, and the trial Court could not be faulted for non-disposal within the stipulated period due to the pendency of records in this Court.
Issues:
Whether an order of the High Court is subject to review after the dismissal of a Special Leave Petition by this Court and the invocation of Order 47, Rule 1; whether the High Court retains jurisdiction to review its own order once this Court has confirmed the impugned order.
Ratio Decidendi:
Under Order 47, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code, the dismissal of a Special Leave Petition in limine operates as a final order, causing the merger of the High Courts order with the Supreme Courts order. Consequently, the High Court is divested of jurisdiction to review its own order, and any subsequent review would violate principles of finality and judicial discipline.
Result:
The appeal is dismissed with no costs awarded.
(A) The Civil Procedure Code, Order 47, Rule 1 governs the jurisdiction and procedural conduct of appeals by special leave to the Supreme Court. The instant appeal, invoked by special leave under Order 47, Rule 1, challenges the Kerala High Courts judgment dismissing the Special Leave Petition. The dismissal of the SLP in limine, as confirmed by this Court, operates as a final order between the parties, resulting in the merger of the High Courts order with the Supreme Courts order. Consequently, the High Court is divested of any power to review its own order under the Code or under the Trusts scheme framed under Order 47, Rule 1, as such review would undermine judicial discipline and operate as a res judicata as far as the parties are concerned.
(B) An appeal by special leave to the Supreme Court lies under Order 47, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code. The dismissal of a Special Leave Petition in limine without assigning reasons operates as a final order and does not attract res judicata in the nature of Article 226 proceedings, but it bars the High Court from reviewing its own order once confirmed by this Court. The principles of judicial discipline and finality prevent a Tribunal or High Court from exercising review power after an order has been confirmed by this Court.
Facts of the case:
A dispute arose regarding the election to the Committee of the Sree Narayana Dharmasangam Trust, which is governed by a scheme framed by the High Court in 1959. Following the expiry of the term of the elected body, elections were held in July 1994, which were challenged. An ad-interim injunction was granted by the subordinate court, and subsequent appeals and revisions were decided by the High Court and this Court, culminating in a dismissal of the SLP by this Court, directing the case to be disposed of expeditiously.
Findings of Court:
This Court found no merit in the appeal and held that once an SLP is dismissed in limine, the order passed by the High Court stands merged and becomes final, leaving the High Court without jurisdiction to review the order even when communicated of the dismissal. The Court reiterated that review powers cannot be exercised after confirmation, and the trial Court could not be faulted for non-disposal within the stipulated period due to the pendency of records in this Court.
Issues:
Whether an order of the High Court is subject to review after the dismissal of a Special Leave Petition by this Court and the invocation of Order 47, Rule 1; whether the High Court retains jurisdiction to review its own order once this Court has confirmed the impugned order.
Ratio Decidendi:
Under Order 47, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code, the dismissal of a Special Leave Petition in limine operates as a final order, causing the merger of the High Courts order with the Supreme Courts order. Consequently, the High Court is divested of jurisdiction to review its own order, and any subsequent review would violate principles of finality and judicial discipline.
Result:
The appeal is dismissed with no costs awarded.
Order
Leave granted. This appeal, by special leave, arises from the judgment of the Kerala High Court, made on January 16, 1996 in R.P. No. 204/95 in C.R.P. No. 2724/94.
2. The dispute has arisen with regard to the election to the Committee of Sree Narayana Dharmasangam Trust. The Trust is governed by the scheme framed by the High Court in A.S. No. 14/56, dated March 26, 1959. Since the term of the elected body was to expire on 10.8.94, the Trust Board on 4.7.94 decided to conduct election on 26.7.94. Disputes had arisen as to the validity of the elections held on 26.7.94 and the suit came to be filed. Ad-interim injunction was granted by the learned Sub-ordinate Judge, Attingal in O.S. No. 247/94 on 22.11.94. Against the interlocutory order passed by the appellate authority in C.M.A. No. 167/94, dated December 2, 1994 C.R.P. No. 2727/94 came to be filed. The High Court by judgment dated June 19, 1995 allowed the revision, set aside the order of the appellate authority and gave certain directions. Calling that matter in question S.L.P. (C) No. 13667/95 came to be filed in this Court. This Court on June 29, 1995 passed the following order:
"We do not find any ground warranting interference since it is an individual case and that too by an interim order. The S.L.P. is dismissed. However, the trial Court is directed to dispose of the suit a s expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of six months from the date of receipt of this order."
3. Thereafter, an application came to be filed to review the order passed by the High Court in the revision, which had been dismissed by the High Court holding that the order passed by the High Court stood merged with the order of this Court. As a consequence, the High Court cannot review the order. Thus this appeal, by special leave.
4. Shri P.S. Poti, learned senior counsel for the appellant contends that this Court did not decide the matter on merits. When the patent error is apparent on the face of the record, it is always reviewable by the High Court and, therefore, the order dismissing the S.L.P. does not operate as a final order. Therefore, the High Court has the power to review its order. We find no merit in the contention. In State of Maharashtra v. Prabhakar Bhimaji Ingle1, this Court has considered the similar controversy. The facts therein were that the Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal passed an order in O.A. No. 1169/93 against which S.L.P. was filed in this Court. It was dismissed by this Court on August 28, 1993. Pending the S.L.P., a review petition was filed in the Tribunal. The Tribunal reviewed its order. When that order came to be challenged, this Court held thus:
"4. But in this case, when the self-same main order was confirmed by this Court, the question arises whether the Tribunal has had power under Order 47, Rule 1 CPC or any other appropriate provision under the Tribunals Act to review the orders passed by it and confirmed by this Court by refusing to grant leave. We find that the exercise of the review power is deleterious to the judicial discipline. Once this court has confirmed the order passed by the Tribunal, that becomes final. Therefore, the Tribunal cannot have any power to review the previous order which stands merged with the order passed by this Court.
5. It is next contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that though the Tribunal was communicated with the order of this Court dated 25.8.1995, it has thereafter passed the order, it would mean that though it had the knowledge of dismissal of the order passed by this Court, the Tribunal has exercised the power of review and that, therefore, it cannot be said to be illegal. We are wholly unable to appreciate the contention of the learned counsel. We could appreciate that if the Tribunal had no knowledge of dismissal of the SLP it might, in certain circumstances, review its earlier order, e.g., if it was found that the order was vitiated by any manifest error of law apparent on the face of the record. But having received the communication that this Court has already upheld its order, the Tribunal s exercise of power can be said to be audacious and without any judicial discipline. Under those circumstances, we do not think that the Tribunal is justified in reviewing its own order when this Court had confirmed the order passed earlier."
5. Therefore, once this Court has passed an order, the order passed by the High Court stands merged with the order passed by this Court. Thereafter, the High Court/Tribunal is devoid of the jurisdiction to review the order. This question also was reiterated in Yogendra Narayan Choudhary v. Union of India2, thus :
"It is settled law that even the dismissal of special leave petition in limine without assigning reasons does not operate as res judicata. Under these circumstances, we are of the view that the view of the latter Bench of the CAT, Calcutta and of the Cuttack Bench are clearly consistent with the above reasoning. Therefore, we do not find that there are fit cases warranting interferences."
6. Thus, it is settled law that even the dismissal of special leave petition in limine operates as a final order between the parties and any order passed by the High Court Tribunal subsequently operates as a res judicata as far as the parties thereto are concerned. It is true that in Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. v. State of Bihar3, this Court had pointed out that when the writ petition was dismissed by this Court in limine, the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 is not precluded. The dismissal of the writ petition under Article 32 does not operate as res judicata. That principle is entirely different from the review of an order under Order 47 Rule 1. Under these circumstances, we are of the view that the High Court is well justified in refusing to review the order passed in the revision. However, since the records have been called by the High Court and the matter is pending, the trial Court could not dispose of the matter within the time limit, specified earlier, by this Court. Therefore, we cannot find fault with the trial Court for non-disposal of the matter. However, the civil court is directed to dispose of the suit as indicated earlier within six months from now.
7. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
Appeal dismissed.
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Parallel Citations of other Journals :
Sree Narayana Dharmasangam Trust v. Swami Prakasnanda & Ors., 1997(4) Supreme 651 : JT 1997(5) SC 100
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